9
3

ANTIOCH *the* REVIEW

FALL '59

John Dewey in Perspective

Introduction
GEORGE R. GEIGER

Individuality, Individualism, and John Dewey
HORACE M. KALLEN

History as Experiment
SIDNEY RATNER

Experiment and Necessity in Dewey's Philosophy
MORTON WHITE

Frontiers for an Experimentalist Philosophy of Education
FRANCIS T. VILLEMAIN
NATHANIEL L. CHAMPLIN

ARTERLY PUBLISHED BY THE ANTIOCH PRESS

.75

LIBRARY
EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
YPSILANTI

HANDBOOK OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS

40th edition, 1959
cloth, $10.00

Fortieth anniversary edition of the traditional complete reference on private schools. This book includes both primary and secondary schools, special schools, boarding and day schools in all parts of the United States, Canada and around the world. All materials have been revised, with many new schools added, and new sections on Canadian schools and guidance clinics are included. As usual, a new and provocative introduction contains articles by well-known figures in private education.

GUIDE TO JUNIOR COLLEGES AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES

3rd edition, 1959
cloth, $5.00

Companion volume to the HANDBOOK, this guide provides current information on two-year liberal arts programs and a variety of vocational and specialized programs. The only complete guide to post-secondary education, it is a vital reference volume for advisers, educators and parents. Featured sections include:

Statistics and descriptive text
Curricula finding lists
Junior colleges with secondary departments
Associations membership lists
Index, including senior colleges and universities

Order both books from PORTER SARGENT PUBLISHERS, 11 Beacon St., Boston, Massachusetts, publishers of THE DIRECTORY FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN and THE GUIDE TO SUMMER CAMPS AND SUMMER SCHOOLS.

ANTIOCH *the* REVIEW

FALL '59 VOLUME XIX NO. 3

John Dewey in Perspective 293
introduction by GEORGE R. GEIGER

Individuality, Individualism, and John Dewey 299
article by HORACE M. KALLEN

History as Experiment 315
article by SIDNEY RATNER

Sonnet 328
poem by PATRICIA LOW

Experiment and Necessity in Dewey's Philosophy 329
article by MORTON WHITE

Northborn 344
poem by MEMORY McGONIGAL

Frontiers for an Experimentalist Philosophy of Education 345
article by FRANCIS T. VILLEMAIN
and NATHANIEL L. CHAMPLIN

For Johnny Pole on the Forgotten Beach 360
poem by ANNE SEXTON

King Domino 362
story by WILLIAM DALE SMITH

The Turtle 378
poem by ELEANOR KEATS

The Embattled NAACP 379
article by JAMES RORTY

Confession of Witchcraft 390
story by VK

God of the Hearth 397
poem by HOPE STODDARD

Plea 398
poem by VIRGINIA KOBLER

Family Planning in Rural India 399
article by S. CHANDRASEKHAR

Small Sea 411
poem by CHARLES FARBER

Setting the Record Straight 412
review by GLENN NEGLEY

The Great Debate, Continued 416
review by FRED CRANE

Poets of the Sixties 421
review by JUDSON JEROME

THE ANTIOCH PRESS
introduces a new book
by
Horace M. Kallen
A STUDY OF
LIBERTY
A discourse on the nature and role of liberty as experience, idea, and ideal.
Publication Date — October 15
$3.00
THE ANTIOCH PRESS • YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO

Editor's Shop Talk

The traveller across America this summer found himself involved, not necessarily voluntarily, in many celebrations—anniversary, centennial, or better. In Colorado, for instance, he would have found that he had "rushed to the Rockies" to help celebrate one hundred years of statehood. In Indiana the "Lincoln Year" reminded him that it was Lincoln's hundred and fiftieth birthday. And from the Whaling Museums of Massachusetts to the Frontier Days of Oregon, great and small celebrations honored great and small events and great and small forefathers.

Why this national preoccupation with the past? Why these local orgies of oratory and whisker-growing? Social psychologists may interpret it as a search for roots; moralists as a rededication to ideals; historians as a long-overdue rise in the popularity of their work; politicians as a tribute to past glories and future promises; economists as a means of distributing the wealth of tourists.

These thoughts are obviously prompted by the fact that this is the second issue of the *Review* this year to celebrate a centennial—first Darwin, now Dewey. And we don't think any of the above interpretations adequately explain our motives. Honor? Yes; we think these men are worthy of admiration. Rededication? Perhaps; we leave that up to the individual reader. Economic gain? Hardly; we would do better selling souvenirs.

Other marks the traveller sees on the countryside this year are those made by Mission 66, also connected

ANTIOCH *the* REVIEW

EDITORIAL BOARD

PAUL H. ROHMANN,
Managing Editor
JUDSON JEROME, *Poetry Editor*
NOLAN MILLER,
Book Review Editor
IRWIN ABRAMS
VICTOR F. AYOUB
PAUL BIXLER*
VALDEMAR CARLSON
GEORGE R. GEIGER
ALBERT B. STEWART
ROGER L. WILLIAMS
* *on leave*

Published quarterly by
THE ANTIOCH PRESS
at Yellow Springs, Ohio

Copyright 1959 by The Antioch Press. Contributions to *The Antioch Review* may not be reprinted in whole or in part without the permission of the Editor.

Subscription: $3.00 the year; Pan-American, $3.50; Foreign $4.00 Single copies, 75 cents. U.S. distributor: B. DeBoer, 102 Beverly Road, Bloomfield, N.J. Published at 212 Xenia Ave., Yellow Springs, Ohio. Second class mail privileges authorized at Yellow Springs, O.

The Antioch Review is not an official publication of Antioch College and the views expressed in its columns are not necessarily those of the College. The Editors assume no responsibility for the views expressed by contributors.

Indexed in the
International Index to Periodicals

with an anniversary, the fiftieth of the National Park Service, in 1966. Mission 66 is building roads, establishing visitor centers, enlarging facilities generally in the national parks so that they will be fully prepared to meet the demands made on them *after* their fiftieth anniversary. Maybe our attitude toward centennials is more like that of Mission 66.

We don't deal in trees and mountains and lakes and canyons. We deal in ideas. But ideas need refurbishing as well as parks. They are as subject to erosion as mountains, and a philosophical upheaval can divert a stream of thought as effectively as an earthquake can change the Madison River. An anniversary is a good time to re-survey areas of thought as well as areas of land—Grand Canyons or Grand Designs—clear out the underbrush, build bridges, examine them for signs of wear and tear, obsolescence or strength to serve us in the future. Viewed in this way, and not as quaint remnants of the past wearing whiskers, more ideas should have centennials.

* * *

The editor responsible for this special issue of the *Review*, George R. Geiger, studied under John Dewey at Columbia and, as a leading exponent of Dewey's philosophy, has been somewhat of a traveller across America himself these past months, participating in numerous symposia and lecture series celebrating this centennial. This issue, "John Dewey in Perspective," is not to be confused with Dr. Geiger's book, *John Dewey in Perspective*, a major exposition of Dewey's thought recently published by Oxford and reviewed on page 412. George R. Geiger is Professor of Philosophy at Antioch College and, to our way of thinking, not the least of his accomplishments is the fact that he was a founding member of the *Review's* Board of Editors and has served on it continuously ever since.

* * *

"Conformity," once a dirty word in advanced circles, is rapidly becoming a tired word in all circles. We have published little on this much-debated topic, largely because it was so much and so shrilly debated that there seemed little new to say. We have in hand now, however, two articles that do have something new to say and perhaps can help put the problem, after all the pointing-with-alarm, into some sort of understandable perspective. They will be published in our Winter issue.

The first, by Victor F. Ayoub of our board, interprets the problem of conformity as essentially a problem of values. "Conformity to *what?*" is, he believes, the important question. In a pluralistic society, that is a knotty question, and in the second article Robert G. Angell, University of Michigan sociologist, reports on research seeking to define the moral norms to which Americans subscribe and deviation from which provides the crux of the conformity question.

Also scheduled for the Winter issue is an article by Heinz Eulau, "Neither Ideology Nor Utopia: The New Deal in Retrospect"; an article on Negro housing in the North by Chester L. Hunt; stories by two familiar *Review* contributors, Ruth Kronman and Nolan Miller; and several other pieces we're excited about but which are not yet far enough along to announce.

John Dewey in Perspective

Introduction

By GEORGE R. GEIGER

■ Although October 20, 1959 marks the anniversary of John Dewey's birth, we must remember that he lived until June 1, 1952. This is mentioned, not to celebrate the longevity of philosophers, but rather to note that his life spanned almost a century of revolutionary changes in science, politics, and technology. (It is interesting to observe that Darwin's *Origin of Species* appeared within five weeks of Dewey's birth, and that 1859 was also the year in which John Stuart Mill published his essay *On Liberty*.) Dewey thus had a long view of the rise of new knowledge and of its collision with the mores of a pre-evolutionary and pre-technological culture: he himself enjoyed a kind of natural or built-in perspective which helped to locate his general position in philosophy.

Whether we can look upon that position from a valid perspective (as the present issue of the *Review* suggests) is dubious. It is not simply that a few papers, or a book, or even a series of books would be inadequate to provide an overall vision; more to the point is that the man in perspective died just a little more than seven years ago, and lived and thought actively almost to the very end. We may not yet know how to judge him. For example, Dewey's reputation, both in technical philosophy and popular education—as every literate person knows, also some not so literate—has been on a steady decline over the last few decades, much depressed since the high point of, say, the early 1930's. There is some slight evidence that he is at the moment being treated with a little more respect, perhaps only as a result of his centennial, but also, in part, as an inevitable reaction from some of the vulgar and almost hysterical misperceptions of what he was about, misperceptions which have travelled as far as the White House. Predicting the nature of Dewey's reputation at the time of his second centennial in 2059 would be an interesting exercise in the history of ideas. So, it may be premature and a little

pretentious at this time to construct a true perspective, and the present group of articles are not, and were not intended to be, a peremptory judgment or even a resumé of Dewey's thought.

In one sense, of course, no such resumé is needed, since everybody—at least so it would appear—knows what Dewey stands for. Vulgarization and stereotyping have just about taken over, and the term "progressive" in education and "pragmatic" in philosophy have by now acquired bizarre accretions of meaning it seems almost impossible to remove. (Incidentally, Sidney Hook's article in the last issue of the *Review* is a persuasive attempt to remove some of these accretions.) There is nothing unique or surprising about this. The product of every original and provocative thinker is inevitably going to be simplified, oversimplified, and ultimately distorted; and it is a nice question how the responsibility for the distortion should be allocated. If contemporary Marxism as professed, say, in the Soviet Union is not what "Marx really meant"; if Freud is unfairly represented by certain extravagant misapplications of his ideas; if notions of the contributions of Darwin, Einstein, or even Thomas Aquinas are more prevalent than accurate, who is to blame? Emerson warned, "Beware when the great God lets loose a thinker on this planet," and one reason for his warning would seem to be that the ideas of the thinker are vigorous and challenging enough to be appropriated, one way or the other, by many men. If this must mean misappropriation, with the ideas being tied to interpretations the thinker would surely have repudiated, this is still no more than testimony to the influence and magic of his presence. Thus, "Deweyism" has become an American stereotype. Much of what passes under that title has little to do with the philosophy of a man called John Dewey, yet it is there and must be reckoned with.

The articles which follow do not reckon with it directly. However, what they do may be more important than trying to dispel the many misconceptions about a man and more important even than talking about his work in general. It will be discovered that the essays are addressed to specific issues suggested in the body of Dewey's writings, issues such as the nature of individuality, the status of general propositions, the relation of esthetic experience to education, the meaning of history; and it will also be discovered that some of the discussion is decidedly critical of Dewey. Certainly

here is no mere praise-giving of the *Festschrift* type. All this is helpful, since too often Dewey is praised or condemned *en bloc*, with insufficient attention being paid to particular and possibly unfamiliar aspects of his thought. Having said this, one perhaps might go on only to note that in their efforts to avoid any charge of lack of criticism, some of our writers seem to make a particular effort to administer logical punishment. Which, of course, is part of the job of philosophers.

The crucial question of the nature of the individual is the theme of the opening paper, and Dewey's seeming inconsistency on the matter more than perplexes his old friend, Horace Kallen. For Dewey sometimes celebrates the individual as passionately as the writer of the article himself, while at other times Dewey seems to "socialize" the individual out of any meaningful existence. Dr. Kallen feels that part of the inconsistency stems from the vestigial remains of Hegelian dialectic and absolute idealism still unexcised from Dewey's earliest years. Professor Kallen also believes that the sense of tragedy inescapably joined with the uniqueness of the solitary person, which the existentialists have done so much to illuminate, plays no real part in Dewey's concern for the individual. (On this score, attention might be called once more to Sidney Hook's article already mentioned, especially the closing paragraphs.)

Like Horace Kallen, Morton White also sees more than mere remnants of absolute idealism in Dewey's logic, especially as it deals with the realm of universal and general propositions. The points made here are rigorous and technical and will require the reader's close attention. Professor White feels that Dewey's proposals in social and political philosophy are handicapped by his failure to work out the logic of a priori statements. Now, the function of an introduction like this is to present rather than criticize the articles which follow; yet the present writer must be permitted at least the opportunity to note that this whole matter of Dewey's atavistic reversion to Hegel is a highly controversial one, and to let it go at that.*

---

*Except to suggest that since Professor White refers with approbation to a paper by Professor Brodbeck, there are a number of responses to that paper, perhaps the most incisive being one by Milton Mayeroff in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLVII, No. 12, June 8, 1950, pp. 353-8.

The other two papers, in differing degrees, use this centennial commemoration to develop ideas related to Dewey's philosophy but advancing beyond it or at least turning in different directions—a development Dewey himself foresaw and welcomed. Professor Ratner makes a distinguished contribution to historiography in his challenging use of the experiment as a tool of historical analysis. The problem to which he addresses himself is posed in these familiar lines of Henri Poincaré, the mathematician:

> Carlyle has somewhere said something like this: "Nothing but facts are of importance. John Lackland passed by here. Here is something that is admirable. Here is a reality for which I would give all the theories in the world." . . . That is the language of the historian. The physicist would say rather: "John Lackland passed by here; that makes no difference to me, for he never will pass this way again."

The reader will want to see how Dr. Ratner attempts to reduce the stark methodological dualism advanced by Poincaré.

Francis Villemain and Nathaniel Champlin do much more than extend Dewey's views on the relation of the fine arts to education. They select the concept of *quality* and show that it can effect a reconciliation between ends and means such as is found in scientific method itself, and, of more moment, such as is required in the relation of instrumental to intrinsic experience. This has been a notable problem in Dewey's work, and it may be said that the present article suggests a way of developing further at least one aspect—and a crucial one—of that work.

An introduction like this may be allowed to do one thing more and that is to try and arrange a meeting between John Dewey and Irrational Man. For it is fashionable these days to celebrate irrational man. Here existentialism, neo-orthodoxy, Zen, and the new conservatism seem to conspire together to show how unwarranted is the belief in man's ability to solve his problems logically. The conspiracy, so to speak, is neither contrived nor gratuitous. There is good reason these days—and has been for nearly half a century—for men to be frightened and disillusioned. Nor was John Dewey unaware that many men had lost their nerve; in fact, if he had not been, something would have been wrong with his own idea that philosophy is in great part a reflex of current cultural conflict. The depressed position of his own philosophy in the last few decades

is itself testimony, in part, to the elevation of irrational man, for Dewey had come to be regarded as almost a symbol for the (liberal) confidence in man's Promethean possibilities. What, then, in few words, can be said about the supposed naiveté of such a confidence?

First of all, it must be underscored that there was nothing naive or overly optimistic about Dewey's own opinion of rational man, no more than there was in other supporters of secular man such as Voltaire or Erasmus. It was not simply that Dewey himself became quite discouraged in his later years, for at no time did he feel that intelligent inquiry was omnicompetent or that all problems were solvable. What is more important (since the picture of Dewey as a bemused liberal is merely a caricature) is that he made a careful, yet customarily disregarded, distinction between problematic experience and consummated experience. That there is a realm of immediate and intrinsic quality (as Professors Villemain and Champlin point out) to which problem-solving—and therefore science itself—is irrelevant, has been a prime insistence of Dewey's. His apostrophes to the incommunicable quality of completed and fulfilled experience make up the heart of his all-important approach to the fine arts; indeed, for him, esthetic experience is the very paradigm of all experience.

Now, if what the various existentialist philosophies have in common—which appears to be the case—is the memorializing of such immediate experience, then Dewey's emphasis here is in no way an alien one. But the trouble is that experience quickly turns from a datum to a problem, from intrinsic to instrumental, from a "having" to a "knowing." Examples are so common as to prove embarrassing. It is *this* rhythm of problematic experience to which the activities symbolized by "intelligent inquiry," "reflective thinking," "scientific method," and so on apply. To interpret Dewey or anyone like him to mean that non-reflective experience is inconsequential or nonexistent is simply false. Non-reflective subject matter provides the brooding background, the matrix of experience, parts of which move to the foreground when there are difficulties.

If such difficulties are *not* amenable to intelligence and critical scrutiny, to what are they subject? Authority? Custom? Intuition? The Irrational? I do not mean that these sanctions collapse as soon as they are mentioned. On the contrary, they have been the long-

time techniques man has almost automatically turned to. The point here, put in almost telegraphic form, is that the rebirth of contemporary irrationalism with its frontal attack upon the possibility of using human reason to handle human problems depends upon the underlying assumption that reflection, science, and the rest have *already* been consistently applied to the human situation (ever since, oh, Newton)—and look at the results!

The assumption here is a very slick one. Its slickness rests on the switch that the sciences of man are now "old stuff," that depth psychology, interpersonal psychiatry, cultural anthropology, field approach to social and political behavior have all had their day; and that what is truly new in a bright, shining package is good old-fashioned obscurantism. Slick this may be, in a Madison Avenue sort of way, yet it is nothing less than the technique of the big lie: social science, reflective thinking, critical intelligence—all have been found wanting and are now passé. "Religion" or some other symbol is the vogue and should now be given its chance. All of which is an inversion so shocking that it must prove an attention-getter.

To recapitulate: (1) Dewey's faith in rational man was a modest one and did not suffer from the ***hubris***, the pride, which some forms of modern irrationalism define as sin. (2) He insisted upon a realm of consummated experience to which rational problem-solving applied only as an instrument—except that the instrument could itself be appreciated as of intrinsic worth. (3) He would have rejected—as (almost) who would not?—the notion that man has been truly rational in handling his problems for a period long enough to have demonstrated the inapplicability of human intelligence. Actually, the serious vulnerability of Dewey's position is the polar opposite—it is promissory and futuristic rather than a has-been.

In conclusion, a single point may be made: Problems will be solved intelligently or some other way. Dewey's entire argument stands on the premise that there is no substitute for authenticated knowledge *in dealing with problems*, wherever those problems may occur. Like Charles Peirce, he pleads that we "do not block the way of inquiry." This would appear to be Dewey's constant challenge to irrational man, a challenge recognized but perhaps not sufficiently emphasized in the following articles.

Individuality, Individualism, and John Dewey

By HORACE M. KALLEN

■ In the nineteenth year of the ninety-two of his life, John Dewey, earning forty dollars a month as a high school teacher in Oil City, Pennsylvania, anxious over his future and worried over the discrepancies between the faith of his mother and the science of Thomas Henry Huxley, "got religion." As Max Eastman tells the story, he got it by way of a mystic experience. This left him, the night it came to him, with the very glad conviction that he need no longer worry over anything. He expressed the feeling to himself thus: "What the hell are you worrying about anyway? Everything that's here is here, and you can just lie down on it."

"I've never had any doubts since then," Dewey told Eastman, "nor any beliefs. To me, faith means not worrying. . . . I claim I've got religion and that I got it that night in Oil City."

Young William James also had a mystic experience. He had it while a student in Germany, deeply disturbed over the implications of scientific determinism for his own nature and destiny. The relief it brought him was like Dewey's. "God" would thenceforth signify "that you can dismiss certain kinds of fear." "Fear of life,"

HORACE M. KALLEN, who was a leading participant in the "Conversation on Santayana" in our Summer issue, has been associated with the New School for Social Research since its founding. He is now Research Professor in Social Philosophy and Professor Emeritus of the Graduate Faculty. The most recent of his many books on social philosophy is *A Study of Liberty*, to be published this month by the Antioch Press, and an early work, *The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy*, has just been reissued by Hill and Wang.

he wrote Paul Blood many years later, "in one form or another, is the greatest thing to exorcise; but it isn't reason that will do it. Impulse without reason is enough. . . ."

In the conspectus of William James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, this religion that Dewey got is a religion of the healthy-minded, the "once-born," among whom James counted Emerson and Theodore Parker and Walt Whitman. Dewey himself noted its kinship with Whitman's cosmic oneness and Wordsworth's pantheism. As James signalized this religion, discussing Whitman's "To You" in the final chapter of *Pragmatism*: "Whatever may happen to you, whatever you may appear to be, inwardly you are safe. Look back, *lie* back, on your true principle of being."

James, on the other hand, is placed by his experience among the "twice-born." He had been "a sick soul," so sick that he thought of suicide as salvation from a nature all necessary connection compelling him to be and to suffer without escape. Then, aroused by reading in Renouvier, he took a decision which broke the determinist circuit. He ceased to yield to the imposed necessity. He refused to lie back. He chose to stand up and affirm, and fight for, his freedom and autonomy as a person to the day he died.

It is, of course, well enough known, that, however much James and Dewey agreed on the how and the why of knowing and doing, their "ultimate ideologies" or beliefs diverged. They diverged, I think, on gradients originating in those religious experiences. As reading Renouvier had liberated James to reject the implications of the physiology he was learning in Germany, so reading a physiology by the grandfather of Aldous and Julian Huxley set Dewey on the road to intellectual freedom from his ancestral Christianism. Both men had experienced a liberation. James moved from a monistic determinism of positive science, over a moment of noetic voluntaristic monism induced by Royce's dialectic, into the irreducible, open-ended, open-minded pluralism which he ascribed to nature, and into the individualism for which "human nature" is a shorthand symbol. Dewey, on the other hand, found an exciting instrument of reconciliation and reciprocation in the dialectic practices of Hegel wherewith he could give the enduring sentiment of his religious experience professional articulation. Then he was awakened, more or less, from his Hegelian slumbers by reading

James's *Principles of Psychology*, which he later signalized as the "spiritual progenitor" of the new logic he had been bringing to birth and to functioning shape at the University of Chicago.

The two men had in common certain challenges of many aspects of the Genteel Tradition—especially its static rationalism, its absolutism, its bland disregard of Darwin's findings as they bore on the origins, nature, and role of mind in the making of mankind and of its goods and truths. But as I read the record, they were more allies against the common foe than partners in a common vision. James, whose sensitive imagination could skip intermediaries between differences to their ultimate identification, could declare his agreement with Dewey with much less reservation than Dewey his agreement with James. In the making of Dewey's instrumentalism, James seems to have played much the same role as Hegel: he provided certain liberating and consequential insights which gave new directions to Dewey's own philosophic formation. Dewey bespoke his divergence from James even in avowing his debt to him. Thus, in a book whose dedication signalizes the debt—the *Studies in Logical Theory*—he deplores (footnote, p. 81) James's "satisfaction in the contemplation of bare pluralism, of disconnection, of radical events not having to do with one another." Writing to James about the book (March, 1903), he begs him to "overlook the disrespectful allusion to your pluralism. . . . I can but feel that your plurality as it now stands is aesthetic rather than logical," and adds that his "Hegelian bacillus of the reconciliation of contradictories . . . makes me feel as if the conception of process gives a basis for uniting the truths of pluralism and monism and also of necessity and spontaneity."

And Dewey's subsequent expression, right up to *Knowing and the Known*, discloses a disposition toward Oneness and workings to attain it. As I read him, he nowhere accepts James's perception that the Many are primary and indefeasible, that the One is a function of ultimately external relations between the Many; that in human togetherness the One is a secondary formation, mostly hit upon, invented and used to help along man's struggle to live on and to grow. James's philosophy, Dewey says in *Experience and Nature*, "springs from his extraordinarily intense and personal feeling for the worth of the individual and equally intense realization of how

much natural science seemed hostile to rational justification of the idea that individuality as such has any special value or justification in the universal scheme of things." Thus, the religious experience signified to James "that the essential individual—call it his soul—stands in communication with the universe at a level more primitive and at the same time more fundamental, in a certain way more veridical than is attainable at the level of conscious and rational observation and thought."

This, Dewey felt, was central in James's philosophy. He set science, or "nature-lore," over against religion or "individual-fate-lore." He observed that the tendency of science is to submerge individuality as such, to denude of all importance what happens in and to the individual as such. Thence James's psychology candidly makes reservations, contrary to his own scientific prepossessions and assumptions, on behalf of the Self as Subject—that "vanishing subject," Dewey noted—and of the will as free. James was committed to scientific method in psychology, and his *Principles* embodies more than promise of a "behavioral theory of the self." But there was the Subject, nevertheless!

For Dewey the Subject was a redundancy that nowise could contribute to the knowing of knowing. Duly he dispensed with it. He went, with the help of James's *Principles,* on to a conception of the human psyche as a configuration of activities which one of the soul's residuary legatees, "the reflex are concept," could not, however, account for. Put in the place of that "useless redundancy" the soul, it only reduced an individual's behavior to a "patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical conjunction of unallied processes." True, the individual *is* his actions, there is no Ego behind. But his actions are aspects of situations where organism and environment seamlessly interplay. The organism's doings and knowings are better seen and understood in terms of the "habits" generated and shaped by this interplay, and *Human Nature and Conduct* so accounts for them.

Here, individuality is truly individual only as a variable social product; personal traits are aspects of social situations; habits are the stuff they are made of. Impulse can divert habits in new directions, onto new formations, but impulse is not itself simply the spontaneous original nature it is taken for. As every growing infant's

condition discloses, its impulses serve its survival and growth only as they get shaped and channelled by "social dependencies and companionship." All an individual's life, his impulses, and his passions as well, are "agencies for transfer of existing social power into personal ability." Tracing and accounting for the transfer gets done without any subject figuring in the sequences. We could do better, Dewey suggested in an address to the College of Surgeons on "The Unity of the Human Being," if we could understand this unity in terms of the ends common to the organization of the parts that compose an organism and how these ends involve the environment where the organism breathes and eats and otherwise lives and moves. But we think of its unity in terms of the skin behind which its parts are arranged, and we think of the skin as a boundary and not as a bridge. With the result that we isolate the body and delude ourselves into believing that the modification of a neural structure accounts for what was the modifying experience. But the experience is an event in a cultural and social situation and involves the organism responding as a whole to the problem of the situation.

Thus, the organism, or body, is, like the subject, on its way out as a more or less independent variable. Psychology, even when defined as "the total course of experience in the individual mind," becomes "social psychology." Individual minds become formations of the give-and-take between organisms—so George Herbert Mead accounted for them—growths of a social whole as perhaps the hair of a dog is a growth of the whole dog. Although, we are advised in *The Public and its Problems,* inquiry discovers no group-mind, no collective will, although it discovers only common situations evoking chains of communication and rearrangement between many organisms and some one object or condition, these chains link aggregations into groups, groups into publics among which one or another, at one time or another, enacts a dominant role, yet all together they form only an aggregation, not an organization, and none, be it an individual or a public, with any fixed wall of separation from any other. In replying to a sympathetic critic—this was in 1939—Dewey conceded that he had not yet produced a satisfactory theory of personality, nor shown how "natural conditions provide support for integrated and potentially equilibrated personality-patterns."

That it could be done, he was sure. The conflict of individuality as a true whole and the diversified continuum of social relations was not beyond being brought to unity and peace. But, somehow, the unity and peace come about through reconstructing individuality into modes of behavior, following a sequence of causes and influences which sufficiently accounts for them. The reconstruction is done in different contexts: *The Public and Its Problems, Individualism Old and New, Liberalism and Social Action, The Theory of Valuation,* up into *Knowing and the Known,* all move on this unbroken gradient, which postulates an idea of process wherein immediacy is ever transcending itself, ever bridging into the future beyond, especially via the interplay of means and ends, goals and goings, when the ends are "ends-in-view," be their time-span brief or prolonged. If "in view" intends anything other than awareness, I have, alas, not been able to discern it; nor that awareness has any more function than the vanished Subject in the flow of activities or behaviors.

Dewey's latest expression, *Knowing and the Known,* composed with Arthur Bentley, not only continues to reduce individuality to social relations; it liquidates social relations into behavioral sequences. As it regards the qualities and conduct of men, no scientific account of them can be had in terms of an idea of a soul or self or mind or even organism, if it be held to act in or from itself for itself, if "self-action" be ascribed to it. "Interaction," implying Newton's third law of motion, is somewhat more serviceable. But the term to designate behavior-in-an-environment which the writers completely approve is "transaction." This is an ongoing circular process wherein knowing and the known are inseparable partners. "Transaction" envisions as "together, extensively and durationally, much that is talked about conventionally as if it were composed of irreconcilable separates." It signalizes the man-in-action, not as his world's "Other," nor even as "in" his world, "but as action *of* and *in* the world in which the man belongs as an integral constituent."

A footnote (p. 142) adds

> . . . Transactionally viewed, a widening or narrowing of attention [We get no hint of how there can occur an attention that is widened or narrowed by no specific body. *Whose* attention? is apparently a useless

> redundancy.] is about all that remains indicated by such words as "social" and "individual." . . . If one insists on considering individual and social as different in character, then a derivation of the former from the latter would, in our judgment, be much simpler and more natural than an attempt to produce a social by joining or otherwise organizing presumptive individuals. In fact, most of the talk about the "individual" is the very finest kind of an illustration of isolation from every form of connection carried to an extreme absurdity that renders inquiry and intelligent statement impossible.

Dewey would abandon the word individual "and all substitutes for it." Instead, he would use "behavior" to denote the transactional unity of whatever differences individual and social might signify. "Behavior" is preferred to "experience" as well, since its signalizes activities within "the organic-environmental situation, with organisms and environmental objects taken as equally its aspects . . . . The phrase 'human behavior' would be . . . short for 'behavior' with the understanding that it is human."

Finally, these understandings and procedures for knowing the known in its Many-in-Oneness are referred to the following postulates:

1. Cosmos or field of factual inquiry.
2. Organisms as cosmic components.
3. Men as organisms.
4. Men's behaviors as organic environmental events.
5. Knowings (including the knowings of the cosmos as such organic-environmental behavings).

It is not news that critics of Dewey's pragmatism, naturalism, and exaltation of the scientific method as mankind's most reliable way to growth and freedom, have seen in his overall philosophic intent a variety of holism or transcendental idealism. As the record goes, I could not readily qualify their perceptions as errors.

It seems to me that this last reconstruction of knowing and the known would isolate them from any kind of knower that any one of us knows, and to suggest that the transactional whole must itself be the knower. If so, then be the specifications of the knowing process as minutely and precisely behavioral as the sciences of behavior can render them, the transactional whole attains a suggestive likeness to the Whole of one or another variety of transcen-

dental absolutism, be it materialist or mentalist. We might invoke Josiah Royce's "absolute pragmatism" for preference. Perhaps this consequence should be traced back to the "Hegelian bacillus" that Dewey did not altogether deprecate in his letter to James which bespeaks his feeling that "the conception of process gives a basis for uniting the truths of pluralism and monism and also of necessity and spontaneity." Certainly it is confluent with the observation in the *Logic* (pp. 104-5) which declares the "unified whole" to be the goal of the inquiry which is logic. Certainly it is confluent with the assertion (p. 198) that "the insoluble problems which have led to speculative metaphysical construction about the One and the Many arise from making entities, expressed as nouns, out of processes and operations properly designated by active verbs and adverbs."

As if the verbs and adverbs were not themselves Many, challenging inquiry to liquidate them into a "unified whole." I can not get over the feeling that behind and beneath this "unified whole," which process promises and inquiry seeks, there works the sense of that other Whole which Dewey experienced that night in Oil City. This somehow became rationalized during his Hegelian interlude, and later got projected by a sort of Jamesian "sentiment of rationality" as the *deus absconditus* of all his inquiries: the relations of individual and society, of truth and error, of faith and intelligence, of knowing and the known. That other Whole, it seems to me, takes on a somewhat more explicit disclosure in such a sentence as this: "Within the flickering, inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal." The disclosure is renewed in Dewey's designation of "being religious" (in contrast to "having a religion") as "the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends which imagination presents to us," in his signalizing "a just sense of nature as the whole of which we are parts" (in *Experience and Nature*).

II.

Remarkable but little remarked is that this predisposition of Dewey's toward unity goes hand in hand with his familiar, often-remarked commitment to the individuality of individuals, to their

freedom and growth. This commitment is profound and active. It qualifies the citizen-philosopher's judgment of all *isms* in the light of their possible and actual consequences to individuality. It is the dominant feature of the public image of the sage and the citizen, John Dewey. As one envisions his personal history, unifying and unity get argued and appreciated more as instruments in the service of every man's individuality than as magisterial powers subduing individuality to the uses of unity.

In logic, pluralism goes with individuality more consistently than monism, empiricism than idealism, and pragmatism than empiricism. In life, the connection shows itself to be contingent and external; shows itself a function of some turn in a person's personal history. It happens that one individual may use an absolutistic philosophy to ground his efforts toward a greater liberty, that another may invoke a pluralistic creed to justify authority, hierarchy, and irresponsible power. And vice versa, as all readers of the history of philosophy well know. Monisms and pluralisms are alike employed to challenge and deny the conventional rationalizations of *de facto* powerholders or to confirm and vindicate them. The philosophic faith of victorious rebels alters its role when the rebels have in their turn become powerholders and enthroned their creed and code to rule other persons' conduct and to rationalize their own continuing in power. They keep them so, until challenged and overthrown in their turn. The Roman sacerdotal establishment is a perennial instance. A passing one was Mussolini, who never read a line of either James or Dewey, but claimed pragmatism for the philosophic matrix of fascism; I remember well how absolute idealists and neo-realists (Bertrand Russell for choice) gloated over the fantastic imputation. Need anybody be reminded of the diverse philosophic evocations generated by the clash between the "free world" and the "peoples' democracies" of our day, the one with its libertarian ideals and the other with its egalitarian creeds?

We have only to read or hear what they are saying about each others' faith and works and, where we can, to examine the products and the attitudes toward one another of the individuals who actually produce them. The divergence of practice from profession, works from faith, generates a logical fissure with no observable like effect on the cohesion of sentiment and outlook in the individuals who

embody this divergence. Their personalities disclose no parallel split. Charge them with inconsistency and they will retort with Emerson's epigram. The divergencies appear not only to utter, but to nourish and confirm their individual being. Whatever their creeds, however "ultimate" their ideologies, the experiential ultimate of that, and of every claimed ultimacy, is the living individual believing and doing and asserting his ultimacy. To himself, each such individual is "indefeasible." The word is Dewey's. He uses it again and again, uses it even while undoing individuality into sequences of deindividualized behaviors. The indefeasibleness indicates a residue that analysis cannot reduce, an ineffability which the sequences of undoing at long last signalize. For the analytical undoing can go on from next to next without ever stopping save as the inquirer *chooses* to stop here or there and not elsewhere. The stopping-point is not the end of the line, but the end of the inquirer's will to keep questing. We need but think of the geneticists' twenty-four chromosomes with their nearly 300,000,000,000 different possible combinations, each at least as divergent from the others as the physiologists' and anatomists' inquiries indicate, to recognize that the imputed causal sequence regresses infinitely, that whatever help an inquirer may have had from other inquirers, and however others respond to his declaration of the *what* and *where* he says is the beginning of the sequences, the saying expresses a personal decision and a personal judgment. As physicist Percy Bridgman says in *The Way Things Are*:

> The importance of the individual [becomes] increasingly obvious to me, even in science which is sometimes actually defined in social, public terms. My reason for insisting on the importance of the role of the individual in science was that "proof," without which no science is possible, is entirely an affair of the individual and is therefore private, with the result that any creative science is of necessity private rather than public.

The intent of these observations is that in the last resort the individuality of the inquirer and the individuality of the human subject of inquiry are ineffable. Each is, however accounted for, somehow a unique organic identity, an *individual,* struggling from birth to keep on struggling among, with, against, and for other such unique individuals. The matrix of each struggler is that sense of his own life which every one at every moment possesses, and

which is to him the touchstone of "reality," its ultimate measure. For willy-nilly, all else is appraised as "real" or "not real" as it can be orchestrated (I think orchestration is a term closer to actualities of experiencing and knowing than "transaction") to that ineffable, perduring nuclear perception whereto "indefeasible" almost exclusively applies. Did not Dewey himself sustain, to the day he died, just such an identity, unmistakable to friends, to foes, to Deweyites, anti-Deweyites, and non-Deweyites? Did they not confront him over the years, a visible and audible presence, in body slim, neither short nor tall, his hair straight and thick, falling in a bang down his forehead, his blue eyes in a face a bit pale for the long, dark moustache, his bearing hesitant, reserved, almost withdrawn; occasionally altogether abstracted; his speech slow, deliberate, as if he were deciding upon what to say as he went along, and saying it in tones monotonous, and sometimes almost inaudible, but often in cadences affecting the hearer like a sad melody in a minor key? Did not the style of thought, rich, diversified and often surprisingly dramatic in content, disclose an identity as singular as the person and utterance of the thinker—all perceived and felt as this and only this unique, indefeasible individual, John Dewey?

Was not this man the identity unmistakable within the confluent changes and chances of the years, within the succession of his places and roles, the sequences of his speakings and writings, the diversity of separations and unions, commitments and associations, attacks, counters and pacifications, whose records biographers compose into a personal history and critics examine for understanding and disclosure or attack and exposure? Dewey's own sense of his life-stream, his ongoing feel of it, he bespoke once in the collection of professional *Selbstdarstellungen* published in 1930 as "Contemporary American Philosophers." Not unsignificantly, did he not write of himself as the visible, audible, speaking presence he was to others, nor as the face and figure his mirror reflected to him whenever he made his toilet? That which his words about himself seem actually an endeavor to convey is the unique inner sense of the identity which face and figure sustained and expressed. He felt himself "unstable, chameleon-like, yielding one after another to many diverse and even incompatible influences; struggling to assimilate something from each, yet striving to carry it forward in a way

that is logically consistent with what has been learned from its predecessors." Perhaps Herbert Schneider will say to Dewey's friends and lovers whether this thumbnail self-portrait fits with "Pan and the Logos" taking possession of Dewey's innocent being when it came to birth in Burlington, Vermont, on October 20, 1859.

Maybe I have a mistaken sense of fitness, but I think it does fit, even though I cannot say that it sets before me the vital singularity of the one and only John Dewey we others used to meet with, look at, deal with, live with, struggle with, peacefully or disputatiously. The singularity, the individuality, continues ineffable. Always communicating, it does so incommunicado; knowledge can be at best a continually more minute sequence of manifold predicates about it. Whether we respect and love and honor the individuality of individuals, or use, abuse, and labor to nullify it, we take it for granted, even as did John Dewey, the libertarian, the democrat, the educator, the philosopher of the common man. "Individuality," he wrote in *Individualism Old and New,*

> is inexpugnable because it is a manner of distinctive sensibility, selection, choice, response and utilization of conditions. . . . No individual can make the determination for any one else; nor can he make it for himself all at once and forever. . . . If, in the long run, an individual remains lost, it is because he has chosen irresponsibility, and if he remains wholly depressed, it is because he has chosen an easy parasitism.

In whose interest, indeed, did the writer of these words espouse so many, on occasion such lost, causes, if not first and foremost the interest of individuals (Leon Trotsky and Bertrand Russell come to mind, and they will do well enough for symbols) needing to be saved from injustice, from hurt, from suffering, from misrepresentation? Why did Dewey make education the first and last article of his philosophic faith and the foremost endeavor of his works, if not for his caring that children everywhere should grow up free and intelligent individuals in a society committed to this end. "Democracy," he wrote, "will not be democracy until education makes its chief concern to release distinctive aptitudes in art, thought and companship." In fact, for Dewey, the definition and pursuit of the goal of a society of free men, growing in freedom and intelligence, can be said to have been the inwardness of the philosopher's quest. "If we are willing," he wrote, "to conceive education as the

process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow man, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education . . . the theory of education as deliberately conducted practice . . . the theory of education in its most general phrases." He long regarded his *Democracy and Education* as the most authentic statement of his philosophy, and deplored the fact that the fellows of his craft gave it so little heed. On the record, to have said of him, as has been said, "he set the children free" was right and true as of no other philosopher or educator, for he worked out the design of how each individual may grow by freedom and intelligence into the ever greater freedom and intelligence possible to his singularity. He designed a discipline wherein interest gives rise to effort and effort compounds into responsible habit without external compulsion or the intrusion of authority with its I.Q.'s and other devices of pedagogic *force majeure*. Such a discipline is a discipline of freedom.

A concern for individuality and its growth seems to me to pervade all of Dewey's observations regarding society, its proper aims and works and ways. The liberty and growth of the individual stand out as the practical *terminus ad quem* of whatever Dewey has said or written or done regarding the impact of institutions on individuality. *Human Nature and Conduct, The Public and Its Problems, Liberalism and Social Action, A Common Faith, Individualism Old and New* strike me as all naturalistic utterances of the same urge. We note its like in transcendentalist Emerson and in pantheistic Whitman even as in pluralistic James. It provides them, each in his singularity, with ways and means toward a common faith. Whatever be the individual*isms* they confirmed, however materialist or idealist, teleological or determinist their systems, they give individuality sanction within it, even when their metaphysics liquidates it. The individual*ism* they condemn and reject, certainly the *ism* Dewey condemned and rejected, is that which would rob all but those who profess it of their individuality. For Dewey, writing *Individualism Old and New*, the "old" is the feudalistic expression of the day's "pecuniary culture" with its corporate hierarchies and organization men. This individualism he read as a doctrine of privilege which militates against the equal liberty to grow of all individuals in their diversity, and is thus the matrix of "the crisis in our culture." The

individualism he approved is an individualism employing the new "socializing" technologies, the new establishments, in order to emancipate, not suppress, individuality; in order to "generate a mind and soul, an integrated personality . . . [with] an intelligence, a sentiment and individuality of a new type," the which "can be achieved only through the controlled use of all the resources of science and technology that have mastered the physical forces of nature."

And yet . . . .

When it came to envisioning and interpreting the inexpugnable and ever new individuality, Dewey reacted to its *haecceitas* via causal sequences and necessary connections imputed to the technological and institutional scene. He sought its identity in terms of the environment wherein it lives and moves and struggles for its being, and not in terms of that "distinctive sensitivity, selection, choice," and so on, i.e., that sense of his own life, which every individual at every moment possesses and which for him *is* his individuality. Back in the early thirties we started together on a new book about individuality and individualism. After a time, Dewey suggested that I'd best go it alone, since I was taking individuality for ineffable as well as inexpugnable identity, while he took it for an aspect of a total situation, of the "whole" which it is an aspect of. My *Individualism*: *An American Way of Life,* published in 1932 is the book. Seven years later, Dewey contributed a brief paper to a collection entitled *I Believe* and published by Simon and Schuster. In this he called attention to his earlier view that "what an individual actually *is,* in his life experience, depends upon the nature and movement of associated life" and he added:

> I shall now wish to emphasize more than I formerly did that individuals are the finally decisive factors of the nature and movement of associated life. . . . Only the voluntary initiative and voluntary cooperation of individuals can produce social institutions that will protect the liberties necessary for achieving development of genuine individuality. . . . It has been shown in the last few years that democratic *institutions* are no guarantee for the existence of democratic individuals. The alternative is that the individuals who prize their liberties and who prize the liberties of other individuals, who are democratic in thought and action, are the sole final warrant for the existence and endurance of democratic institutions.

w
to
ıd
a
be
of
of

ble
sal
cal
on-
ıd
ıd
ery
in
id-
I'd
as
a
id-
ok.
on
he
lly
ent

in-
of
ion
ties
has
no
e is
ties
the
in-

X

The individualism thus signalized is the individualism on which Dewey parted company with me at the beginning of the decade. His conversion at the decade's end may well have been influenced by the assault on the freedom and dignity of the human person via the "state socialism and public collectivism" of Hitler and Stalin. However, it would seem to have been a passing conversion. His *Freedom and Culture* resumes the situational conception with its holistic implications, nor do the later expressions of this authentic philosopher of the common man fail to give it his customary priority. I won't say that healthy-minded John Dewey's "distinctive sensitivity, selection and choice" were, like Emerson's, like Whitman's, certain and optimistic about the beneficence of reconciliation and unity. I will say that the spirit of Dewey's philosophy, unlike William James's, evinces a certain blindness to the sheer individuality of individuals, the precipitousness that their "lives of quiet desperation" often manifest, and the never-to-be-reconciled evils that beset their struggles to go on struggling, which we call existence. I will say that Dewey's philosophy discloses no deep awareness of humanity *in extremis,* the good of one man's existence stretched on the rack of some other man's good and turned thereon to suffering and evil. I will say that this philosophy communicates no deep sensitivity of the evil that flows from the inexpugnable warfare of irreconcilable goods, or of how ultimately evil this evil it. Hitler taught these facts of life especially to the Jews, Stalin and his hierarchy to all who happened to manifest a sense of the good not subservient to theirs—so *Doctor Zhivago* attests. The French existentialists learned these facts of life in the Resistance and afterward gave it voice in their Existentialisms.

But the facts are inveterate and the generations of men encounter their protean manifestations everywhere. One such symbolic manifestation is the figure of Prometheus irreconcilable, forever tortured and forever vanquishing unconquerable Zeus by refusing to yield to him. Another is irreconcilable Job, innocently suffering intolerable pain, preferring to die rather than deny his integrity and yield to Jehovah omnipotent. Prometheus and Job, trapped in the "evil" which is the warfare of moral ideals, signalize that appreciation of the individuality of individuals intended by the words: "Though he slay me will I be true to myself." Their contrary is the

classical mistranslation which tradition put in the mouth of Job: "Though he slay me will I trust in him."

Be the "him" who is trusted Nature or God, the seat of significance is shifted from the individual to his whole environment or some part belonging to the whole. It has seemed to me these many years that Dewey's philosophy, so far as it is concerned with the individuality of individuals, is ambivalent. On the one hand, individuality (together with the individualisms and socialisms which he accepts or rejects as holding individuality for an "end-in-view" or as accounting for it as a consequence in a cause-effect sequence) gets reduced to a procession of behaviors in the courses of a more rather than less propitious Nature. On the other hand, Dewey's specifications of a design for living, his theory and practice of education, of social change, of pursuing knowledge and confirming belief, postulate individuality, with its liberation and growth, as the initiation and consummation of the human enterprise; they transvalue the courses of nature into materials and tools which man's intelligence addresses to the enactment of this postulate; they vindicate individuality against the killing authority of institutions and against the irresistibly killing energies of nature. They imply a humanism untainted by the naturalism which explains man away, and a naturalism with which man works to confirm and consummate his humanity.

History as Experiment

By SIDNEY RATNER

■ History and science are usually pictured as belonging to two sharply contrasting realms. History as a narrative of past events seems confined to describing unique individuals and situations as they emerge, flower, and pass away only to be succeeded by others, each different from its predecessors. Science, on the other hand, as it is ordinarily described, focuses on observing and analyzing only the abstract, general, and repeatable aspects of events and things. So physics, chemistry, and biology—to mention only three of the natural sciences—study, among other things, masses in motion, the reactions of chemical elements and their compounds, and such functions of animal and plant organisms as digestion, respiration, and reproduction. The results of such controlled observations and experiments are summed up in mathematical formulas that purport to state universal truths or tentative approximations to invariant relations between specific events, elements, or phases of the processes and objects under investigation. Newton's law of gravitation, Boyle's law of gases, and Einstein's world-shaking formula, $E=Mc^2$, are among the best known examples of laws in the natural sciences. Many identify all of science with this concentration upon the similar and recurrent phases of events and processes in nature and society.

Here is a dichotomy, a sharp cleavage between two fields of

SIDNEY RATNER, Professor of History at Rutgers University and former member of the Institute for Advanced Study, is Chairman of the national John Dewey Centennial Committee. He is the author of *American Taxation: Its History as a Social Force in Democracy*, editor of *The Philosopher of the Common Man: Essays in Honor of John Dewey on His Eightieth Birthday*, and co-author of *John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom*.

work, the first seeming to fall definitely into the humanities, the second into the sciences. Each area or field of research seems to be completely divorced from the other and to be pursued by completely different methods and tested by completely different criteria. This dualism, like that between body and mind, science and ethics, the fine and the applied arts, fact and value, was a dualism that John Dewey opposed. He himself never wrote a full-scale treatise on the logic and philosophy of history. But he did write some illuminating discussions of the nature of historical knowledge in *Experience and Nature, Freedom and Culture* and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.* I think that the most appropriate tribute I can pay to his memory is to present a theory of history in line with the theory of scientific inquiry he developed over some fifty years. This theory would be one which boldly faces the dichotomy between history and science and declares the division to be both theoretically invalid and practically harmful. My theory is not new in its origins but in its formulation and development. I call it Experimental History because it is based upon the assertion that history involves experiments and, in fact, is experiment to the same extent as descriptive astronomy, geography, and geology.

The widespread dualism between history and science goes counter to the long-sanctioned usage of the terms "history" and "science." For example, Lord Kelvin and Tait in their classic *Treatise on Natural Philosophy* (1896 ed.) state that the term "Natural Philosophy" was used by Newton to denote the investigation of laws in the material world and the deduction of results not directly observed.

> Observation, classification, and description of phenomena necessarily precede Natural Philosophy in every department of natural science. The earlier stage is, in some branches, commonly called Natural History; and it might with equal propriety be so called in all others.

Similarly, Thomas Hobbes wrote in his great treatise *Leviathan*:

> There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is *knowledge of fact:* the other *knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another.* . . . The register of *knowledge of fact* is called *history.* Whereof there be two sorts: one called *natural history.* . . . The other, is *civil history.*

A careful study of the full range of scientific research reveals that scientists are profoundly interested in what seem to be unique

events, objects, processes, and developments such as the development of stellar systems, the origin of our solar system and the earth, the evolution of plant and animal species and of human beings and societies. So noted a scientist as C. F. von Weizäcker has confirmed in his brilliant volume, *The History of Nature* (English trans. 1949) what Dewey had worked out earlier and independently, namely: that the uniqueness of man as the only form of life or matter with a history, a career, is an illusion. The seemingly unchanging character of atoms, continents, planets, stars, and lower forms of life is due to the time scale most historians of human affairs use. But the physicist, paleontologist, geologist, and astronomer, with their instruments and their longer time scales, know that the seemingly fixed physical and biologic objects and forms they analyze have changing characteristics and careers. Physical and biologic nature has a history, in fact consists of *histories,* as truly as humanity does. The principle of a developing career applies to all things in nature, despite the differences between the physical, biologic, and psychological levels of existence. All things in nature have histories or careers; man's distinction is not that he has a history, but that he can reconstruct and write that history.

History, in one sense, embraces all that has happened in the past; in another sense, it includes the sum total of all that has ever been written, or will be written, about events of the past. But history also means inquiry into the existence, nature, and order of events in space-time. In this last sense, history is a dynamic process for exploring nature and society. One group of these inquiries is called natural history; another, human history. Although many contemporary historians restrict the term "history" to research into human activities, their practice is an arbitrary limitation. Both semantics and logic justify the use of the term "history" to cover the nonhuman and the human.

Given the unity of natural and human history, we have to consider the question: how does experiment enter into human history? It is obvious that experiments are possible and necessary in physics, chemistry, and biology. But how do experiments occur, or how can they be made to occur, in the determination of what happened or is happening in human affairs? Here linguistic usage and the analysis of scientific and historic method help to provide the answer.

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary,* the word "experiment" originally was used, and still is used, to mean "an action or operation undertaken in order to discover something unknown, to test a hypothesis, or establish or illustrate some known truth." Scientists refine upon this statement. They emphasize the control that the scientist achieves by isolating and analyzing the phenomena to be studied. One objective is to obtain results that can be repeated and tested under similar controlled conditions by other scientists. Where similar phases of events exist, repetition of the original experiment is possible. In most cases in physics and the other natural sciences, this rule can be, and is, observed. But even in the natural sciences, as we have pointed out, there are unique events and processes that cannot be repeated exactly or even approximately. Nuclear physics has driven home this point. Yet individual observations of the nuclear physicist are admitted as scientific data because the procedures used and the data obtained fit into the general system of scientific method and knowledge. The core of publicly verifiable knowledge is supplemented by a periphery of private knowledge. This situation in nuclear physics and other natural sciences is paralleled by the situation in human history. Certain types of events and processes in human affairs are similar and repeatable throughout all or most of human history. But many, perhaps most, of the events studied by historians are believed to be unique in various important respects. When the historian uses experiment in his investigations into human affairs, he uses it as the astronomer or geologist does in his field of investigation.

Every time a question arises as to whether anything alleged by some person to have occurred at some time and place had in fact occurred—for example, whether the Trojan War had taken place—a test or experiment has to be made to either prove or disprove the author's statement. At one time the *Iliad* was regarded as a myth, a complete poetic fabrication, and Troy was thought to be nonexistent. But Heinrich Schliemann in the 1870's demonstrated that Troy had actually existed as a city. Other archaeologists—e.g. Flinders Petrie, Arthur Evans, and Homer A. Thompson—have reconstructed the ancient history of Egypt, Crete, the Middle East, Greece, Rome, and Palestine and have either confirmed or disproved statements that have come down to us in various historical forms. The

tools of the archaeologists have ranged from pick axes and shovels to a knowledge of paleontology, ancient languages, records, and artifacts.

The great nineteenth-century American historian, Francis Parkman, studied critically all available written sources for a history of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century struggle between France and Great Britain for control of North America. He also probed the accounts of explorers and government officials about the geographical background, life of the Indians, and problems of strategy by going into the forests and lakes of Canada, traveling along the routes of the French explorers, and living among the still uncivilized Indians of the Western plains. This field work helped him to do two things: to evaluate the accuracy of the various statements made in documents he had studied, and to acquire a personal experience of the historical scene. This enabled him to recreate with unusual depth and vividness the physical background and the characteristics of the people he described. As he himself put it,

> Faithfulness to the truth of history involves far more than a research, however patient and scrupulous, into special facts. . . . The narrator must seek to imbue himself with the life and spirit of the time. He must study events in their bearings near and remote; in the character, habits, and manners of those who took part in them. He must himself be, as it were, a sharer or a spectator of the action he describes.

In our own day, the life of Christopher Columbus as an explorer and discoverer of America has been presented with remarkable freshness and insight by Samuel Eliot Morison in his great biography, *Admiral of the Ocean Sea.* Morison was inspired by Parkman's example to relive the experiences of Columbus as given in his and other contemporary accounts of his various voyages to the New World. Morison took to sea, first in a charted yawl, then in the barkentine *Capitana,* and finally in the ketch *Mary Otis.* He followed the various routes that Columbus had taken on his four voyages to America. Here we have a historian undertaking an arduous experiment in seamanship to verify the accuracy of Columbus's statements on the problems of navigating to the New World and on the conditions encountered in his explorations.

Most scholars cannot undertake such extensive adventures in historical reconstruction as Francis Parkman's and Samuel Eliot

Morison's. Yet every scholar, with access to books and manuscripts, either accepts the authority of some writer or actor in the past on what took place, or ventures to experiment, to test the accepted statements or some new hypothesis of his own. Anyone who has made a discovery for himself knows more about the intimate details of such a process of discovery than is usually to be found in most reports on the outcome. Hence, an illustration from my personal experience may be illuminating.

In the early 1930's the Supreme Court came into conflict with the New Deal. Some suggested that if the Court ruled against the government, President Roosevelt should enlarge the Court and "pack" it with pro-New Deal judges. Others argued that this was unwise, undesirable, and unprecedented. A few contended that there were such precedents, notably the packing of the Supreme Court by President Grant in the famous Legal Tender or Greenback Cases of 1870-71. Various writers denied that any such packing had occurred in Grant's administration and cited impressive historical authorities to refute this claim. At that time I was immensely excited by the possibility that all the great authorities might be wrong, and that facts might be discovered which would confirm the truth of the charge against Grant.

On February 7, 1870, the Supreme Court, by a four to three vote on the *Hepburn* vs. *Griswold* case, declared the Legal Tender Act of 1862 unconstitutional insofar as debts contracted before its passage were concerned. On the very day Chief Justice Chase handed down this decision, President Ulysses S. Grant nominated William Strong of Pennsylvania and Joseph Bradley of New Jersey to the Supreme Court bench. The presence of the two new judges on the Court encouraged Grant's Attorney General, E. R. Hoar, to reopen for further consideration the entire Legal Tender question. On May 1, 1871, the new Court, by a five to four vote, reversed the *Hepburn* v. *Griswold* decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts as a valid exercise by Congress of the war powers, in respect to all contracts, whether made before or after passage of the acts.

The question soon arose: Did Grant pack the Supreme Court so as to secure a reversal of the first Legal Tender decision? Judge Hoar, although he had resigned in June, 1870, as Attorney General,

denied these charges and presented powerful evidence that neither Grant nor he knew what the first Legal Tender decision of the Court was going to be. "The Judges of the Supreme Court kept their own opinions, and, until they were read, nobody knew what they were." Moreover, nominations had been sent to the Senate on the very day of the decision; hence it seemed impossible that the President could have chosen his two nominees to the Court with any intention or knowledge that they would reverse a decision, the nature of which he did not know.

This and other evidence convinced the most eminent historians that the charge of "court-packing" was not justified by the facts. Nevertheless, some sixty–odd years later the storm over the constitutionality of the New Deal led me to question their conclusions, to speculate about possible hidden connections between Grant and the Court, and to seek new light on what had actually gone on in Grant's regime. I discovered that Professor Allan Nevins of Columbia University had in his possession a remarkably detailed and illuminating diary of all the significant events in Grant's regime which had been kept by Grant's Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish. Moreover, Fish had saved thousands of letters to and from all the important public officials of his day. The mass of manuscript material was so overwhelming that it would have taken years to read through all the material stored at Columbia University. But I elaborated a set of hypotheses about the individuals who most likely would have corresponded with Hamilton Fish on the Court-packing charge. One after another of these hypotheses proved fruitless, but, after several days of strenuous searching, I discovered a letter from Judge Hoar to Hamilton Fish asking Fish whether Grant would authorize a public statement on the falseness of the charge that he (Judge Hoar) had advised Grant to pack the Supreme Court. This led me to seek to learn whether such a public defense of Judge Hoar had ever been issued by President Grant. The answer to this question I found in a section of Hamilton Fish's unpublished diary that no one previously had explored. On October 28, 1876, Fish recorded calling upon Grant and reading to him Judge Hoar's letter. To Fish's astonishment, Grant said that although he had exacted no pledges or expressions of opinion from Justices Strong and Bradley on the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act, he knew that Strong as

a judge in Pennsylvania had upheld this constitutionality and that Bradley's opinion evidently tended in the same direction. Grant stated that he had felt it important that the constitutionality of the law should be sustained, that he had desired the Supreme Court to sustain its constitutionality, and he had believed such to be the opinion of all his Cabinet at the time.

Another problem to be solved was whether Grant knew definitely in advance what the first Legal Tender decision was going to be. The Supreme Court's tradition of secrecy about its impending decisions misled most historians into overlooking an admission by Grant's Secretary of the Treasury, George S. Houtwell, in his *Reminiscences* that he had been informed of the first Legal Tender decision by Chief Justice Chase himself about two weeks before its public delivery on February 7, 1870. Chase had feared that the Court's decision would cause the creditors to rush for gold and thereby create serious financial difficulties for the Treasury. It seems unlikely that the Secretary of the Treasury would have refrained from informing the President of so crucial a point.

The results of my investigation had overthrown the established opinion of historians on Grant's "packing the Supreme Court". The evidence that I had been able to unearth, presented in the *Political Science Quarterly* for September, 1935, convinced Charles Beard, Edward S. Corwin, and other scholars that Grant had appointed Bradley and Strong to the Supreme Court because he believed they would uphold the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts. Yet it is not just to say that Grant "packed the Court" in the sense that he had exacted a pledge or expression of opinion from Bradley and Strong before nominating them. Nor is it correct to say that the new judges were "creatures of the President placed upon the bench to carry out his instructions." Both Bradley and Strong seemed to have acted from a sense of conviction and with intellectual integrity. The conclusions I reached were the results obtained from an historical experiment: a testing of old and new hypotheses on a controversial public issue in the light of evidence, some of which was known to all scholars and some of which was discovered through formulation of some new hypotheses as to hidden connections between seemingly irreconcilable facts.

In one sense, all historians who investigate such mysteries are

detectives seeking like Sherlock Holmes to reason back from the evidence before them to the occurrence of events that explain the problem which at first both baffles and excites them. In another sense, all historians are like astronomers and geologists in using instruments like telescopes and pickaxes to obtain observations on distant stars or remote geological periods and in reasoning from the data thus obtained as to what is happening in remote stellar space or had happened eons ago. The researches of the historian, the astronomer, and the geologist involve experiment in the sense that their verifiable observations are due to the controlled movements of their eyes and bodies, the use of specially-contrived instruments, and the focusing of such instruments on certain objects and processes.

We have shown how experiment, in the sense of testing a hypothesis as to what actually occurred in the past in the light of all the evidence that a skeptical investigator can discover and assemble, has been applied by three different historians to three different sets of problems. Countless other examples can be set forth by scholars in every branch of natural and human history. For example, in ancient history we have the recent (June, 1952) brilliant decipherment by the inspired young British architect, Michael Ventris, of the later Bronze Age script of Crete, Linear B., as an extremely archaic form of Greek. In the past few years two iconolastic American historians, Robert E. Brown and Forrest McDonald, have produced books that attack root and branch the main theses and much of the evidence presented in 1913 by Charles Beard for *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*. Similar investigations leading to new evidence and fresh analysis of the old and new evidence have brought striking reinterpretations of many turning points in world history, ranging from the decline of the Roman Republic and Empire to the origins of modern capitalism, the nature of the American, French, and Russian Revolutions, the causes of the First and Second World Wars, the sources of modern totalitarianism, right and left.

But if the discovery of new evidence leads to new interpretations, the very process of gathering evidence itself depends on theoretical assumptions. In practice, historians engaged in concrete projects of research use as principles of interpretation those theories about historical causes, events and processes that they believe can withstand

being brought down to bedrock. Such scholars either have absorbed or have worked out for themselves views of what constitute significant categories of fact.

When these principles of interpretation are regarded as above the need for further examination, they turn out to be snares and traps for trusting, unvigilant historians. A historian may gather and check an impressive series of "facts," each one of which may be correct, yet the total assemblage of these facts may give an unwarranted picture or judgment of a complex situation or movement of history. In that case, the principles for the selection, as well as the interpretation, of "the facts" may have been inadequate.

Sometimes the life experience that historians undergo leads them to revise their underlying assumptions. Thus, historians committed to an economic or Marxist interpretation of history were influenced by events they themselves witnessed or took part in, to realize the importance of non-economic and non-class factors in society. Charles Beard, after the emergence of the New Deal, Nazi Germany, and Stalin's dictatorship, acknowledged in the second edition of *The Economic Basis of Politics* that the politician, statesman, and warrior were able to influence the direction of history as much as, if not more than, the captains of industry and finance. But changes in interpretation and evaluation of history (and science) may also arise from reflection on perplexing problems and their presuppositions by scholars and scientists working in quiet studies and laboratories. Kepler, Clerk Maxwell, and Einstein in physics; Darwin, Mendel, and T. H. Morgan in biology; Gibbon, Ranke, and Croce in history—all of these created new theories and syntheses that sprang in large part from their concern with understanding the physical, biological, or social world more adequately than their predecessors had been able to do. The passion of the scholar for discovering the full truth about past events (often united with an intense concern about contemporary events) has left its distinctive mark on the work of such historians as Frederic Maitland and Llewellyn Woodward in England, Elie Halévy and Marc Bloch in France, Henri Pirenne in Belgium, Peter Geyl in Holland, Jacob Burckhardt in Switzerland, and Friedrich Meinecke in Germany.

New interpretations in history too often arise only when some imaginative historian is moved by personal inspiration and unusual

circumstance to challenge the accepted canons of historical construction. *Experimental* history would seek to articulate in explicit terms the need for (1) a systematic trial of all hunches on what are the facts in specific cases or problems; and (2) a *seriatim* scrutiny and testing of the principles of interpretation. No matter how seemingly obvious or buttressed by evidence some principle like the economic, geographic, or biological interpretation of history may be, the experimentalist will try to guard against his own predilections and try to discover to what extent the principle of interpretation he has used is warranted as an explanation. For instance, the great anthropologist, Franz Boas, started out in his youth with a predisposition towards the theory, made popular by Ratzel, Huntington, and others, that the geographical factors were the most important in history. But he discovered after working for some years that different primitive societies had marked cultural differences despite similar geographical backgrounds. Boas and Ruth Benedict were also allies of those historians who questioned the racial theories propounded by Gobineau, Houston Chamberlain, and others.

The number of principles of interpretation is so large that a volume could easily be filled merely listing and briefly describing those used by historians in different fields of inquiry. One of the most frequently-used principles of interpretation in every-day historical research is that of "historic necessity and inevitability." Noted historians have called the Civil War an irrepressible conflict and an inevitable event. Others have said the same about the coming of the First and Second World Wars. The Marxists constantly talk about the inevitable decline of capitalism and the emergence of a world-wide Communist economy and society. The Nazis used to speak of riding on the wave of a world revolution that would establish a Nazi Order that would last at least a thousand years.

This talk about necessity and inevitability comes from beliefs of historians based not on self-evident truths, but on theories inspired for the most part by a combination of outmoded nineteenth-century universal determinism, Hegelian dialectics, classical tragedy, and biblical prophesy. Modern science relies largely upon a relative frequency theory of probability. An experimental historian who happened to believe in the necessity and inevitability of a

certain social situation would test his theory by comparative analysis of similar situations and by envisaging what might have happened had certain factors in the situation been different. The events that erupted in revolution or war in certain times and places have not always had the same results elsewhere or may be avoidable in the future. Internal changes that in France and the United States led to civil war were handled in nineteenth-century England without this resort to force. International tensions that today might erupt into World War III probably will not be allowed to do so by either of the super powers because of the new dimensions in destructive power that the nuclear weapons have made possible. New possibilities have emerged through scientific inventions that affect the competence with which historians can say that something is "necessary and inevitable" simply because they have studied one or several cases in which a certain social change occurred in one way rather than another.

Many do not realize to what an extent the very principles of interpretation applied by philosophers and historians to "given" historical problems are the instruments for discovering and selecting what information is to be obtained about these and other problems. Even a highly oversimplified theory like the economic interpretation of history may light up whole areas of history that hitherto had been dark, because the theory leads scholars to discover facts about the importance of economic interests or the economic system that they otherwise would have not have been led to know. A new theory may bring to view a whole set of facts that the previous dominant theory had prevented historians from seeing. To research scholars, historical facts are not *"given";* they are *"taken"* or constructed from observations guided by theories that have proven to be fruitful. Historical inquiry, therefore, is always an experiment both in regard to testing hypotheses concerning specific events, their existence, causes, and consequences, and in testing hypotheses about series or clusters of events such as periods, social classes, societies. The theories we have as to what constitutes an individual, a family, a city, a state, an economic system, war, revolution, art, science, and religion are the nets we plunge into the ocean of events for the catch we seek. When social thinkers advance new definitions or descriptions of personality, economics, or society, historians then look for

examples of what the theorists have led them to expect. Often they come back with material which confirms some theory, new-fangled or old. Sometimes they disprove these theories. But theories, one way or another, are indispensable for the discovery and assemblage of evidence concerning historical events.

Experimental history offers no grandiose philosophy of history like that of St. Augustine, Hegel, Marx, Spengler, or Toynbee. The experimental historian believes that he offers something more modest, yet more valuable. Creative imagination and insight are indispensable to all historians. But the experimental historian is saved from being duped by his own hopes and fears, prejudices and uncritically-held presuppositions. He analyzes the methods needed for discovering and verifying or disproving "facts," and he transforms inarticulate or vaguely-formulated principles of interpretation about specific histories or concatenations of events into critically-held and revised postulates of investigation. His inquiries are part of the self-corrective system of science; to that extent they contribute to human understanding of events in the past as well as to control of events in the present or impending future.

Sonnet

By PATRICIA LOW

I did not speak my heart to you. I wrung
the moment out, but when speech would have followed,
(as eyes do sometimes treat tears, so the tongue
with words) "I love you" hung back and was swallowed.

I did not tell the hills I loved them that
spring afternoon I looked upon them last;
I did not fall against the trees, but sat
and watched slow clouds move in and on and past.
I did not grab at yellow weeds that lined
the lane, nor poke my toe in ruts that drought
dried up; and when I went I left behind
the scoop of sand I meant to carry out.
Yet nowhere have I found so rich a garden,
since that long day I stumbled from my Eden.

This is the first publication of PATRICIA LOW, although she has won several awards in fiction and poetry at Purdue University and first prize in poetry at the Indiana University Writers' Conference. At present she is working on her M.A. at Indiana and is managing editor of *Folio*.

Experiment and Necessity in Dewey's Philosophy

By MORTON WHITE

■ John Dewey, more than any other thinker in modern times, viewed the history of Western philosophy as a fruitless quest for certainty, as a misguided effort to discover a class of truths which would be stable, certain, and self-evident. And for this reason the notion of a priori knowledge, or knowledge which is supposed to be independent of experience, was always suspect in Dewey's philosophy. For more than a half-century he campaigned against the view that there are two sorts knowledge, one rational, necessary, unchanging, certain, and the other empirical, contingent, and merely probable. Preoccupation with the status of what other philosophers regard as a priori knowledge is therefore almost perpetual in Dewey's thought. It dominates not only his work in logic and epistemology but also his discussion of basic political, moral, and educational problems. He criticizes proponents of the doctrine of natural law when they speak with confidence about self-evident principles, he opposes transcendental moralists who defend prejudice in the name of intuition, and he insists that the pedagogical separation of learning and doing is partly the result of a failure to see continuity in all kinds of knowledge from mathematics to geography.

Dewey continued an old tradition in philosophy when he coupled belief in transcendent principles with a tendency toward

---

MORTON WHITE, whose latest book is *Religion, Politics and the Higher Learning*, is Professor of Philosophy at Harvard. This article is a version of a paper delivered at Brandeis University in April of this year as one of a series whose general title was "John Dewey in the Light of Recent Philosophy."

political conservativism. To realize this, one need only recall the similar views of John Locke and John Stuart Mill. Both of these great empiricists felt obliged to undermine certain views on a priori knowledge, partly because they felt that these views were politically dangerous. And it was from Locke and Mill that Dewey derived a similar concern. Locke, Mill, and Dewey were all fearful lest an excessively anti-empirical view of knowledge encourage political and social tyranny because they thought that a tendency to think of practical matters in an excessively rationalistic way might give the upper hand to those whom Locke called "the dictators of principles." John Stuart Mill testified eloquently to the liberal motivation of his own work in logic when he said:

> The notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness, independently of observation and experience, is, I am persuaded, in these times, the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions. . . . There never was such an instrument devised for consecrating all deep-seated prejudices. And the chief strength of this false philosophy in morals, politics, and religion, lies in the appeal which it is accustomed to make to the evidence of mathematics and the cognate branches of physical science.[1]

Dewey's logical work was motivated, as Mill's was, by a desire to examine the methods of natural science and mathematics in order to drive the rationalists and intuitionists from their stronghold. But, as I shall try to show, he does not always succeed in this effort. On the contrary, there is a part of Dewey's theory of a priori knowledge in which, without realizing it, he provides wonderfully elaborate quarters for a rationalistic Trojan horse. To see this, we must look into a number of questions concerning the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, which is so intimately associated with the problem of a priori knowledge.

In a volume by various hands paying homage to Dewey on his ninetieth birthday, I expressed my dissatisfaction with the distinction between analytic and synthetic as developed in the literature of logical positivism, but prefaced my argument by saying:

> It must be emphasized that the views which will be put forth are not

---

[1]Mill, J. S., *Autobiography*, ed. J. J. Coss (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924), pp. 158-159.

strict corollaries of Dewey's views; indeed, he sometimes deals with the question so as to suggest disagreement with what I am about to argue. But I trace the source of my own general attitudes on this point to Dewey, even though my manner and method in this paper are quite foreign to his.[2]

One of the first comments I received, from a devoted disciple of Dewey, read: "Unless I have misread Dewey [your paper] is squarely in the context of his thinking. If I had time I could document this." As my friend did not have time, the point was never documented. I took him to imply that criticisms like mine of the positivistic distinction between analytic and synthetic were *completely* Deweyan, and that my qualification about Dewey's dealing differently with the question—on some occasions at least—was the product of squeamishness or ignorance. Since then I have looked into the relevant texts more closely and I feel more confidently cautious in claiming Dewey as an ally on this point. An inspiration he undoubtedly was, as I have already indicated. But he says so many things which are either inconsistent, or objectionably dark, or unacceptable for other reasons, that I feel we cannot look to him for a complete view of the subject. In order to show what I mean, I must begin with a discussion of recent issues in the theory of a priori knowledge.

II

The positivistic identification of the a priori with the analytic has almost obscured the fact that for Kant, whom the positivist was so bent on refuting, the phrase "a priori" meant "absolutely independent of experience" while the word "analytic" referred to judgments "in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity." Moreover, Kant's chief reason for saying that some judgments are a priori is the fact that they are necessary. Necessity, Kant says, is a criterion by which we can distinguish a priori judgments. He says that experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise. There-

[2]White, Morton, "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism," *John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom*, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: Dial Press, 1950), pp. 316-317.

fore, according to Kant, the concepts of necessity, a priori-ness, and analyticity were distinct, and the problem was to relate them to one another. Positivists also acknowledge the existence of truths which are a priori because necessary, but then wish to show that necessary truths *are* necessary simply because they are analytic. The positivistic argument runs: (1) *All and only a priori truths are necessary*; (2) *All and only necessary truths are analytic*; therefore, (3) *All and only a priori truths are analytic.* And since Kant accepts statement (1), the difference between the positivist and Kant over statement (3) may be thought of as arising from their difference over statement (2), which Kant, as we know, denied.

This way of looking at the matter makes clear that the positivist's assumption that there is such a thing as a priori knowledge which is expressed in necessary statements is what leads him to draw his distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. For the positivist wishes to show, so to speak, that a statement is a priori *because* it is analytic, that we do not depend on *experience* in justifying it because we can justify it in some other way. In one version of the positivistic theory we can justify the statement by examining only the meanings of its component terms, and this is what frees us from dependence on experience. Moreover, on this view and on Kant's, if a statement must be justified by appeal to experience it cannot be analytic. For if it is analytic, it is necessary and, as Kant says, a necessary judgment cannot be established by appeal to experience. No statement is analytic a posteriori.

Now what is the relation between Dewey's view and this way of looking at the problem? It may be summarized by saying (1) that there are places in which he denies the existence of a priori knowledge and (2) that there are also places in his writing where he virtually affirms the existence of analytic a posteriori statements. The result is paradoxical from the point of view of recent discussions of the problem of a priori knowledge. For if a philosopher denies that there is any such thing as a priori knowledge and hence believes that all knowledge is a posteriori, it seems odd that he should continue to speak of *any* statements being true by virtue of the meanings of their terms alone. And yet this is precisely what Dewey does when he comes to discuss what he calls "universal" as opposed to "generic" propositions. He thinks that the laws of natural

science are at one and the same time analytic and a posteriori, even if he does not say so in just so many words.

III

Before presenting the evidence for this, I must make a few more preliminary remarks. In Kant's discussion of the a priori, the status of logical principles was not a central issue. He was primarily concerned with truths of arithmetic, geometry, and physics. And he was eager to show that there are truths in each of these domains which are synthetic a priori, because they are fundamentally different from analytic truths of essential predication like "Every bachelor is an unmarried male adult." The positivists, persuaded as they were that applied geometry and physics contained no a priori truths, did not argue very much with Kant about *their* analyticity. Or, to put it another way, positivists felt that so far from being analytic, such statements weren't even a priori. But positivists did join issue with Kant on the nature of arithmetic, which they regarded as a priori, and this led to a discussion of the nature of logic. Why did it lead to such a discussion? Because some positivists held with Frege that the truths of arithmetic were analytic as a consequence of being deducible from those of logic, and that it was this that refuted Kant on arithmetic.

However, the conception of logic employed by the positivist in this attack on Kant was very different from Kant's own, if only because Kant did not have the benefit of *Principia Mathematica.* In contemporary terminology, Kant limited the class of analytic truths to those that could be derived by putting synonyms for synonyms in a *limited* class of logical truths, simply because he described analytic judgments as "those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity." This seems to restrict the class of analytic statements to those which are the result of putting synonyms for synonyms in substitution-instances of formulae like: "Every P is a P," "Everything which is a P and a Q is a Q," "Everything which is a P and a Q, is a P," "All and only things which are P's are P's."

Therefore, the first move of the positivist influenced by Frege is to expand this set of logical principles, for the positivist cannot

deduce arithmetic if he does not. Therefore, the positivist alters the *data* of Kant's problem. But in altering the data, the positivist catapults himself into a new problem. Because now the positivist must explain the sense in which both Kant's and his own additional logical principles are analytic, since the positivist cannot continue to define an analytic statement as one in which "the connection between the subject and predicate is thought through identity." The seriousness of this problem is underscored by the fact that there was a time when postivistically minded logicians thought that they could produce a criterion which would do for all logical principles what the truth-table method does for the calculus of statements. But this has been shown to be impossible. Therefore, some other interpretation must be given to the contention that the principles of logic are analytic. But, in my opinion, none has been given. If it be said that analyticity is simply obviousness, or self-evidence, then why all the bother about deducing "$7 + 5 = 12$"? Surely this is just as evident as some of the logical truths used in its deduction—if not more so.

As if this were not enough, the positivist is also faced—as a modern Kantian is too, incidentally—with the problem of telling us how we shall understand the expression "synonymous with" in his demonstration of the analyticity of so-called truths of essential predication. For even if he were clear about what is meant by saying that the statement "Every bachelor is a bachelor" is analytic, he would still have to say what he means by saying that the expression "bachelor" is synonymous with "unmarried male adult," as opposed to being merely coextensive with it.

IV

Since recent criticism of the positivist's treatment of a priori knowledge divides itself into a question about the analyticity of so-called logical truths and another about synonymy, we may approach the work of Dewey with two questions: (a) How does he view logical (and mathematical) truths? (b) How does he view so-called statements of essential predication?

Before we turn to Dewey's writings in detail, it is advisable to point out that he never seems to have tried to meet Kant by using

the supposed philosophical accomplishment of *Principia Mathematica*. But he has had many things to say about logical principles which bear on the issues that are raised by positivistic dependence on the logistic thesis.

First let us ask whether Dewey believes that the truths of logic and arithmetic are a priori. For if he denies that they are, then we may say that his views on this question are irrelevant to or undercut the controversies of the last twenty years. And, in fact, there are places in which he seems to deny that the truths of formal logic and mathematics are a priori. We find Dewey saying in his *Reconstruction in Philosophy*: "Mathematics is often cited as an example of purely normative thinking dependent on a priori canons and supra-empirical material. But it is hard to see how the student who approaches the matter historically can avoid the conclusion that the status of mathematics is as empirical as that of metallurgy." And a little further on in this same book Dewey says: "Logic is a matter of profound human importance precisely because it is empirically founded and experimentally applied." Faced with these passages, one is led to say that Dewey does not believe that there are *any* a priori truths and therefore that he avoids both the problem of Kant and that of the logical positivists by denying one of their assumptions.

It might be said in reply that Dewey's use of the word "logic" is so different from that of Kant and the positivists that he would naturally, but irrelevantly, say that logic is a posteriori. For doesn't he hold that logic is a science in so far as "it gives an organized and tested descriptive account of the way in which thought actually goes on"? And isn't this why Peirce said that Dewey regarded logic as the natural history of thought and not as a normative science? The reply is certainly in order, but I do not think that it suffices to dismiss Dewey's views on logic as altogether irrelevant to the traditional controversy. For in that same passage in which he says that logic is a descriptive science, Dewey says that it is an art too. And when he calls it an art, he says he means that it "projects methods by which future thinking shall take advantage of the operations that lead to success and avoid those which result in failure." And when he speaks of methods, he is thinking also of methods of inference which are formulated by the principles of formal logic. Therefore, he *does* join issue with Kant and the posi-

tivist, as is even more evident in his *Logic*. The fundamental theory of that book is that "all logical forms . . . arise within the operation of inquiry and are concerned with control of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions." And when Dewey speaks of logical forms he says he is referring to principles like "if anything has a certain property, and whatever has this property has a certain other property, then the thing in question has this certain other property," as well as to the traditional principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. He is not speaking solely of statements that might normally be assigned to the "natural history of thought."

Dewey speaks of such logical forms or principles as "conditions," "demands," "postulates," "requirements" of inquiry. To engage in an inquiry, Dewey says, is "like entering a contract. It commits the inquirer to observance of certain conditions." Having agreed to engage in an inquiry, so to speak, you bind yourself, or promise, or agree to proceed in a way that observes a "rule" or "logical law" like "if anything has a certain property, and whatever has this property has a certain other property, then the thing in question has this certain other property." He says: "If you are going to inquire in a way which meets the requirements of inquiry, you must proceed in a way which observes this rule, just as when you make a business contract there are certain conditions to be fulfilled." Such observance of logical rules is "at first implicit in the undertaking of inquiry. As they are formally acknowledged (formulated), they become logical forms of various degrees of generality."

This statement by Dewey may be used to bring out a number of important features of his view. First of all, and most important for the student of Dewey's theory of a priori knowledge, is the fact that postulated logical forms ("principles" or "rules," as Dewey calls them) may change in time. "Postulates alter as methods of inquiry are perfected; the logical forms that express modern inquiry are in many respects quite unlike those that formulated the procedures of Greek science." And here we seem to find a radical departure from a more traditional view of the truths of logic. The only sense in which they are necessary, for Dewey, is conditional: one must accept them at a given time if at that time our aim of successful inquiry requires us to accept them. Such principles are not imposed on inquiry from without, Dewey says over and over

again, and therefore they are not "externally a priori," and they are not "a priori principles fixed antecedently to inquiry and conditioning it *ab extra*." He says of a logical principle that "while it is derived from what is involved in inquiries that have been successful in the past, it imposes a condition to be satisfied in future inquiries, until the results of such inquiries show reason for modifying it." This means that logical principles for Dewey are neither "arbitrary" nor "mere linguistic conventions." "They must be such as control the determination and arrangement of subject-matter with respect to achieving enduringly stable beliefs."

It is just this instrumental feature of logical principles which leads Dewey to deny a sharp distinction between a priori principles of formal logic and a posteriori principles of natural science, and, in a sense, to deny the very existence of a priori knowledge. This is most explicit in his statement of a view which he says he derives from Peirce. (Whether Dewey is right in assigning this view to Peirce is of no interest to me at the moment.) Dewey speaks of "leading principles" as articulations of habits of inference which may be narrower or wider in scope. "Material" leading principles, which are relatively narrow, correspond to empirical generalizations, while those which formulate habits involved in *every* inference, in spite of differences of subject-matter, are "formal." But it must be insisted that Dewey does not draw a distinction between these two kinds of leading principles on the ground that the formal principles are a priori while the material principles are a posteriori. In so far as the two kinds of principles differ only in *width*, they differ, we may say, only in degree and not in kind. Basing himself on the model of a craftsman who "learns that if he operates in a certain *way* the result will take care of itself, certain materials being given," Dewey says that we discover that "if we draw our inferences in a certain way, we shall, other things being equal, get dependable conclusions."

In this context Dewey does not formulate a radical distinction between an inference in accordance with a law of natural science and an inference in accordance with a law of logic. *Both* of them are governed or involve habits "that tend to yield conclusions that are stable and productive in further inquiries." The fact that some leading principles are formal and others not, does not lead Dewey

to say that the formal principles are justified independently of experience while non-formal principles depend on experience. On his view, I infer, a physical principle like conservation of energy is not justified in a way radically different from the way in which logical principles are justified.

> The position taken [he says] implies the ultimacy of inquiry in determination of the formal conditions of inquiry. Logic as inquiry into inquiry . . . does not depend upon anything extraneous to inquiry. The force of this proposition may perhaps be most readily understood by noting what it precludes. It precludes the determination and selection of logical first principles by an a priori intuitional act, even when the intuition in question is said to be that of *Intellectus Purus*. It precludes resting logic upon metaphysical and epistemological assumptions and presuppositions. The latter are to be determined, if at all, by means of what is disclosed as the outcome of inquiry; they are not to be shoved under inquiry as its "foundation."

It is hard, therefore, to distinguish the justification of such principles from the justification of those which are, say, physical, for physical principles will also be determined "by means of what is disclosed as the outcome of inquiry." And so Dewey says:

> In the degree in which we understand what is done in inquiries that result in warranted assertions, we understand the operational conditions which have to be observed. . . . The conditions of the required operations (required in order that a certain kind of consequent may issue) *are as much matters of experience as are factual contents: which are themselves also discriminated in order to serve as conditions of a warranted outcome.* [My italics.]

I conclude from passages like this in the *Logic* and from others in *Reconstruction in Philosophy* that Dewey, in some places at least, opposes a distinction according to which all truths of formal logic are a priori and all truths of natural science a posteriori, and, moreover, seems to deny the existence of a priori knowledge.

V

As I have already indicated, however, Dewey's reflections on the matter do not end here. Having led us to believe that he cannot draw a sharp epistemological line between logical and non-logical truths, he now proceeds to puzzle us by what he says about the

distinction between "existential" and "ideational" propositions, as he calls them; and we become even more puzzled by his disastrous distinction between "generic" and "universal" propositions. For after implying that formal logic is just as empirical as physics is, Dewey now implies that the laws of physics are analytic *and* that they must be justified by experience. Let us examine the text in order to see how this comes about.

In his *Logic* Dewey makes a distinction between what he calls "existential" and "ideational" propositions which resembles that between synthetic and analytic statements. Thus Dewey says:

> Propositions . . . are . . . of two main categories: (1) Existential, referring directly to actual conditions as determined by experimental observation, and (2) ideational or conceptual, consisting of interrelated meanings, which are non-existential in content in *direct* reference but which are applicable to existence through the operations they represent as possibilities.

I realize, of course, that he follows this with a kind of pragmatic incantation, for he says that "In constituting respectively material and procedural means, the two types of propositions are conjugate, or functionally correspondent. They form the fundamental divisions of labor in inquiry." But this is an experimentalist's blessing of a distinction which one does not expect to find Dewey making after he has criticized the "sharp division between knowledge of matters of fact and of relations between ideas." For all of Dewey's aversion to "shoving" abstract meanings under logical principles, he surreptitiously shoves them under his "ideational propositions," which might be called analytic by a positivist. And for all of his aversion, in the early pages of the *Logic*, to a sharp division between logical leading principles and material leading principles, does he not make this same sharp division when he formulates his distinction between implication and inference?

Were this the only *volte face* in the later pages of his *Logic*, one might say that Dewey is merely reverting to a position like that of Hume and the logical positivists. But once Dewey begins to fall, there is no stopping him and before he is finished he is, I submit, a rationalist in the worst sense of that word,[3] one who thinks that the

---

[3]See Miss May Brodbeck's trenchant article, "The New Rationalism: Dewey's Theory of Induction," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 46 (1949), pp. 780-791.

laws of natural science are established by examining the relations between concepts alone. We may see why, by asking what sorts of statements he calls existential and ideational. Like so many of his predecessors (and successors) in the history of philosophy, Dewey is struck by a distinction between two kinds of statements which begin with the word "all." He speaks of "the ambiguity of 'all' as sometimes having existential reference, in which case it represents an inference having at best a high order of probability, and sometimes having non-existential reference, when it stands for a necessary relation which follows, by definition, from analysis of a conception."

In effect, he calls existential "all"-propositions "generic" and ideational "all"-propositions "universal." Thus he says that the statement "All men are mortal" may be construed as meaning either "All men have died or will die"—in which case it is, according to Dewey, a "spatio-temporal proposition" and generic; or it may be construed as meaning "If anything is human, *then* it is mortal," in which case it is *universal* and states, says Dewey, "a necessary relation of abstract characters." On the first interpretation, Dewey goes on to say, the statement is inductive and matter-of-fact; on the second it is valid, "if valid at all, by definition of a conception." The pervasiveness of the error into which he has fallen becomes clearer when we discover that he also construes contrary-to-fact conditional statements of science as universal and hence as valid "by definition." He says:

> In science, there are many propositions in which the clause introduced by "if" is known to be contrary to conditions set by existential circumstances; that is, to be such that they cannot be existentially satisfied, as "If a particle at rest is acted upon by a single moving particle, then," etc. In such propositions *if* and *when* designate a connection of conceptual subject-matters, not of existential or temporo-spatial matters. If the word "conditions" is used, it now refers to a logical relation, not to existential circumstances.

Throughout the later chapters of the *Logic*, Dewey speaks of the *necessity* of universal propositions as opposed to the contingency of generic propositions, and of the analytic and definitional nature of the former. He also appears to hypostatize meanings in spite of his protest against other philosophers who do the same thing. Speaking of definitions, he says that "in a definition a single symbol having a

total meaning is resolved into an *interrelation* of meanings." He adds that in definition "conceptual meanings . . . are resolved into characters that are *necessarily* interrelated just because they are an analysis of a single conception." He also tells us that mathematical statements are universal because they are abstract hypothetical propositions. And the grand climax of that part of Dewey's *Logic* which flows from his contrast between existential generic propositions and ideational universal ones—a part which begins roughly around page 254 and continues remorselessly through about page 486—is the statement on page 453 that all physical laws state a relation of characters, preferably in mathematical equations, and that "while the latter have ultimate existential reference, through the possible operations they direct, they are non-existential (and hence non-temporal) in their content."

VI

How shall we sum up? I am inclined to say that Dewey's view of so-called a priori knowledge is inconsistent. The view set forth in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, in *The Quest for Certainty*, and in about the first one hundred and fifty pages of the *Logic*, is that there is no such thing as a priori knowledge. But if there isn't, then one might say that Dewey has dispensed with the need for a concept of analytic truth. Yet Dewey's distinction between generic and universal statements is not only founded on a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, but it also leads Dewey to say, in effect, that there are analytic a posteriori statements. Therefore, he simultaneously dissociates himself from philosophers who have campaigned against positivistic complacency about the notion of analytic, and from those partisans of positivism who, while they are happy with analyticity, are horrified at the thought of an analytic a posteriori statement.

I think it is fair to place Ernest Nagel in this second category, a fact which explains his puzzled reaction to Dewey's theory of generic and universal propositions. In his review of Dewey's *Logic*, Nagel is confident about there being a clear use of the term "analytic." (Being less confident about this, I am puzzled by Nagel's dark allusions to the "contemporary technical sense" of the word

"analytic" in his review. Although his review was published originally in 1939, he has reprinted it recently[4] and so I must assume that he is still confident about that contemporary technical sense. Why, I do not know. But let us proceed.) What troubles Nagel is not that Dewey should believe that there are analytic statements, but that he should say that the law of universal gravitation is analytic in this "contemporary technical sense." What Nagel does not stress sufficiently, however, is the fact that Dewey thinks *all* of the *laws* of natural science are universal, i.e. "analytic" and "definitory," at the same time as he says that they are tested by experience. In short, that Dewey believes the laws of natural science are analytic a posteriori, every one of them.

The question naturally arises: How does Dewey get himself into his predicament? I can suggest one answer to this question without being sure of its diagnostic power. I believe that Dewey was unsuccessfully seeking a solution of the problem of lawlike statements, as it has been called more recently. This is suggested by the fact that his generic statement, "All men have died or will die" differs from his universal "All men are mortal" in a way that is reminiscent of Goodman's distinction between a non-lawlike and a lawlike statement.[5] It is confirmed by the fact that Dewey proposes contrary-to-fact-conditionals as examples of universal propositions and that Goodman characterizes a lawlike statement as one that supports a contrary-to-fact conditional. Dewey was rightly aware of the fact that contrary-to-fact conditionals assert a *connection* between antecedent and consequence, in a sense a *necessary* connection. But, since he seems to have been tied in one part of his *Logic* to the positivistic view that all necessary connections are analytic and definitional, he could find no better way out than to call scientific laws definitional and analytic.

Dewey was a valiant figure in the struggle to solve the problem of necessity, but he was not the source of final truth. In one part of his thinking he was led to say that we cannot neatly characterize all

---

[4]Nagel, Ernest, *Sovereign Reason* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954).
[5]Goodman, Nelson, *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955).

of logic as a priori and all of natural science as a posteriori. But when he was trapped into saying that all of the laws of natural science are analytic, he revealed his confusion—so much confusion that it is hard to see how Dewey could have consistently sustained his attack on social philosophies like that of Natural Law. Dewey, of course, was always suspicious of social doctrines dominated by what he calls "the conceptual approach." Even after his defense of the view that the laws of empirical science are necessary because analytic, he makes critical allusions in his *Logic* to those who defend the doctrine of Natural Law and the theory of intuitions of *a priori* necessary truths. He charges them with a failure to recognize what he calls "the three indispensable logical conditions of conceptual subject-matter in scientific method":

> (1) the status of theoretical conceptions as hypotheses which (2) have a directive function in control of observation and ultimate practical transformation of antecedent phenomena, and which (3) are tested and continually revised on the ground of the consequences they produce in existential application.

But, one may finally ask, doesn't Dewey want to have his cake and eat it? He wants the hypotheses of social scientists (and moralists too) to be subject to alteration as circumstances and evidence changes, yet in his logical description of the aim of science he says that scientists seek analytic connections between abstract characters. How, in all consistency, can he say that *such* a connection will be falsified by appeal to experience? How can he consistently attack partisans of natural law like Aquinas?[6] One is bound to say that his doctrine of generic and univeral propositions is not only untenable, but that it leaves him naked to his ideological enemies. No amount of pragmatic talk can undo his capitulation to rationalism in the later pages of his *Logic*. And while there are problems created by the more empiricistic doctrine set forth in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, in *The Quest for Certainty*, and in the earlier parts of the *Logic*, I believe that these texts represent a healthier strain in Dewey's thinking on this subject.

---

[6]See the "Epilogue" to my *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

In this year of Dewey's centennial we can pay him no greater tribute than to examine his views carefully and seriously. Nothing could be more alien to the spirit of the man or of his philosophy than a worshipful repetition of his more ambiguous words. For it was Dewey who once said:

> Anybody can notice today that the effect of an original and powerful teacher is not all to the good. Those influenced by him often show a one-sided interest; they tend to form schools, and to become impervious to other problems and truths; they incline to swear by the words of their master and to go on repeating his words after him, and often without the spirit and insight that originally made them significant.

Northborn

By MEMORY McGONIGAL

Oh, I am not as I thought I would be in my aging—
Not of the gentle, who ask but the sun to warm them;
Late in the northborn rises the northblood, raging—
South can never appease them, never unform them.

Let me away from this place without season, loose me
From the slumber and the songs half sighs and the loves half laughter;
I am the child of time; it took to produce me
Winters, and the dying of years, and the springs coming after.

How shall I float on these tepid tides, to the rocking
Of the barcarolle and the soft strings strumming under?—
I who have shouted aloud to hear the unlocking
Of the frozen waters when they pour in floods of thunder?

Giant again, I have sent forth my sighing before me,
Gust on the gale—there is one who will know I am coming;
Countryman, countryman, oh, for the love that you bore me,
Let the wild pipes play, let the great drums be drumming!

MEMORY McGONIGAL's verse has appeared in *Saturday Evening Post*, *Good Housekeeping*, *Commonweal*, and elsewhere. An employee of the McCall Corporation, she makes her home in Brooklyn Heights.

Frontiers for an Experimentalist Philosophy of Education

By FRANCIS T. VILLEMAIN
and NATHANIEL L. CHAMPLIN

■ Dewey's educational theory is primarily a philosophy of scientific learning more broadly conceived than heretofore since such learning, he feels, should not only comply with a scientific format but should also be addressed to the problems of free men. But this educational theory does not do justice to the richness of Dewey's thought, nor is it entirely compatible with a major element in his thinking. In certain writings not concerned directly with schooling there is a cluster of ideas which, if developed, would bring about a major change both in Dewey's educational theory and in the broad reaches of contemporary experimentalism. This set of ideas, we believe, locates an instrument of no less power than scientific method, an instrument capable of being employed in the construction, direction, and assessment of human life.

For some people it might seem inappropriate to turn to Dewey's general writings when the task is one of developing his educational theory. It could be argued that his general philosophy is really about other matters and not relevant directly to the work of the schools. Such a view would be unacceptable to Dewey. He subsumes schooling under the more generally defined concept of education. "Schooling is a part of the work of education, but education in its full meaning includes all the influences that go to form the attitudes and dis-

---

FRANCIS VILLEMAIN and NATHANIEL CHAMPLIN have been collaborating ever since their graduate days at Columbia. At present they are teaching philosophy of education at, respectively, Rutgers and Wayne State University.

positions (of desire as well as of belief), which constitutes dominant habits of mind and character."[1]

In his major educational document, *Democracy and Education,* Dewey defines philosophy in such a way that any separation between philosophy and educational theory is untenable. To maintain this separation is to block the creative exploitation of Dewey's thought and, at the same time, to ignore and violate his vision of the subject matter and purposes of philosophic reflection. On the other hand, to move with Dewey's thought is to press into service the full sweep of his philosophic themes in order to have an educational theory as comprehensive as he envisioned it to be: "If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined *as the general theory of education.*"[2] Philosophical writings that do not deal explicitly with schooling are to be taken as part of a general educational theory and, as such, are properly used for contributing to the development of conceptions about and directives for *education in the schools.* Following this Deweyan directive, "philosophy of education" refers to a critically developed organization of ideas in which general conceptions uniquely relevant to schooling are at once featured and systematically unified with a general theory of education. This unification may act to modify both general theory and schooling directives.

II

While Dewey is a recognized spokesman on such matters as pragmatism and democracy, these matters do not encompass the heart of his philosophy. An examination of his theory of experience and his vision of the *summum bonum* shows him to be a philosopher of art above all else. As a major interpreter of Dewey says, art experience "is the central theme in all of Dewey's thinking. . . . His educational, social, scientific and logical contributions, technical as they can become, are all geared to this end."

In the Dewey view of the nature of experience, the esthetic is so central that we cannot have an experience without it. Indeed, it is the defining characteristics of "an experience." Dewey writes: "An experience has a unity that gives it its name, *that* meal, that storm,

that rupture of friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted by a single *quality* that pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts."[3] Since ". . . the esthetic is no intruder in experience from without . . .", we cannot escape qualities nor need we apologize for them. The qualitative or esthetic is generic to *all* experience.

We have here a preliminary set of notions. First, it is being argued that the qualitative is not to be set off as a type of experience that is independent of still other forms of experience. Rather, it is woven into the fabric of all "normally complete experience." Second, the qualitative or esthetic is ever present whether the experience is primarily of a painting or of a mathematical formula. Third, qualities are not to be construed as a superfluous luxury nor as a contamination of "pure" experience. And fourth, since qualities *just are,* they are candidates for evaluation or assessment.

Dewey finds these qualities performing a function vital to the perpetuation of things that dearly matter: ". . . the immediate existence of quality, and of dominant and pervasive quality, is the background, the point of departure, and the regulative principle of all thinking."[4] This is an extremely sweeping claim. Even our language, Dewey tells us, becomes a "meaningless jumble" when it proceeds without reference to the "pervasively qualitative." The qualitative sets the necessary framework in which cognitive operations are released. But there is more to it than this. What Dewey calls "pervasive quality" functions in a *regulative* capacity. "Without its controlling presence, there is no way to determine the relevancy, weight or coherence of any designated distinction or relation. The universe of experience surrounds and regulates the universe of discourse. . . ."[5] And further: ". . . such qualities permeate and color *all* the objects and events that are involved in an experience."

Dewey goes on to say that we *think* in terms of the relations of qualities. There is "qualitative thought." In his view this kind of thinking is as demanding as the kind we do "in terms of symbols, verbal and mathematical." The distinction to be noted is that we can think *about* qualities—as Dewey is doing in his writing—and we can think *with* qualities. That is, qualities are themselves *thoughts.* Particularly this second point prompts the conclusion that the process of creating, deploying, working, and reworking qualities

is a form of intelligence. Where he was centrally concerned with this in *Art as Experience,* Dewey writes, "Any idea that ignores the necessary role of intelligence in production of works of art is based upon identification of thinking with use of one special kind of material, verbal signs and words. An incredible amount . . . of intelligence . . . is exercised in perception of qualitative relations. . . ."[6] This process of qualitative thinking is a "doing or making." When the outcome sought by the doing and making is itself a quality, and when this quality has acted in a regulative way over the doing and making, we have a case of that kind of intelligence which is art. As Dewey puts it: "The doing or making is artistic when the perceived result is of such a nature that *its* qualities *as perceived* have controlled the question of production."

There are experimentalists who would be reluctant to grant that such doing and making is intelligence. They would be quite willing to call it art. Even Dewey, elsewhere in his writings, equates intelligence with the processes of empirical inquiry. But any activity which is purposive and focally preoccupied with a qualitative consequence fits not only Dewey's theory of art but also his general theory of intelligence. The Dewey of *Experience and Nature* writes:

> "Thought," reason, intelligence, whatever the word we choose to use, is existentially an adjective (or better an adverb), not a noun. It is disposition of activity, a quality of that conduct which foresees consequences of existing events, and which uses what is foreseen as a plan and method of administering affairs.[7]

It is important to point out at this juncture that a conception describing art as an affair of intelligence does not for Dewey make art a special case of cognition. Consistent with his experimentalism, Dewey insisted upon art as an affair of qualitative relating. His theory of art is not subsumed under his general theory of knowledge. Of course his is a *theory* of art and, as such, is to be examined from the vantage point of standards which apply to any theory. But it is a theory about something which itself is not an affair of theory or of knowing. In a reply to Croce, he makes this crystal clear.

> . . . Croce assumes that I have written about art with the intention of bringing it within the scope of pragmatic philosophy. . . . . The actual fact is that I have consistently treated the pragmatic theory as a theory of *knowing,* and as confined within the limits of the field of specifically

cognitive subject-matter. And in addition I have specifically rejected the idea that aesthetic subject-matter is a form of knowledge. . . .[8]

The fact that Dewey makes use of illustrative instances in such fields as painting, music, and architecture might reinforce the thought that his is simply a theory of "fine art." But while Dewey turns to such areas as these to obtain empirical data for the support of his conclusions, he does not take these areas to exhaust what is meant by artistic "doing and making." Again, the esthetic or qualitative is generic to all experience. Any experience can become art experience—not simply those labelled "fine arts" experience.

Nor does Dewey rest his case with this analysis. He makes a staggering claim—the claim of claims—for the qualitative. The ultimate goals for human life, the locus of the good, are seen to reside in art experience. "Art—the mode of activity that is charged with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession—is the complete culmination of nature, and . . . 'science' is properly a handmaiden that conducts natural events to this happy issue."[9]

Such a statement as this should lay to rest the notion that Dewey makes knowing operations, or the scientific method, the final good for human life. Science, law, medicine, schooling, or any human activity or social arrangement are, in the last analysis, to be assessed in terms of their adequacy as "handmaidens" (an *instrumental* office) to the perpetuation and refinement of experience focally esthetic. "Esthetic experience is a manifestation, a record and celebration of the life of a civilization, a means of promoting its development, and is also the ultimate judgment upon the quality of a civilization."[10] To which must be added a warning: "As long as art is the beauty parlor of civilization, neither art nor civilization is secure."

III

The development of a complete and coherent philosophy of education which does justice to the foregoing conceptions concerning art was not undertaken by Dewey, nor has it appeared to be a task of compelling importance to Dewey's students. The full-blown Deweyan philosophy of education awaits the perception of the qualitative-esthetic theme and of the strengthened relations between this

part of his thought and the great themes which make up his educational theory. Such a philosophy would in no way depreciate the role and procedure of empirical inquiry in the educational situation. The import might well be even greater. But such an educational outlook, while encompassing the body of educational writings herein held as incomplete, would, in the final analysis, be a philosophy of art education writ large.

A promising approach to this frontier task for a Deweyan-based philosophy of education is the same one Dewey used in studying and building his theory of art experience. This approach is distinguished from others by the fact that it attempts to reach generalizations about, or to locate governing agencies for, relationships between acts and consequences—between means and ends. The inquiries conducted toward gaining such conclusions are here called "methodological inquiries." Logicians have, of course, been carrying on such inquiries for years. The laws of logic delineated by logicians are prescriptions to be followed in relating theoretical materials. But this interest in delineating regulative devices for governing conduct has rarely been directed to qualitative materials.[11]

Dewey's thought is pioneering in this respect. He conceived the arts in such a way as to render them amenable to a study which could reach methodological conclusions. It must be born in mind that he made the arts an affair of intelligence which, in turn, he defined as an activity of deliberately controlled means-ends relating. And to say that the arts are controlled is to say that they are subject to a regulative device which patterns the relating of means to ends.

Methodological inquiry studies conduct which reveals and submits to deliberate and self-imposed pattern. Such inquiry must produce theory about these orderings. Hence, not any subject matter is a proper object for such investigations. Nor are concepts from just any field of knowledge appropriate.

Dewey seems to be struggling to maintain this methodological approach to the qualitative. By emphasizing and depending upon such concepts as "meaning," "thought," "means," "ends," "control," and "order," he de-emphasizes and, at times, actually rejects concepts from such fields as psychology, physiology, and neurology. His disposition toward methodological language and away from concepts receiving their meaning in other fields is sound on at least

two grounds. First, non-methodological conceptions cannot contribute either to a definition of art experience or to a theory about it. Second, such conceptions are further unsuitable because as terms they do not represent (stand for) things which can be studied methodologically. They fail to represent the distinctive character of the matters examined.

This point on the appropriateness of concepts with respect to any given inquiry deserves an illustration and further analysis. One cannot describe onomatopoeia by describing the vibrations of the ear drums, the electronic impulses of the nervous system, the light waves reflected from typewritten pages, or the muscular contractions of the larynx when in the presence of an instance of this form of poetic construction. When in seeking to describe some discrimination made in experience (for example, the onomatopoeia) we use language which refers simply to elements which sustain or produce the discriminated, we have committed the reductive fallacy. We leave the distinctive thing we are talking about undescribed. Or we may leave our readers and ourselves with a case of mistaken identity. Needless to say, Dewey criticizes this fallacy throughout his writings.

In no way is this to be taken as saying that other-than-methodological modes of constructing knowledge claims are menial and unworthy of vigorous pursuit. Different modes of inquiry, with different concepts, locate and study different things. Their subject matters, together with the language they use to locate and describe these subject matters, should not be confused with each other. The choice of one over another is dependent upon the problem to which one is addressed.

The problem of education requires methodological theory—conceptions which direct educators in their selection of the procedures, the means and the objectives of their undertaking. A philosophy of education which fails to provide educators with direction at these crucial points may still be a hymn to the profession, but it will not release professional performance in education. Since, however, methodological discourse provides knowledge expressly about procedures identifying subject matters to be manipulated and goals to be obtained—all matters of, for, and by experience—it *does* release the professional activity of the teacher.

Educational theorists within the Deweyan tradition have work

to do on two broad fronts. First, there must be a major expansion and systemization of methodological knowledge about the qualitative which would include its bearing upon and relation to cognitive operations. Second, there must be a re-examination of Dewey's insightful educational themes with a view toward their integration with this new knowledge. Work on both of these broad fronts is work that will entail the reconstruction of theory all along the line.

IV

Traditionally the term "quality" has been used to refer to a standard of excellence or to an attribute of something. An alternative, and methodological, definition must be fashioned if we are to extend Dewey's analysis of the qualitative. Such terms as "method," "means," "ends-in-view," "thought," "symbols," "mediation," and "control" are foundational to methodological inquiries—so much so that this sort of inquiry cannot proceed without them. Literally, they define the subject matters of these inquiries. If such terms cannot apply to what is designated by the term "qualitative," then plainly, methodological discourse is irrelevant.

Suppose, to illustrate, we do as Dewey did: we turn to the arts. A college authority commissions an architect to design a classroom building. Having been informed of the budget, the site, the space requirements, the activities to take place, the health and safety conditions, building codes, and such matters as these, the architect still lacks that which will permit him to design the building. He will have to ask the college authority whether it wants a Georgian, Classical, Cape Cod, Swiss Chalet, California Ranch, Jacobean, Norman Fortress, Gothic, or Modern International building. Once this has been determined, the architect has a format which will release his designing activity. He will know whether the building is to be tall and slender or long and horizontal; whether it will be light and airy or heavy and ponderous; or whether it will depend primarily upon wood, stone, glass, or concrete.

If the style selected is Gothic, the term "Gothic" does not provide the format. But it does *refer to* a host of structures that are differentiated from other structures by virtue of what they have in common. This commonality or pervasiveness is a regulative device. It

sets the format or pattern, prescribes the elements employed in the designing, and acts as a point of reference for determining what is to be rejected as inappropriate. For example, the architect will not use a glass block wall studded with aluminum frame windows, or fluted columns to support a picture window. The building will not be a horizontal structure nestling into the grade of the terrain. While it is true that the architect must confront qualities as relevant *means,* and although he may eliminate certain Gothic elements, still the fact that these elements are possible *means* is determined by that to which we refer with the term "Gothicness." This regulative device which controls or directs the designing procedure is the architect's *method.*

Method as one distinction may be joined by a second and third. Our architect will no doubt design a building which will be a distinct example. This distinctiveness—sharing in the commonality of Gothicness—is his specific *end-in-view.* Further, he has a range of *means* by which he attains the end-in-view, the distinctiveness—means in the sense that they are the elements which are incorporated into and produce the end. The end emerges from the components selected and organized and is thus other than any one or a mere collection of these means. He builds his building by orchestrating method-authorized components, i.e., fenestration, elongation, filigree, volume juxtaposition, spatial modulation—each of which receives a character prescribed by the method followed and the end sought.

If quality is a matter for methodological definition at the most general level, it is also a matter of meaning. Since meaning is an affair of *instituted* connections or relationships (sometimes and inadequately called "perceived," "given," "felt," or "intuited"), then quality too must be such an affair. For what we refer to by the terms "Gothicness," "redness," or "joviality," at one and the same time emerges out of and exhibits instituted connections or relationships. The quality designated by the term "redness" is not obtained save as a relationship of contrast is instituted. When we have the quality of redness, we have a constructed contrast. This methodologically described circumstance must be present in order that a quality gain its status. Clearly, therefore, any quality is obtained only as these relationships are present, or better still, as the connection or relations are *presented.* In less methodological language, this same event

has been called "direct," "immediate," or "had in the present." Indeed, art experience has been distinguished as *immediate* rather than *mediate* and thus held to be outside of the bounds of methodological inquiry. But in rigorous methodological language qualities are affairs of presented or exhibited relationships; and these relationships constitute their meaning. And if qualities are meanings, they are symbols. Qualities represent the instituted relations out of which they emerge and which they help to present. Discriminations of some "itness" and "thatness" are products of constructed interconnections, and they stand for as they display these relations.

Our departure from current usage, which locates symbol as an element of cognitive processes, is warranted to the extent that the concept "symbol" rests primarily upon the notion of representation (as demanded by Charles Peirce), leaving open the question as to what is to be represented, whether things, events, processes, or relationships between terms or people. But we now have a different species of symbol. This other, or what may be termed "qualitative symbol," differs from that employed in cognitive procedures, herein referred to as "theoretical symbol." The difference is primarily one of emphasis. No hard and fast boundaries can be erected. However, one can be distinguished from another. A distinguishing feature of the qualitative symbol is that it presents what it represents. A distinguishing feature of the theoretical symbol is that it represents without displaying or placing before us what it represents. Each type of symbolic function has its own proper and improper mode of usage. The point to be made is that the qualitative *does* submit to methodological analysis. And the qualitative is continuous with and as thorough-going an affair of human intelligence as the deliberately ordered conduct of empirical knowing. The latter, tragically, is usually taken to exhaust what is "intellectual."

V

Students of Dewey who have made philosophy of education primarily a philosophy of democratized inquiry have in the main gained support from the Dewey of *How We Think*, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, and *Democracy and Education*. In these works we find Dewey's most influential, refined and extended analysis of

thought and intelligence. Still, however important such analysis has become, it is addressed primarily to the task of describing the manipulations of theoretical symbols. A *general theory* of intelligence must come to include a conception of qualitative intelligence and the indicated analyses.

In Dewey's most general account, intelligence is occasioned by and operative within what is called "problematic" or "indeterminate" situations. Room is thus left for an *other than* scientific intelligence. But the detailed descriptions of the problematic situation and its role in schooling fail to include an explicit account of how problems and procedures may be dominantly qualitative rather than dominantly theoretical. Dewey does little more than note the role of the qualitative in those problem situations which are dominantly theoretical. Accordingly, when it comes to organizing learning situations in the schools, teachers are expected to provide situations which are patterned after the broadly conceived procedures of empirical inquiry. Anything "more than this" is dismissed as "atmosphere," "frill," "non-method," "irrational," "non-intellectual," "emotional," and "subjective." Physiological, biological or psycho-therapeutic language becomes the language of the more sophisticated. Such restricted conceptions of learning, together with the dismissal of the *more or other than theoretical* (dismissals never made by Dewey), fog the vision of the full range of resources and potentialities of deliberately nurtured learning.

In the absence of methodological theory, the children in our schools receive a corresponding neglect in not having potential qualities built into their lives to think, prize, enjoy, and share with others. Since, as Dewey would remind us, no experience can proceed without the qualitative, school life necessarily includes qualities. But these qualities are included indiscriminately and inadvertently. Accident, restrictive interpretation, and arbitrarily "packaged" and isolated units reign in the absence of a systematic account of the qualitative in life and education. The qualitative as methodologically identified and described becomes, therefore, a vast sweep of matters to be built critically into the means, ends, and methods of the schools —matters to be injected systematically into the nurture and experiences provided the young.

Learning is properly conceived as occurring only in a problem-

atic situation, where some end-in-view is being sought. But the fact must be recognized that ends-in-view are to be found in a spectrum ranging from problems dominantly qualitative to, at the other extreme, problems which are predominantly theoretical. A given substantive instance of a problem may be such that the end-in-view is predominantly theoretical and, therefore, requires methods and means which are largely theoretical. The former instance places the theoretical in an instrumental relation to qualitative resolution. And in the latter instance qualitative orderings are in the service of ends which are singularly theoretical.

This expanded account of the "seat of learning," the problematic situation, should be integrated from the standpoint of valuation with the most sweeping educational criterion Dewey would have us use, the criterion by which we judge all educational criteria. Criticized and defended widely, Dewey's formulation and justification of this criterion still stands as the most adequate for the philosophy of experimentalism. "The educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end. . . . Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education."[12] He raises questions and forwards responses in the following:

> . . . from the standpoint of growth as education and education as growth the question is whether growth in this direction promotes or retards growth in general. Does this form of growth create conditions for further growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off the person who has grown in this particular direction from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing growth in new directions? What is the effect of growth in a special direction upon the attitudes and habits which alone open up avenues for development in other lines? I shall leave you to answer these questions, saying simply that when and *only* when development in a particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to the criterion of education as growing. For the conception is one that must find universal and not specialized limited application.[13]

This "growth for the sake of further growth" criterion does not specify substantive objectives for education. It need not do so. That is not its function. It functions to help in the appraisal of criteria on the one hand unique to theoretical "growings," and on the other hand unique to qualitative "growings." Qualitative methods are, in this view, properly appraised in terms of their contribution to the refine-

ment and extension of qualitative ordering. So, too, would be the case in theoretical orderings.

But this criterion does not reflect as fully as it might the judgment concerning the locus of the *summum bonum* for men as required by an esthetically oriented philosophy of education. Since the ultimate goal for men is seen as the attainment and continual reconstruction of art experience or qualitative intelligence, then the criterion, "growth for the sake of further growth," must yield to reformulation. All manner of experiencings and learnings are to be judged as growths if they contribute in the final analysis to growths which are focally qualitative. A philosophy of education which embraces this principle is then a philosophy of art education. As such, it places the theoretical in the service of the esthetic or qualitative.

We can be clearer about the purposes of the schools, as they are formulated with the foregoing generalizations, only as we consider the impact of schools so guided upon civilization. The issue is not whether or not the schools *should* have an impact upon civilization. The fact of the case is that they inescapably do. Neutrality is a myth. Dewey points to the issue as being one of determining what the impact *should be* "with the maximum possible of courageous intelligence and responsibility," rather than with blind chance. As the title, *Democracy and Education,* suggests, he sees the school as a social institution and as charged with the responsibility for contributing directly to the great social problem of preserving and extending our democratic heritage. Further, the democratic commitment is not only a conception about a kind of society the school should attempt to foster, but also a conception which defines attributes of schooling itself. The latter is necessary if the former is to be obtained. As methodologist, Dewey says, "as are the means used so are the actual ends achieved."[14] Democracy, therefore, is not limited to political, governmental, or economic arrangements. It is a personal, school and civilization ideal.

A democratic society is seen to be in a constant state of flux. Its "keynote" is in the demand for the "participation of every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the living of men together."[15] Its "foundation" rests upon a shared procedure in which the directives for social change are both developed and

tested in the process of that change. It is a way of life which depends upon the critical intelligence of all its members, upon unhampered social inquiry. If it has a faith, such a faith centers in human intelligence and shared experience. Indeed, Dewey finds this to be the distinguishing trait of his vision of the ideal life.

And, finally, the Deweyan educational perspective is revealed as he affirms the individual as the seat of moral worth. If democracy has moral meaning, it gains this meaning as all political, economic, industrial, and other arrangements contribute to the "all-around growth" of every member of the society. Here is democracy as an educational conception: "Since the process of experience is capable of being educative, faith in democracy is all one with faith in experience and education."[16]

Dewey's democratic social outlook upon the schools and their place in civilization may now be joined with the theme of qualitative intelligence. Dewey heralds this fusion in *A Common Faith,* where he establishes the distinction between "religion" and "the religious." The former makes reference to institutionalized beliefs and practices, while the latter is looked upon as a quality which may be said to pervade a wide variety of experiences, esthetic, scientific, political, moral, and others. If democracy is a distinctive and overarching ideal proposed for mankind and conceived as pervading all facets of social life, then it is to be revealed in those instances Dewey finds to have religious quality. "Any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value is religious in quality."[17] This thoroughgoing rejection of hedonism is joined by the acceptance of a creatively demanding conservatism. Dewey reminds us that what we prize most dearly are not of ourselves, but are the products of the past doings, makings, strivings, sufferings, and creatings of the "continuous human community" with which we are linked. Ours is the task of conserving, rectifying, and making more widely and generously shared these prizings.

There is but a small step to take from this set of notions advanced by John Dewey. His conception of democracy describes what must be present in order to obtain what is envisioned by the indicated redefinition. Democracy, reconceived, is that quality of experience which pervades social life, and in so doing contributes to the attain-

ment of the fullest possible growth of all toward qualitative ideals. So defined, democracy is a conception about an esthetic-religious affair.

Democratic public education is that form of education which provides this sort of religious experience. Methodologically viewed, such an educational task is one with the deliberate nurture of those qualities in the lives of the young which should permeate the schools and life in the civilization. This esthetic-social objective is one of developing competence in shared qualitative and theoretical intelligence that will enable men to move toward the religious ideal that is democracy. It is an ideal that holds the promise of qualitative extensions and refinements common to all people—the infinite reconstruction of our qualitative intelligence. It is in truth the democratization of art experience.

---

[1]John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (New York: Putnam, 1935), p. 58.
[2]John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1916), p. 383.
[3]John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton, Balch, 1934), pp. 37, 46.
[4]John Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization* (New York: Minton, Balch, 1931), p. 116.
[5]John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Henry Holt, 1938), p. 68-9.
[6]John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 46, pp. 50-51.
[7]John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Chicago: Open Court, 1925), pp. 158-159.
[8]John Dewey, "A Comment on the Foregoing Criticism," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. VI, No. 3, March, 1948, p. 207.
[9]John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 358.
[10]John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, pp. 326, 344.
[11]It is interesting to note that Dewey, who shared a great deal with Aristotle, should come to do to the arts in general what Aristotle, for the first time in the history of thought, did to tragic drama. This places both men solidly in the tradition of uniquely practiced methodological inquiry; uniquely so, for both Dewey and Aristotle conducted this sort of inquiry into the arts as well as into cognitive operations.
[12]John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 59-60.
[13]John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1938), p. 29.
[14]John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action*, p. 86.
[15]John Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," *School and Society*, Vol. 45, No. 1162, April 3, 1937, p. 457.
[16]John Dewey, "Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us," *The Philosopher of the Common Man* (New York: Putnam, 1940), p. 227.
[17]John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale, 1934), p. 9.

For Johnny Pole on the Forgotten Beach

By ANNE SEXTON

In his tenth July some instinct
taught him to arm the waiting wave,
a giant where its mouth hung open.
He rode on the lip that buoyed him there
and buckled him under. The beach was strung
with children paddling their ages in
under the glare of noon chipping
its light out. He stood up, anonymous
and straight among them, between
their sand pails and nursery crafts.
The breakers cartwheeled in and over
to puddle their toes and test their perfect
skin. He was my brother, my small
Johnny brother, almost ten. We flopped
down upon a towel to grind the sand
under us and watched that Atlantic sea
move fire, like night sparklers,
and lost our weight in this festival
season. He dreamed, he said, to be
a man designed like a balanced wave . . .
how someday he would wait, giant
and straight.

Johnny, your dream moves summers
inside my mind.

He was tall and twenty that July
but there was no balance to help,
only the shells came straight and even.
This was the first beach of assault,
the odor of death hung in the air
like rotting potatoes; the junkyard
of landing craft waited open and rusting.
The bodies were strung out as if they were
still reaching for each other; they lay
to blacken, to burst through their perfect
skin. And Johnny Pole was one of them.
He crumpled like a small wave, a sudden
hole in his belly and the years all gone.
The Pacific noon chipped its light out.
Like a bean bag, outflung, head loose
and anonymous he lay. Did the sea move fire
for its battle season? Does he lie
forever, where his rifle waits, giant
and straight? . . . I think you die again
and live again,

Johnny, each summer that moves inside
my mind.

ANNE SEXTON, whose poem, "My Friend, My Friend," appeared in our Summer issue, has been writing only a short while but has been published in *The New Yorker* and many of the literary reviews. Her first collection of verse will be published by Houghton Mifflin early next year.

King Domino

By WILLIAM DALE SMITH

■ When Gilford Simms got his foot crushed by a blast furnace ladle in the Craft Steel bottom-house, Dominic Govanni was standing only fifty feet away, supervising the construction of a new Bessemer bottom. Dominic had climbed up out of the bottom when he heard the crane motors overhead growling with the weight of the ladle.

It was one of Dominic's pleasures in the bottom-house to watch Gilford direct the overhead crane, not only because Gilford was his son-in-law, but also because he commanded the crane with such vigor and authority. Each signal was a distinct ultimatum. Dominic was especially fond of watching Gilford perform the vigorous pantomime required to guide one of the blast furnace ladles into a hole for repairs. It was a very snug fit.

So when Dominic heard the crane hoist the ladle, he paused to take his pleasure, rolling a cigar on his tongue as he watched. The ladle, rusted to the color of cinnamon and studded with rivets, was still hot from the molten iron that had filled it. As it glided toward Gilford, rocking gently within the embrace of the giant hooks hanging from the crane, Dominic could see the fuzzy lines of heat and the clouds of graphite radiating from the interior of the ladle. So Dominic was not surprised when Gilford flung his arm up to shield his face from the heat. But the craneman misunderstood the gesture. He dropped the ladle. It ricocheted from the backwall and crushed Gilford's foot.

WILLIAM DALE SMITH's first novel, *A Multitude of Men*, is due this month from Simon and Schuster. He has had short stories in *New Campus Writing* and *New World Writing*. A veteran of the Marines and a graduate of Antioch College, he now makes his home in San Francisco.

Before Gilford's scream had ended, Dominic was running, brushing aside a worker who stood over the Bessemer bottom with his air-hammer clattering in the air. As he lumbered past the ovens in which the bottoms were baked, Dominic caught a glimpse of the craneman above him. The man was working his controls frantically to hoist the ladle again.

When Dominic reached him Gilford was floundering, scooting on his hips through the fragments of slag and bricks he himself had probably chipped from the morning's batch of ladles. His safety helmet was gone and the freckles on his face looked like tiny brown blisters on a mass of uncooked dough.

Dominic scrambled on his knees through the rubble, snatching from his neck the red bandanna that was as much his trademark in the bottom-house as the sleeveless blue workshirt he wore and the black cigar he carried clamped between his teeth.

By the time the tourniquet was tied in place, Gilford was unconscious. Through the open doors of the bottom-house came the outraged wail of the ambulance as it left the gate-hospital, which meant to Dominic that at least one man in his crew was able to act without an order. Feeling dismissed by Gilford's inertness, Dominic stood up. From his mouth he plucked the cold cigar. It was bitten nearly in half and he flung it into the hole. He rubbed his broad and glistening face with the knuckles of one hand.

Then he heard the crane motors again. Looking up, he saw that the craneman had deposited the ladle near the pond of oil-slicked water that was used to cool the very hot ladles when they were to be completely relined with firebrick. The crane, with the giant hooks still dangling from the trolley, was gliding toward the end of the bottom-house. It approached the ladder that was the only access to the crane.

Dominic was no longer bewildered. It was not grief that inspired him as he seized a crowbar from the rubble underfoot and began to run. What he felt was jubilance. The crime had been committed and the criminal was trying to escape. Dominic moved very fast, his knuckles white around the crowbar.

The craneman, having parked the crane, was cocking one leg over the railing near the ladder when he saw Dominic below.

"Don't stop!" Dominic bellowed. "Climb down!"

The craneman withdrew his leg.

"Climb down! What is it? Without that machine you got no guts?"

"Now look, Dominic," the craneman said. "It was just an accident."

"Hah! I'll give you accident. I order you down here!"

The man retreated into his cab and the crane trundled down the floor. Dominic followed, hefting the crowbar, and when he reached the pond he saw that Gilford was already on a stretcher. The ambulance left the bottom-house the way it had entered, bumping rhythmically over the railroad ties and out the door through which the ladles were shuttled.

The crane above Dominic was silent, motionless. Lifting the crowbar, Dominic flung it end over end, and it ricocheted from the metal cab resoundingly.

"Stop it!" the craneman yelled. But his voice was hoarse with fear, and Dominic knew it.

"You'll come down," Dominic shouted. "And I, Dominic, will be waiting. Filthy butcher!"

Then a pair of millwrights began yelling for the crane. They were patching old ladles and had their welding equipment set up near the ovens. The crane wheeled away so fast the hooks seemed to be snatched after it. Again Dominic followed, unhurried now but breathing as if his heart were bloated. He paused only long enough to bellow at his crew and watch them clamber into the unfinished Bessemer bottom and take up their tools.

He stalked the crane for nearly two hours. He continued to stalk it even as he was interviewed by an official from the safety department, a man who trotted after Dominic, dodging ladles and rubble, shouting questions over the big man's shoulder. Dominic did not halt his pursuit even when a pair of motor inspectors from the electric department appeared to defend the craneman. They too followed Dominic, offering apologies and excuses and even threats. Except for an occasional grunt of contempt, Dominic ignored them. A fresh black cigar jutting from his mouth seemed almost bizarre against the expression of serenity that was now on his face.

Finally the Bessemer superintendent himself appeared to ob-

struct Dominic's craving for justice. He was an old man but he walked erect and his eyes glittered like two pieces of quartz embedded in his face.

"Go home, Dominic," he said. "Take the rest of the day off."

Dominic shook his head. His face was still serene.

"Don't make trouble. You've got that craneman so rattled now he can't see straight. Leave the man alone."

"Clyde, that's not a man up there. That's an accident. Only this accident is still to happen."

"Dominic, I got steel blowing upstairs. So I'm not going to coax you. You lay a hand on that craneman and you're fired."

Dominic snatched the cigar from his mouth. "You're bluffing. You wouldn't fire me. Not for any two-bit butcher of a craneman."

"All right. Call my bluff." Clyde's face was hard, adamant.

"But it was Gilford! Like my own son. What do I tell Rosa?"

Suddenly Clyde seized Dominic's arm. "Listen to me. Get this through your fat dago head. Let that craneman go, then climb up and beat on that crane for an hour. You'll feel just as good. Better. I guarantee it."

"You're crazy," Dominic said. But his eyes were now alert, wary.

Clyde snorted. "I know you, Dominic. I've known you for thirty years. I know what you've got. You've got constipation of the mind. You need a laxative of the mind. Some day you'll get it."

"This is stupid," Dominic said.

"If you're not out of here in two minutes, Dominic, you're fired. I swear it. As sure as God made little green apples."

They stood immobile for a moment, staring at one another. Finally Dominic returned the cigar to his mouth and the stalk of tobacco seemed to furnish his face with a single definite line. He lifted his chin and jerked his belt and walked from the bottom-house.

When he emerged from the washroom and trudged toward the gate, there were patches of clay-dust, like gray talcum, in the corners of his eyes and the recesses of his ears. He was oblivious to the sunlight, which seemed to cavort before his eyes as graphite and soot filtered through it. On the bus he fell into a stupor. The terror that had scalded him when Clyde threatened to fire him was receding now. All that was left was the barrenness of the two hours spent

stalking the crane. He felt betrayed. Now, with the terror gone, he did not believe that Clyde would have fired him. He was too valuable.

Behind his back they called him King Domino. He knew it. The newcomers who worked for him called him King because of the way he reigned over the bottom-house. He did not exert power over it so much as influence, commanding awe and even respect by the tremendous vitality he displayed as he moved from job to job, laying brick or chipping stone or helping to mix a batch of mortar. He wore no sleeves on his shirt because his enormous arms were caked with dust as high as his shoulders at the end of each day.

But the old-timers and the men who ran the furnaces on the open-hearth floor had a different reason for calling him King. He knew vast secrets about stone and brick. The bottoms he made, when bolted to the iron vessel that was the Bessemer, survived a dozen more heats than any other bottoms constructed. Often he was called to the open-hearth floor to inspect the brick roof and walls of a furnace full of bubbling steel. After a thorough inspection of the furnace, during which he would even climb to the roof and chip out mortar with his penknife, Dominic would advise them on how to regulate their fuel, both the coal oil and the oxygen, to save the furnace and still produce a batch of high-carbon steel. For this work it was not obligation he craved, but only the respect befitting the title of King Domino.

He had reigned over the bottom-house for thirty years. His knowledge of stone and brick was legendary and his title undisputed. But there had been a time, ten years back, when his sovereignty became a burden to him. He knew that he was King only because of the secrets he had painstakingly acquired, and he felt compelled to share them, although what he needed and actually sought was not a confidant but an heir, a prince, a man worthy of being endowed with the crown. He had five daughters, bequeathed to him over a period of twelve years by his wife, Anna.

The oldest of these daughters was in her final year of high school when Dominic discovered Gilford Simms. Being shorthanded in the bottom-house, he went to the labor pool to select three men. He had already jerked his thumb at two men whose work he knew, when he saw the boy at the fringe of the crowd. He was obviously

new. His shirt still bore the creases from the cardboard around which it had been folded on the store shelf, and his tan safety shoes were clean and unblemished. Usually Dominic avoided new men, especially young ones. They were wisecrackers and clock-watchers and hated to work. But there was about this boy an air of innocence that appealed to Dominic. Dominic interviewed him.

"Where did you work before?"

"I never worked for wages," Gilford said. "Just my Daddy's place. Farming."

"What made you leave?"

"Too many of us for one little old farm. Besides, I'm fixing to learn a trade."

"What trade?"

Gilford grinned shyly and shrugged.

"Let me see your hands," Dominic said.

Gilford extended them, palms upward. They were square and calloused, and Dominic said, "I'll teach you a trade. But it's hard work."

"I ain't afraid of work," Gilford said. "Hard work and me's been buddies since I can remember. Just you watch me."

Dominic watched him, and never in his life had he seen such an apprentice. Gilford exhibited a devotion to the shaping and fitting of stone comparable to his own. Each ladle Gilford relined he approached with the veneration of an architect about to build a church, and he examined his ladles when they returned to the bottom-house pitted and burned and crusted with slag, which was the only way to learn secrets. It was two years before Dominic realized why Gilford was capable of learning them.

Gilford, too, was an immigrant. True, Gilford did not have to attend night school in order to learn the language and acquire a diploma, as Dominic had done, beginning when he was already twice a father. But he was nevertheless an immigrant. He possessed not only the immigrant's appetite for work, but also the immigrant's unflagging belief in the supremacy of what he fashioned with his hands. He had never learned to dishonor his work by regarding it as inferior to the work performed by a machine.

Before long Gilford shared Dominic's contempt and actual hatred for the overhead cranes. They were to Dominic the most

odious of all machines. "Up there," he once told Gilford, "sits a miserable man. But you can't pity his misery. He feeds on it, like a maggot on filth."

"How come?" Gilford asked, truly interested.

"Because he doesn't run that machine. That machine runs him. Without that crane he is only half a man. A cripple! Only a cripple would run a machine. And remember, a cripple hates a whole man. So don't pity him."

"Bunch of goddam parasites," Gilford said, looking up.

"Hah! Gilford, sometimes I think you're more dago than American, you know it?"

"No speaka," Gilford joked. "Pass the spaghett."

Under Dominic's tutelage, Gilford acquired the habit of ridiculing the cranemen. Often they would bait a craneman together, driving him frantic with their dogmatic signals and their unconcealed contempt. And when the craneman would make a mistake, Dominic would cup his hands to his mouth and bellow his favorite rebuke: "Whazamatter, punk?"

After what he considered a decent interval, Dominic invited Gilford to leave his furnished room and move into the big house Dominic owned on Orchard Street. His two oldest daughters were already married and there was plenty of room. Gilford accepted, and before long they were a familiar if incongruous pair, the two of them entering and departing from the mill together, carrying identical tin lunch-buckets and smoking identical black cigars. Or they might attend a local ball game and sit with a case of beer between them, Gilford appearing diminutive and even shrunken beside Dominic's massive bulk.

Their first and only quarrel occurred exactly one month before Gilford married Dominic's third daughter, Rosa. They quarrelled over Dominic's wedding gift, which was a substantial down payment on a house located less than a block from his own home on Orchard Street.

"It's a good enough house, Dom," Gilford said. "It's even a better house than I figured on. But I was fixing to buy one up on the Heights."

"What for?"

"I thought I'd have me a nice-sized garden with it," Gilford said.

"You can, you can!" Dominic said. "Look at that back yard. Mama keeps a garden in the back yard."

Gilford's normally cheerful face looked bleak. "Shoot, that yard ain't hardly big enough for a bed of lettuce. Why, I couldn't even build a barbecue pit in that back yard. I was figuring on a barbecue pit, too."

Dominic bowed his head for a moment. When he raised it, there were tears in his eyes, and he explained hoarsely that he had not done it for himself but for Mama Govanni. "Her health is bad," he said. "She needs one daughter near her, and Rosa was always her favorite. Rosa's babies will make her happy."

Gilford blushed but he actually looked relieved. "Why didn't you say so? How was I supposed to know?"

As they left the house, Dominic clapped him on the back. "That Rosa," he said. "You picked the good one. Plump, and also a generous nature. Even if she is my own daughter. You like the plumpness, huh? It makes you feel wealthy, huh?" Again Gilford blushed.

But Dominic knew it was true wealth, for in six years Gilford and Rosa had produced two sons. And now someone would have to tell Rosa that her man was lying in a hospital with his foot crushed.

But when Dominic reached home, he learned from his wife, Anna, that Rosa already knew about Gilford.

"They called from the hospital hours ago," Anna said. "I sent Angela to watch Rosa's babies, so Rosa could go. Where were you?"

"I was working!" he said. "Where do you think?"

They were in the kitchen, and Anna was breaking beans from her garden and dropping them into a pan on the floor beside her. The noise of the beans was irritating to Dominic.

"How did it happen?" Anna asked.

"It was stupidity. A stupid crane."

"Does that answer my question?"

Dominic was silent. He watched Anna as she went to the sink and began washing the beans. She is very meager in the hips, he thought. And also in the chest, very meager. What was it Gilford had once called her? Poorly. Poor, lack of wealth. Except that it was not her wealth that was lacking, but his own.

He had always thought she would grow to be plump. It was a natural thought; her mother had been plump. He had hoped with

each baby that she would remain plump afterward. But it had never happened. If anything, she grew leaner afterward. She was not as plump now as when he married her, over thirty years ago.

"Poor Gilford," he said.

Anna turned quickly from the sink. "Why not 'Poor Rosa'?"

"Rosa? Why Rosa?"

"What if he can't work again?" she asked. "It will be like the time you were laid off, when Rosa was here." She touched her belly. "It was a crane that caused that too, wasn't it?"

"That was another matter entirely," Dominic said. He spoke quickly and his face was even more wary than when Clyde advised him to beat on the crane. "They built a new crane and did not need so many men with shovels. With industry that is progress. That was entirely another matter."

"What's the difference? If he can't work, it will be the same for Rosa."

"Don't be stupid!" Dominic shouted. "They will have the insurance money and the accident money. They won't starve."

"Who mentioned starving? Do you think I meant money, you fool?"

Again Dominic was silent, remembering. "I was unhappy," he said. "Eight months without work is a terrible thing. Even for progress."

"He'll beat her," Anna said. "It will be even worse, with a crushed foot. He's just like you, isn't he? Don't you always say he is just like you?"

"Yes, but it's only an injury. They perform miracles in hospitals these days. In two months he'll be back to work. I predict it."

"I hope so, for Rosa's sake."

"Not only that," Dominic said. "But I have a plan to help him. I conceived a plan." He left his chair and began pacing the room.

"What plan?" Anna asked. She was setting the table.

"It's the barbecue."

"The what? You're crazy."

"No. Gilford's always wanted a barbecue in his back yard. He told me himself. But he never built it. He'll build it when he comes home from the hospital. While he's healing. I'll draw the plans but

he will build it. Everything will be of stone. Two fireplaces, a table, benches, all of stone. I'll buy the stone too."

"You want mashed potatoes?" Anna asked. "Or fried?"

Dominic drew the plan for the barbecue that same night. The next day he took it to the hospital, seeking not so much Gilford's approval as his enthusiasm. During the month that followed, he revised the plan several times. In its final form it included even a bird-bath and a stone wall around the yard. When Gilford returned from the hospital, the stone and sand were piled in the back yard and the cement was in the basement. At his homecoming party Gilford was presented with Dominic's plan, and he thanked Dominic profusely. He promised to start as soon as possible.

He didn't even leave the house for a month. The doctors hadn't saved as much of his foot as they had hoped, and when the final cast was removed Gilford had to be fitted with a special shoe. It contained a support for his ankle and the heel was five inches thick. Gilford managed to walk on it, but he moved jerkily, flinging the foot ahead of him and twisting his hip grotesquely to absorb the shock. When he finally did venture into the back yard, he decided to build the wall first in order to gain a little privacy for the rest of the work.

Dominic, enamored with the success of his scheme, began stopping by on his way home from work each evening to observe Gilford's progress.

"It's working," he reported to Anna. "It goes slowly, but such a beautiful piece of work."

"Rosa says it doesn't go at all," Anna said.

"Hah, Rosa. What does she know? He's a craftsman. It's a beautiful wall."

"Who mentioned the wall?"

Dominic ignored her. But when after another month the wall was still unfinished, even he began to worry. Now he inspected Gilford's work only once a week. He thought that Gilford might feel uncomfortable if he appeared more often. So when he entered the back yard one evening and hoisted himself over the wall, he was suddenly frightened. This was not the wall he had designed. On his plan the wall was only three feet high, an ornament. This

wall was already over four feet high in places, with no sign of ending.

Dominic said nothing. He joined Gilford, who was kneeling on the ground chipping a stone into shape. Gilford hobbled to his feet and suggested they have a beer.

"I'll get them," Dominic said, but Gilford turned and bellowed at the open kitchen window.

Rosa appeared almost at once, carrying the beer and two glasses on a tray. The beer was in cans.

"It ain't even open yet," Gilford said.

"Open it yourself," Rosa said. "I never do it to suit you." Producing an opener from her apron, she all but flung it into his lap.

"Don't I hear the baby crying?" Dominic asked.

"It's not the baby," Rosa said.

"It's Bobby," Gilford said. "He's sick."

"He's not sick," Rosa said. "He's scared. A while ago his Daddy told him to go some place and drop dead."

"If I told her once, I told her a hundred times to keep them off my back while I'm working," Gilford said.

"Working? Don't make me laugh." Turning abruptly, Rosa entered the house. Dominic sighed at the way her buttocks quivered from the anger in her walk.

The men drank their beer in silence. Dominic felt very uncomfortable about the wall. It fascinated him, but he could hardly bear to look at it. Finally he fished two cigars from a pocket. "Have a stogie," he said.

"I quit cigars," Gilford said. "I got me a pipe now."

With the luxury of the cigar between his teeth, and the juice flowing with the smoke, Dominic felt something like wisdom taking shape in his mind. He smoked hungrily for five minutes.

"Gilford," he said. "Monday you should return to the bottomhouse."

"It's too soon."

"No," Dominic said. "You're ready. I can tell."

Gilford shook his head doggedly. "I'm telling you the honest to God truth, Dom. I just can't cut her. I can't stand on this foot but an hour at a stretch."

"You'll get over that. That comes from working alone. You

think too much about it. Once you're back with the gang, that will pass."

"I couldn't even carry my own weight. The gang'd raise a stink."

"They know better," Dominic said. "You forget who runs the bottom-house."

"No, I ain't forgot. Old Domino runs it. Big King Domino. How could I forget that? My own daddy-in-law."

"Don't talk stupid," Dominic said, getting up. "You'll go Monday?"

"Sure, King. Hell, I got it made. I can work the rest of my life there and never earn a day's wages. I'll be the first man who ever retired into the bottom-house."

His retirement lasted for exactly six weeks.

It began well enough. The men on the daylight crew were happy to have him back, and within a week they were adjusted to his bizarre method of locomotion, the hip jerking violently as the heavy shoe skimmed the surface of the bottom-house floor. What the crew failed to accept was the fact that Gilford managed to work only three or four hours during an eight-hour shift, although it was not his failure they found distasteful so much as the enormity of his effort.

He tripped and fell repeatedly among the debris from the ladles. Once he even fell into the stagnant and oily water of the pond. And he often worked balanced on his good leg and the toe of his grotesque shoe, with his face contorted and his eyes glittering like glazed enamel. When he rested, Gilford sat huddled in a corner behind the ladle-holes, either sucking on his pipe or pretending to eat part of his lunch or, toward the end of his retirement, staring at his outstretched leg as if it were something obscene.

Dominic had no warning that Gilford was quitting the bottom-house. It was payday, and Dominic emerged from the mill to find his son-in-law already ensconced on a stool in the bar where they usually cashed their checks.

"You quit early," Dominic said, occupying the adjacent stool.

"Why not?" Gilford said. "I put in my four hours, didn't I? That's as good as the next man's eight, ain't it? Ain't it, Domino? Old King, Old Daddy. Have a beer, King. On me."

"Don't talk like that."

"Hurts, don't it? Well, I wouldn't lie to you, King. The gospel truth is, I quit early because I had to see a man. Now, you want a beer, or don't you?"

"Just one," Dominic said. "Tonight is free ovenware at the Regal. Mama likes to go."

Gilford paid for the drinks with a flourish.

"Look," Dominic said. "I've got a good idea."

"Out with it. It's in a strange place." Gilford laughed hoarsely at his own wit.

"No, I mean it. This weekend let's work on the barbecue. You supervise and I'll work. You haven't touched it for over a month."

"I got a better idea," Gilford said. "Let's wait till next weekend, and see if the offer still stands."

"That's a funny thing to say."

"Ain't it though," Gilford said. "I'm a riot sometimes. Well, you better go. I wouldn't want you missing out on that free ovenware."

Dominic went home. He did not see Gilford until Monday morning. He was late for work, having waited for Gilford past their usual hour of departure, only to call Rosa on the phone and learn that he had already gone. When he entered the bottom-house, Gilford was nowhere to be seen. Not only that, but when he inquired about Gilford, the entire crew fell silent, averting their eyes.

It was Dominic's chief bottom-maker who volunteered to take him to Gilford. The man beckoned and moved away swiftly, glancing back at intervals to see if Dominic were behind him. Dominic followed him past the ovens and up the long clay-powdered stairway which led to the Bessemer platform. They paused behind a metal shield until a Bessemer vessel, turning on its axle, had stopped spewing fragments of steel across the path before them. Dominic's guide beckoned again, and they picked their way through the embers of hot slag, emerging on a platform inlaid with a pair of narrow guage tracks upon which rested the scrap buggies used to charge the Bessemer. Actually it was a room they entered, except that it had no sides, only the naked crossed girders which supported the roof.

The girders supported also a very old and very battered crane.

It was hard at work above them in the orange gloom created by the Bessemer smoke. It squealed and groaned and the blue arc flashes from the carbon board in the cab quivered like lightning in the gloom. Equipped with only a magnet for loading the scrap into the buggies, the crane was often used for breaking in new cranemen. They could do no serious damage, for no one worked beneath them.

Dominic, shielding his eyes from the Bessemer flame, stared dumbfounded at the crane. There were two men jammed into the tiny cab, and one of them was Gilford. He had a death grip on two of the controls, and beneath his hands the crane jumped and shivered. Dominic watched Gilford's pathetic efforts to load the buggies. The magnet, covered with shredded scrap, would spin and careen near the buggies, and when the power was cut, the load would spill haphazardly, half of it cascading over the metal floor. Finally they dragged the buggies out to charge the Bessemer and the crane was silent, at rest.

Dominic walked down the platform until he was opposite the cab. "Whazamatter, punk?" he bellowed. There was no response from the crane, so he bellowed it again, with obvious relish. Then he turned and walked away.

During the weeks that followed, the only intercourse between the two houses on Orchard Street was carried on by the women, surreptitiously. Gilford's name was never uttered, either in Dominic's home or in the bottom-house. It was not mentioned even when Gilford was promoted to the bottom-house crane. He appeared one morning, lurching down the aisle between the ovens, with his lunch beneath his arm and his face composed, expressionless. Dominic, who had known he was coming, merely lifted his cigar from his mouth and nudged his chief bottom-maker. "We got us another punk, John," he said. "Got us another punk to teach good manners."

Throughout the morning Dominic personally directed the crane. He hounded it, neglecting his other work, commanding the crane not so much with zest as with outright scorn. He never looked at the cab of the crane except to shout at it his traditional cry of rebuke. He acknowledged only the existence of the lift hanging from the crane, using the vigorous gestures of his arms to guide it and even to castigate it. When Dominic entered the Bessemer

shanty to eat his lunch, his eyes were very bright and his mouth appeared swollen, gorged. His bandanna and blue workshirt were drenched with sweat.

John, the bottom-maker, made room for him on the bench. "That boy runs a pretty fair crane, wouldn't you say?" John said.

Dominic snatched the lid from his lunch-bucket and grabbed a sandwich. "*I* run that crane," he said. "The crane runs him."

But midway through the afternoon the crane suddenly balked. When it happened, Dominic was standing on the bank of the pond, waiting to direct the crane as it cleaned the muck and rubble from the bottom of the pond. It was the most hated job the cranemen had to perform in the bottom-house, and was usually assigned to the night-turn craneman, who had very little to do. But Dominic, having finished the regular work ahead of schedule, refused to let the crane rest. He hooked the cast-iron bucket to the crane and walked to the edge of the pond. Then he heard the crane motors stop.

Except for the gas jets in the ovens and the chatter of the ladle-crew in the corner, the bottom-house was silent. Dominic folded his arms and waited, scorning even to look over his shoulder. After a while he heard the motor start again. But it was only the hoist motor returning the bucket to its slot against the wall. Then the bridge and trolley motors whined as the crane moved swiftly and retrieved the giant hooks from where they had been parked on top of an empty ladle. Dominic began to lick a fresh cigar, rolling it on his tongue.

He was still licking it when the hooks nudged him headlong into the pond. He climbed the greasy bank, still wearing his helmet, and the hooks moved to face him broadside, swaying gently. As they glided toward him he seized one hook and instantly the hoist roared upward. He was four feet off the ground when he released his grip. Landing on his hands and knees in the dust, he was dragging himself to his feet when the edge of one hook struck his helmet. It was a very delicate blow, but it drove him to his knees and jammed the helmet hard against his ears.

After prying the helmet from his head and flinging it from him, he moved warily toward the stairway at the end of the building. The hooks blocked his path. Ducking between two ovens, Dominic began to run. The hooks followed, producing a terrible clamor as they raked the metal oven-walls above him. Backtracking, Dominic

emerged into view again and ran into the Bessemer shanty. He fell on the bench, gasping and feeling for the bruises on his legs. To his horror, the snout of a hook jutted into the doorway and the flimsy boards splintered around him as the shanty was lifted from the floor.

He felt very naked suddenly, and he shouted: "Stop it! Stop it!"

While the hooks were being disengaged from the shanty he ran again. This time he ran not toward the stairway but toward the wide doorway at the opposite end which led into the railyard. Hampered by the muck on his clothes, he fell once between two ladles. But he had reached the pond and was skirting it before the hooks caught him. This time they did not even touch him. He was dodging them frantically when he tumbled into the pond.

He did not come out at once. Laboring to his feet, he waded to a small island formed by the brick shell from a ladle. The water was up to his chest and he just stood there leaning on the brick support, breathing harshly. He could hear the crane motors grinding in the distance but he did not care.

When he finally looked up, Gilford was standing on the bank of the pond with his lunch-bucket beneath his arm.

"Whazamatter, punk?" Gilford said. Then he turned and walked away, limping heavily.

When Dominic reached Orchard Street late that evening, Gilford was in the back yard, working on the barbecue pit.

The Turtle

By ELEANOR KEATS

Who, even in his most divine image,
does not feel with you the sudden desire
to bury all within oneself;
nor feel alike so encased and low,
so heavy to drag about in the open day;

Even in his most perpendicular, who is not drawn
to the cold, still rough inchoate form
of all crawling things, so like the child
before he has the strength to stand,
so like the man, in his soul's dragging depths!

Yet, after such low crawlings,
(looking even like an infant in your gentler gazes),
when you suddenly find a morsel for your hunger:

Your eyes glint hard, you arch your neck,
Your jaw drops wide,
And I lose you to that silent world inside.

A graduate in creative writing from Cornell and now the wife of a composer, this is ELEANOR KEATS' first published poem.

The Embattled NAACP

By JAMES RORTY

■ Most whites and practically all Negroes have heard of the NAACP, as the *Catholic Digest* found in its recent race relations opinion poll. But *what* they have heard varies widely. In the North, the average white man told the interviewer that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was what its name implied: an interracial civil rights organization concerned with helping Negroes.

South of the Cotton Curtain, the white man in the street or on the plantation knew better, or thought he did. The NAACP, he insisted, is a conspiracy of "bad nigras," abetted by a few damyankee whites, its object being to subvert and destroy the established social and political order of the South.

As it happens, both opinions are more or less correct. The NAACP is indeed a civil rights and welfare agency, concerned with promoting every aspect of Negro economic, social, and educational progress. But it is also, from the point of view of the southern White Supremacist, a conspiratorial organization, as radical and subversive as were the Russian social revolutionaries of the early nineteenth century who strove to liberate the serfs, and whom the Czar's Okrana periodically shot, jailed, and harried into exile—this being precisely what is currently happening to NAACP organizers and activists in the South.

JAMES RORTY is well known as a reporter on social welfare topics in this and other magazines. His last piece in the *Review* was "FEPC in the States: A Progress Report" in last fall's issue. The present article is a chapter from a book being written with his wife, Winifred Ruashenbush, and entitled *Crumbling Walls: Fifty Years of Negro Progress.*

This year the NAACP celebrates its fiftieth birthday. It was launched February 12, 1909, the centennial anniversary of the birth of Abraham Lincoln, by a conference of Negro and white clergymen, social workers, scholars, and publicists, representing converging streams of Negro militancy and resurgent white abolitionism. The purpose of the NAACP's founders was to re-light the torch of Negro emancipation which by then had been all but extinguished in the South. Reconstruction had failed. The United States Supreme Court had just turned its back on the Negro's plea for the enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution; the Plessy decision had legalized educational segregation. In the South, the Redemptionists had revised the state constitutions to establish the white primary and impose previously unknown forms of segregation in schools, housing, transportation, and public accommodation. To enforce these new caste restrictions and to disfranchise the Negro population, the Redemptionists had invoked a terror worse than anything the oldest ex-slave could remember. Lynching parties averaged two a week. In Atlanta, Georgia, and in Springfield, Illinois, rioting mobs had hunted down men, women, and children in the streets. A famous American statistician had predicted the early extinction of the Negro race in America.

The call that summoned the founders of the NAACP was written by Oswald Garrison Villard, then editor of the *New York Post* and the *Nation,* who had inherited the Abolitionist zeal of his grandfather, William Lloyd Garrison, editor of the *Liberator.* Villard had acted at the behest of Mary White Ovington, a New York social worker, Dr. Henry Moskowitz, and the Socialist journalist William English Walling, who, incidentally, was born in the South. In concluding his account of the Springfield riot, published in the *Independent,* Walling had asked: "What large and powerful body of citizens is ready to come to the aid of the Negroes?"

The answer, of course, was that there was none of either race, north or south. Negro militancy was represented at the conference by Dr. W. E. B. Dubois, whose "Niagara movement," founded four years earlier following Dubois' break with Booker T. Washington, had not thrived. Other Negro and white leaders at the conference were distinguished as individuals, but represented no significant organized groups. They included William Monroe Trotter, editor

of *The Guardian,* Moorfield Storey, the former secretary of Charles Sumner and destined to become the NAACP's first president, Jane Addams, John Dewey, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, the Reverend John Haynes Holmes, Charles Edward Russell, Mary McLean, Lillian D. Wald, the Reverend C. E. Stowe, son of Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Frances Blascoer, who became the NAACP's first secretary.

It was Villard who projected for the new agency an organizational blueprint and program of activities to which it has adhered throughout the first half-century of its history. It must have, he declared, a legal department "strong enough to carry up to the Supreme Court case after case until that shifting and evasive body is compelled to decide whether there shall be two degrees of citizenship in this country . . . and whether the Constitution of the United States shall be permanently violated." There must be civil rights, research, and publicity bureaus to investigate lynchings and publicize every injustice done to the Negro; also an education bureau. Finally, there must be "an industrial bureau to deal with the colored man in relation to labor."

To implement this program, the conference established the National Negro Commission, dedicated to the abolition of all forced segregation, equality in education for Negro and white, and the enfranchisement of the Negro through the enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Commission absorbed Dubois' Niagara Movement and a year later re-named itself the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

From its inception the NAACP has been interracial, with a white president (the present incumbent is Arthur B. Spingarn) and a mixed board of directors. Except during the early years, the executive secretary and most of the staff have been colored. National, regional, and state executives are salaried, but the secretaries of the NAACP's smaller branches, Youth Councils, and College Chapters are usually unpaid volunteers whose dedication, especially in the South, entails sacrifice, hardship, and often danger.

About half the NAACP's membership is north of the Mason and Dixon line. In 1957 a third of its 861 branches and more than half of its total membership of 312,277 were concentrated in the northeastern and middlewestern states whose industrial cities have received the largest quotas of Negro migration from the South. There

are also flourishing branches in the border states. But in the South, where, according to the *Catholic Digest* poll, ninety-four per cent of the Negro population are sympathetic to its objectives, poverty and fear combine to restrict its dues-paying membership. In the Deep South, where its bitterest battles are now being fought, the NAACP has less than 300 hard-won beachheads, with a dues-paying membership of about 50,000.

During the NAACP's first fifty years we have had two world wars and the social revolution brought about by the Great Depression and the New Deal. The same period has witnessed the continued acceleration of the northward migration of Negroes and the progressive industrialization of the South. Today the plantation Negro on whose ignorance, subservience, and poverty the traditional economy and culture of the South was built is a vanishing phenomenon. Coincidentally, there has emerged a substantial Negro middle class of business and professional people, able and determined to demand first-class citizenship for themselves and for their race. It is this class that furnishes the bulk of the NAACP's membership, especially in the South.

The NAACP grew slowly at first, but since the beginning of World War II it has rapidly increased both its strength and its militancy. Starting with 329 in 1911, its membership climbed to 85,000 in 1940 and then soared to 326,000 in 1958. For the Negro, these were years of Jubilee, when the walls of racial discrimination came crashing down everywhere, in employment, in the courts, in the churches, and in the armed forces. Greater gains for the cause of interracial justice were achieved during the 1940-50 decade, in fact, than during the entire half century that followed the collapse of Reconstruction.

The NAACP played a major role in all these achievements, although it shares the credit with other interracial organizations including the National Urban League and the Catholic Interracial Council, as well as with the various Protestant and Jewish civil rights agencies; also with the liberal trade unionists, led by A. Philip Randolph and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.

The Communists, too, have claimed credit for these gains, but such claims are almost wholly spurious. Even during the troubled thirties most Negroes suspected correctly that the Communists sup-

ported Negro protest chiefly for its nuisance value. This distrust was amply justified, both by the absurdities of the official Moscow line (the creation of the ineffable Mr. Manuilsky) with respect to the "self-determination of the Black Belt" and by the routine betrayal by the Communists of every "united front" into which it entered. During this period the NAACP suffered rather little Communist infiltration even in its branches, while its leadership remained alertly and vigorously anti-Communist. In 1949 Roy Wilkins, the NAACP's present secretary, rejected the bid of the Communist-controlled Civil Rights Congress to participate in the NAACP's Civil Rights Mobilization. In his letter to William L. Patterson, Mr. Wilkins recalled what had happened over a decade before when the NAACP had made the mistake of accepting Communist co-operation.

> We remember the Scottsboro case, [wrote Mr. Wilkins] and our experience there with the International Labor Defense, one of the predecessors of the Civil Rights Congress. We remember that the present Civil Rights Congress is composed of the remnants of the ILD and other groups. We remember that in the Scottsboro case the NAACP was subjected to the most unprincipled vilification. We remember the campaign of slander in the *Daily Worker*. We remember the leaflets and the speakers and the whole unspeakable machinery that was turned loose upon all those who did not embrace the "unity" policy as announced by the Communists. . . .
>
> We of the NAACP remember that during the war, when Negro Americans were fighting for jobs on the home front and fighting for decent treatment in the armed services, we could get no help from the organizations on the extreme left. They abandoned the fight for Negro rights on the ground that such a campaign would "interfere with the war effort." As soon as Russia was attacked by Germany they dropped the Negro question and concentrated all effort in support of the war in order to help the Soviet Union. During the war years the disciples of the extreme Left sounded very much like the worst of the Negro-hating Southerners.
>
> American Negroes, and especially the NAACP, cannot forget this. It seems to us to prove conclusively . . . that the organizations of the extreme Left, when they campaign for civil rights, or in behalf of a minority, do so as a secondary consideration, activity upon which is certain to be weighted, shaped, angled, or abandoned in accordance with the Communist Party "line."
>
> We can have no truck with such unity. . . .

During the NAACP's first decade there were nine race riots. Seven of these occurred north of the Mason and Dixon line, among them the bloody outbreaks in the Negro ghettos of Chicago and

East St. Louis that followed World War I. Both riots reflected the embitterment of white and colored war veterans who returned to compete for jobs in the depressed industrial cities that had received the heaviest concentrations of Negro immigration from the South. Desegregation of the armed forces and the equalization of postwar job opportunities would have helped to prevent these and other racial conflicts, as the NAACP and other interracial leaders pointed out at the time. But it was to take another war and another sequential rash of race riots before the logic of these recommendations would command much attention.

Between wars the NAACP campaigned with increasing effectiveness on both the legal and economic fronts. The 1915 decision of the Supreme Court outlawing the "grandfather clauses" of the southern state constitutions which the Redemptionists had used to disfranchise southern Negroes was followed in 1923 by the even more important Moore vs. Dempsey decision. This nullified the conviction of a Negro accused of murder because of the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the jury that convicted him. Although southern courts continued to violate the law by excluding Negroes from both grand and petit juries, the 1923 decision enabled the NAACP to appeal, sometimes successfully, the conviction of Negroes by all-white juries. During this period the energy with which the NAACP protested and publicized mob outrages against Negroes was reflected in the steadily declining curve of lynchings. In his book *Rope and Faggot: A Biography of Judge Lynch*, Walter White, NAACP secretary during its most dynamic period, estimates that during the two decades from 1890 to 1910 mobs lynched 2,586 men and women, while in the years 1910 to 1927 the lynchers claimed only 1,144 victims. After 1927 the toll of lives taken by southern mobs dropped precipitately and by 1940 lynching, as a method of maintaining southern white supremacy, had become obsolete.

The rise of industrial unionism during the depression and the passage of the Wagner Act enabled the NAACP, for the first time, to enlist white trade union leaders as allies in its effort to end race discrimination in the unions and on the job. To counter the strike-breaking activities of employers, especially in the steel and automobile industries, the CIO unions had been obliged to admit Negroes to membership and to fight racial discrimination at the hiring gate

and on the job. By the outbreak of World War II only about a score of unions, most of them affiliated with the AFL and the Railway Brotherhoods, still excluded Negroes from membership, while over twice that number, all of them industrial unions affiliated with the CIO, had adopted anti-discrimination clauses in their constitutions. Some of the CIO unions like the steel and auto workers elected local Negro officers and co-operated actively with the NAACP and the National Urban League to combat racial discrimination within the unions and in the shop.

Despite these gains, however, Negroes were still the last to be hired and the first to be fired in most industries on both sides of the Mason and Dixon line. Hence, when the outbreak of World War II created labor shortages in many critical war industries, Negroes were found to constitute practically the only reserve of unused manpower. In 1940 *Fortune* reported that 82.3 per cent of the employers it surveyed utilized no Negroes, although 64.7 per cent admitted that they could do so efficiently.

Demanding that government take emergency action to correct this situation, the NAACP and its allies besieged the War Manpower Commision and the White House with delegations of Negro and white trade unionists, churchmen, and social workers. In the spring of 1941 President Roosevelt received a small delegation of Negro leaders, including Walter White, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, Lester Granger, Secretary of the National Urban League, and A. Philip Randolph, President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. Randolph was also president of the March on Washington Movement which for weeks had been holding over the President's head the Damoclean sword of a threatened Negro march on the capital.

The decision was a difficult one for FDR, who feared a revolt of southern Senators almost more than he dreaded the disastrous repercussions, at home and abroad, that would be sure to follow a Negro demonstration in force. What he yielded was considerably less than the delegation had asked. But the march was called off and on June 25, 1941 the President issued his historic Executive Order No. 8802 creating the Fair Employment Practice Committee.

Although the Committee had no enforcement powers, its orders were sufficiently obeyed, by companies holding government con-

tracts, to ensure jobs for thousands of Negroes who had previously been turned away from the gates of factories that had advertised for workers. The activities of the wartime FEPC, which was staffed largely by Negroes, were also sufficiently objected to by southern politicians; after VJ Day the NAACP and Randolph's National Council for a Permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission failed repeatedly in their efforts to pass national FEPC legislation. They did, however, induce President Truman to bequeath some of the wartime FEPC's functions to the President's Committee on Government Contracts, which can cancel the contracts of employers who are found to discriminate on grounds of race, religion, or nationality. A much more important achievement, for which Randolph, the NAACP, and the Urban League share most of the credit, was the passage, in rapid succession, starting with New York State in 1945, of some fifteen state FEPC acts and at least fifty municipal anti-discrimination ordinances. Most of this legislation has since been amended to cover housing and public accommodation.

The NAACP's Legal Defense and Education Fund, contributions to which are tax-exempt, is headed by Thurgood Marshall, to whose abilities even southern constitutional lawyers have paid grudging tribute. It was Mr. Marshall who successfully argued the school desegregation cases before the Supreme Court. Since 1915 the NAACP's legal department has carried forty-nine appeals up to the highest court and has won forty-five of them. Southern charges that the NAACP's legal department engages in "barratry"—the instigation of unnecessary suits—are not credited outside the South. It is true that in some Black Belt counties where the NAACP has practically been driven underground, it takes exceptional courage for a Negro individual or group to go to court, no matter how flagrantly their rights may have been violated.

In the Prince Edward County, Virginia, School Case, one of the five on which the Supreme Court based its school desegregation decision, the plaintiff was one of the leaders in a strike of Negro high school students which the NAACP lawyers heard about only when one of the strikers phoned the NAACP office in Richmond. Promptly the white school board brought pressure on the strikers and their chief supporter, the Reverend L. Francis Griffin, who was also the guiding spirit of the local NAACP chapter, to withdraw

the suit. This they refused to do. Five years later, after the president of the school board had become the President of Virginia's Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Rights, I interviewed the Reverend Griffin in the bare living room of his home, from which the installment furnture had just been removed.

"Chill penury hath repressed my noble rage," quoted the beleaguered pastor, whose dwindling flock also comprised, in all probability, most of the undisclosed membership of the local NAACP chapter. A veteran of World War II, the Reverend Griffin had survived the campaigns in North Africa and Italy and in 1949 had inherited the pastorate of his deceased father in Farmville, county seat of Prince Edward County. It was a comfortable berth. At least it might have been if the son had been content like his father to be a "good nigra," preach the old time religion, and leave politics alone. Virginia is not Mississippi, and the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Rights do not publicly approve of violence. But there are other ways of handling subversive NAACP agitators. After he refused to call off the school suit, the Reverend Griffin found that white tradesmen no longer gave him credit. Then a faction of his congregation turned against him. Under the pressure of social isolation and accumulating financial embarrassment, Mrs. Griffin had a nervous breakdown, and later he too became ill. Soon after I saw them, the Griffins left Farmville to seek quieter and greener pastures far from Virginia's South Side.

In the Deep South, Negroes who carry the NAACP's banner publicly face ordeals far more difficult than anything the Farmville pastor was called upon to endure. Consider, for example, what happened to Gus Courts, grocer and president of the NAACP chapter in Humphrey County, Mississippi. Courts's offense—far more serious than that of the Reverend Griffin from the point of view of southern White Supremacists—was that he had registered to vote and urged other Negroes to register.

In February of 1957 Mr. Courts told his story to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Mississippi has about a half million potential Negro voters of whom in 1955 only about 8,000 were even registered. In Humphrey County there are 7,500 white people and 17,000 Negroes. Courts got 400 NAACP activists to pay their poll taxes in preparation for registering. The first Negro to

register was the Reverend George W. Lee. On the night of May 7, 1955, as Mr. Lee was driving home, another car moved up beside his and somebody shot him through the window, killing him instantly. The next morning a local planter and member of the White Citizens Council entered Courts's store and said, "They got your partner last night. If you don't get your name off the register, you'll be next." Courts replied, "I'd as soon die a free man as live a coward." Six months later somebody fired a shotgun through the window of his store, wounding him seriously. When friends volunteered to take him to a hospital, he chose one eighty miles away.

Lamar Smith, another NAACP activist who had mobilized Negroes to vote in the primary election, was less fortunate. On August 13, as he went to register, he was shot dead on the steps of the county courthouse at Brookhaven.

In Georgia, an Atlanta civil rights attorney told the Committee, Negroes who tried to vote have been intimidated by threats, cross-burnings, and night riders who fired into their homes until they fled the community. In Liberty County, Florida, where no Negro had registered since Reconstruction, the NAACP field secretary got a dozen Negroes to register. Soon afterward a cross was burned and shots were fired into the home of the Reverend Dee Hawkins, one of the twelve. The Reverend Hawkins left town and the other eleven removed their names from the register.

The NAACP's attempts to vindicate the Negro's suffrage rights under the Fifteenth Amendment go back to 1915, when it joined in a case before the United States Supreme Court and won a decision outlawing the grandfather clause. For years thereafter, NAACP attorneys chipped away at the White Primary until finally, in 1944, the Supreme Court decision in the case of Smith vs. Allwright outlawed what had been the most effective method of ensuring Negro disfranchisement, thereby opening polling places to hundreds of thousands of new voters in the South.

A decade later, following the Supreme Court's desegregation decision, the voting booths were again closed to Negroes as the White Citizens Councils mobilized to meet the new challenge to southern White Supremacy. In October of 1956 Warren Olney III charged that qualified Negro voters were being purged by the thousands from the election rolls in the states of Alabama, Georgia,

Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina. Simultaneously, Councils moved in the courts and in the legislatures to outlaw the NAACP and put it out of business. In the spring of 1956 the Alabama Attorney General charged that the NAACP had illegaly employed and subsidized Authorine Lucy and Polly Meyers to test the segregation policies of the University of Alabama, and that it had also violated a state law by organizing and financing the "illegal" Montgomery bus boycott. Without a hearing, Judge Walter B. Jones issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the NAACP from doing any business in Alabama. In a subsequent action the same Judge fined the NAACP $100.00 for refusing to turn over its membership lists to the court. The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear the NAACP's appeal, but meanwhile the organization has ceased to function in Alabama and its 30,000 members in that state are no longer listed in its books.

During 1957 the Arkansas, Texas, Virginia, and Tennessee legislatures passed laws requiring disclosure of the NAACP's membership and contributor lists. The last two states also outlawed NAACP legal aids to victims of discrimination on the grounds that this constituted "barratry, maintenance, and champerty." By the year's end, the NAACP was involved in twenty-five suits in which its right to function in the South was at issue. Simultaneously, legislative investigating committees in the South sought in other ways to liquidate the organization or drive it underground.

Reviewing this record as they prepared for the celebration this year of the organization's fiftieth anniversary, NAACP leaders predicted ultimate victory in the present climactic struggle in the South, on both the school desegregation and suffrage fronts. The NAACP's first fifty years, they say, were the hardest. By 1963, the centennial anniversary of the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation, they believe it will be possible for a Negro, even in Humphrey County, Mississippi, to celebrate the occasion without being shot down on the steps of the county court house. Not, of course, that his white neighbors will join in the celebration. That will take another fifty years, or perhaps another hundred.

Confession of Witchcraft

By VK

■ The dictionary gives a plate of poisonous plants, with which I discover I am provided. They're my native weeds, at hand, for fair and foul purposes. Aha, Russell there, doing a little weeding for his aunt—his great-aunt, that is—I won't even whisper if he misses some of them.

Lurking between shrubs and my louver fence they're a notorious lot. Nightshade with blue-black berries the birds avoid, jimson that pretends to flower morning-glories, poke with its aristocratic spikes—they're full of potential!—I can use them.

"Yes, Russell, that's all; you've done a fine job.—No, that's really enough. You run along and exercise Plato.—No, I rode early. I had Xantippe out for hours, this morning."

Although simple weeds are common witch fodder compared to the mandrake, the mandragora. Where, where can I get a high powered Shakespearean mandrake? Or the mandrake that the Biblical Reuben gave to his mother Leah? Under a public gallows grows the mandrake. It is pulled shrieking out of the ground. Shrieking—Shakespeare's word—must be used when its forked body is disturbed, like midget human limbs torn.

Well, I must be content with the mild species which is the New England May-apple. That name I'll never utter, of course. But when I show it in my garden, waxy May-flowered, I'll quote darkly—after what has happened to me lately—from the Duchess of Malfi and other old writings concerning mandrakes, drowsy syrups, black potions, and sinister philters.

VERA KOEHRING, who signs her fiction "VK," teaches zoology, anatomy, and clinical pathology at Hunter College.

There are persons around here who need to hear me rumble incantations.

Am I not an ancient woman who could be imagined as bending to pull a mandrake at midnight? Why don't I get out that old red velvet evening cloak and keep it on a peg under the overhang of the patio, and the cane I have for icy weather—as if I used them;—well, and use them too, comfortably enough.

"Yes, Hilda, I really wore it.—Why, to the opera and receptions.—No, I did not look funny."

Certainly they're not going to see me in riding habit again—those grand-nephew rascals. I'll ride, but early, before the slug-a-beds are up. Xantippe and I patrolling the dawn—it's practically broom-stick riding.

Also, am I not an old woman who could concoct potions along with the best of them? Where are those chipped, discarded flasks from the laboratory where I have so recently been a biochemist for forty-three years? What if my kitchen is stainless steel and a glass wall oven!—right here and now, with a low-watt ruby light, and here, a misty green light, I'll set up distilling apparatus.

Black molasses will be good; it bubbles low and brown; with nutmeg, horehound to double, double the odors. In this other flask I'll compound a wormwood wine. What ambrosial ambiguity!—what pungent poops of Araby!

"If you must ask questions, children, ask them in a whisper. This is all highly 'classified'—Well, this much of a hint:—I might be researching for an incense that will bring back memories to brain-washed minds."

Now, I'll cut the garden artemesia and hang it upside down; the ghostly stock from which to distill Russian raw absinthe—for maddening Tartar frenzy.

I must hang a string of red peppers, shrivelled, as they dry in the adobes of Indians. Peppers burn secrets out of stones.

And what biology laboratory will give me adrenaline remnant of frog left over from the mysteries of dissection to hang by folded web foot—Chinese confection? And say that I save a few clam shells I'll claim to calcine in my infra red broiler as Japanese for what-ails-you.

"All right, you may smell each little pot, and choose:—essence

of peppermint, essence of cinnamon, sassafras. But woe—woe—woe to the child who does not drink deep of the cup brewed in his name."

Why must I feign becoming this potioning old witch? Potion or poison, what am I aiming for? Some of the lone women witches of the days of persecution, who fatefully confessed their state, would know what I mean. Although they could never understand why I, luxury spoiled creature, could wish to be considered as a witch.

Here is one reason: They come to my house, the niece-nephew generation and the grand-niece-nephew offspring, and find a vinyl slickness; there is nothing to distinguish it from their own young chrome and formica homes.

"Russell, you are not to let the children play with the blender!"

And who am I? They don't know.

I'm old enough to qualify for witchcraft. But is my age recognized? My wrinkles, called quizzical, aren't very deep. And the hair:—what's the difference between grey and ash-blond, with slight accent on the ash?

And as I say, not one of that youngest impudent generation is going to see me in riding habit again. A grand-nephew has just called me an old creep, but the way he calls his girls friends old creep!—because I wouldn't enter the jumping contests with him. Speaking as he would to his contemporaries!—saying, "You're losing your grip, old girl."

"Russell, I have one ribbon. Isn't that enough?"

And the child crows, "Afraid to defend it? Chicken!—Chicken!"

Chicken, old girl, old creep? It's enough to make any woman think.

What I am beginning to think is that I want some of the romance of my age rank and status. I believe I want it for myself as well as maybe to impress these young squirts.

What do I have from a stiff working life?—a chemist's life and a humanist's life. Treasures! And it's as if I hid away all evidence of them, and polished up the place with surface plastics.

I was born in the last century, in the gas light era. But now it's concealed fluorescence in my house.

I've worn, not exactly mutton sleeves, but at least lamb chop versions of them. It's sheath skirts and sweaters for me now.

Which is all pleasant and easy. But I believe I'm throwing

something away. I look like a rolling stone?—like a new door knocker? Moss would be velvet. The patina of long use is almost always a meliorating refinement, more lustrous than the sharp brightness of the new, the unhistoricized.

What is a young olive tree?—no more or less sappy than any other sapling. And what is an old one, bent and sculptored to the slope and winds of its garden, even its roots exposed showing its grasp of earth; and giving to its Spain, Italy, Greece the loveliness of antiquity.

What is the powerful appeal of the tortured cedars of Monterey? Has my life been a will-o'-the-wisp adolescence that I should look fresh and transient? And worse, act with that nonchalance which youth tries so hard to assume. Insouciance is easy for me to carry off, as if it were a silly lorgnette.

Though there is no nonchalance in me. I have the library of scholars, and dig out of it the background for today's still warm experiments. I have that weighted inner delight the old philosophers once dressed, in their beards and robes, as venerableness.

But I, venerable? The least sign of sapience I mask with wisecracks. Whom do my relatives know, then, but this apparently shallow old sport who must undoubtedly be on a sawdust diet? What is there for them to hear in the glib patter, or see in the tight belly of this three score and going-on-ten person? Her coffee table bears a single somewhat doctored scrap of artistic driftwood. Driftwood!

Where is the skull of Faust, the tome of manuscript, the telescope—or the witches' cauldron? Too far-fetched? Well, at least where is a bit of lace at the throat and one petticoat too many, a cameo or a strand of amber? These are surely mine.

Boys and girls should hear, through me, the laughter of those who went to France in the wild leaping years between 1914 and 1918. Their photographs, hidden away, have not faded. Their memories, to be kept hidden?

"No, Russell, he is not goofy looking.—Well, they were a kind of puttee, wrapped.—I don't know, it was regulation, they had to wear them.—Well, do you think he chose his hat?"

High button shoes and garments with stays—I wore them. And having worn them, and having charmed—maybe someone—

and lost him—I am a different person than those of the mid-riff crowd. I should remember myself as that person. The young people have a right to smile at the weirdness of that person. I must not rob youth of the gentle grotesque and the chaste baroque.

You lonely old women who confessed, even with stakes and gallows in the background, of knowledge of all kinds of brews, of voices in the wind, of patterns in the embers, of flying with the rusty leaves of autumn, of knowing why the cat arched her back and glowed her eyes in midnight silence—I know how it was with you.

Your garments trailed with the dust of years in their folds. Only sweet and acrid, musty and mousey dust could be in your neglected minds. Your grandsons and grand-nieces scarcely looked your way. Your status was of the shoved-aside and your prestige lower than even that of the ruffians who sat in docks and had attentions in spoiled eggs.

But when it was known that you had little bundles, and brewed potions, and made amulets, and were out, about!— riding winds to strange places—while others slumped monotonously by their smoky fires.—Then you were fascinating!

Old age neglected has no charm; but enhanced, it trails autumn colors and odors. Russet age has its wine cellar and its apple barrel; its fruit cake is wrapped in brandy soaked linen; its rose leaves are bedded with cloves.

Although even if you were Mother Hubbard poor and your bundles of herbs had lost all fragrance, when the witch hunter came to hunt you out you let him see your lore and your longing, the weight of your years and your wild joy and pain. Yes; beyond all loss, beyond all hope, your fancy rode the winds. Yes; you were witches, rightfully confessed.

I, without even a snuff of your courage, nor the need for it, with none of your pain, and with so little use for the prestige factor, yet requisition you, old witches—request you, dear old girls, as my mentors, now that I confess myself apprentice witch, venturing upon career of witchcraft.

By witchcraft I must ascend—levitate—to that rarified pre-mummy immortality in which "age cannot wither her nor custom stale—"

Here is tansy, immortelle. In its volatile oil, soupçon of poison;

in its crushed dryness, seasoning. Such must aromatize my life.

I will be "not wild in my attire,"—but wear a little velvet which hides unknowns in its folds. And be altogether "most profound in my art and yet not damnable." Shakespeare would not mind quotations made in solemn dedication?

Imagine!—already, rather timidly, at least so he pretended, that rascal Russell brought a horse shoe, a cattail, and a crow's feather to the kitchen door last night;—his youth a long pants imitation of manhood.

"Could you use these, Aunt Mehitable?" he said, almost respectfully;—his respect like a part through a crew cut.

My name is Nora; and he winked. But I still believe I am doing all right, having gotten off to such a late start.

I, Russell, the rascal, found the above notes in a portfolio, in her library.

Yes, she's got tomes, and the telescope. She's got bits of sculpture instead of skulls, recessed between *Catalytic Surface Phenomena* and *Enzymatic Processes*. The place is a bone crypt, and a crystal cave. It's a den of sacred serpents. Sappho leaps; behemoths and leviathans play around.

Damn it all—it ties up a fellow's guts!

Russell, the rascal, guards that silly chemistry set-up in her kitchen from the scorn of nurses. His hand shakes when he lights the burners to let the molasses bubble and vinegar lift off the aroma of resins. The stink ought to raise a Pharoah.

Russell, the rascal, escapes to bay his grief to the moon in her winter garden—winter, with a leather greenness of tenacity and a stone roundness in the naked urns and dry fountain. Damn it all! A knarled hand will soon let spring power forth, but a universal hand—uncoaxed by the unique Mehitable mitt.

Russell waits the night watch beside her oxygen tent. He took the following words into his callow heart during her last interval of consciousness:

"Good enough, that witchcraft business?—telescope bought. You know it's for you, Russell boy?—in my will. Your money—well, any time, but rather when you start astronomy? You don't

mind not spending it on horses?—already astronomy's better—Russell?

"Velvet cape and cane—don't say it wasn't witchcraft that I had them, walking by the pond, hearing the split of ice-crack, being on my way—on my way—even before she shrieked, our little May-apple Hilda. Surely witchcraft knowing so well how to use them, crooking the cane in her belt, folding her—red velvet carpet treatment?

"All right, say the old pelvis did get shattered—peanut brittle. I still could drag her far enough, wrap her against the wind, hold her shielded, half-conscious, spasmotic kitten—until she calmed, purred.

"But you did find us, Russell, quite, quite in time.—To know that she's in school, cheeks pink, hands—petals of the May-flower.

"While for me, a right proper witches' death—that eternity of black trees—streaked sunset—awesome white, yet not white, ghost snow—with colors loaned, until twilight—glowed no longer.

"Color loaned?—Everything loaned, for awhile—all the magic to use—only for awhile.—Before we leave, on our way, with the wind—"

God of the Hearth

By HOPE STODDARD

Like a pack of cards
Her house falls in;
The god of the hearth
Looks a god of tin.

Five years fade
Like fog in sun,
Leaving the thought
Of one, of one . . .

The house rebuilds
As life demands,
Her years reshape,
The godling stands.

But the walls are wide
And a clock somewhere
Ticks like a chord
In the golden air

And her hand is as warm
As sun-warmed sand
Or as newly withdrawn
From another hand.

HOPE STODDARD came under the influence of Robert Frost when he was at the University of Michigan, taught in the Berlitz School of Languages in Copenhagen and Hamburg, was on the staff of *Etude*, and is now associate editor of the *International Musician*. She has published two books on music and her poetry has appeared in *Voices*, *Poetry*, the New York *Times*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and elsewhere.

Plea

By VIRGINIA KOBLER

Throw me some hurts
And remember
Me to passion.
Tied in touchless
Circumstances,
I could have screamed
But someone changed
The anagram.
Come back and
Tap my coffin.
I wasn't
Really dead.

Oh yes you were.
Oh yes I am.
I'm deader than
Great Aunt Cattie.
Tranquility
Abides with me.
I do not
Tolerate
Disturbance.
Decay is a
Gentle mate.

Leave me now.
I want to rot
Evenly.
Cover these cracks
With a sack.
Take away this
Memory
Of bright
Yellow-green.
Buy me some dust.
I need it.

VIRGINIA KOBLER is a painter, affiliated with the Seligman Gallery in Seattle. This is her first appearance in print as a poet.

Family Planning in Rural India

By S. CHANDRASEKHAR

■ That we have a population problem in India, in the sense of an adverse ratio between the total available resources and the minimum needs of the country, is conceded by all thoughtful people. It is also agreed that we should increase considerably our agricultural and industrial production on the one hand, and control our numbers on the other, so that we can raise our standard of living in terms of the per capita consumption of necessary goods and services. To attain these objectives, voluntary agencies and the central and state governments of India are dedicated to the task of promoting family planning among all classes and groups in our society. Nobody disputes the need for some kind of family planning; the question is how to implement it in the areas where it is most needed. The dilemma before our country (whose population continues to increase at the rate of five million a year) is that, whereas population control is necessary to check the threatened decline in the already poor living standards, the successful practice of family planning methods requires a far higher living standard than is the case at present.

Nearly eighty-three per cent of our population is rural. In the villages the birth-rate is higher than in the towns and cities. From the economic and health points of view, rural India needs family planning most, and yet the present socio-economic conditions in

---

Dr. Sripati Chandrasekhar, Director of the Indian Institute for Population Studies at Madras, is the editor of *Population Review* and the author of several books on Asian demography. He was in charge of demographic research at UNESCO in Paris in 1948-49, has taught at the University of Missouri, the London School of Economics, and several Indian universities, has lectured widely in Europe and America, and has been a delegate to most of the international conferences on population problems during the past decade.

these parts are least suited to the successful implementation of such a program. Some way has to be found to cut through this dilemma.

The Indian Institute for Population Studies, in Madras, has been operating the Kaufman Family Planning Clinic in the village of Mangadu, in Chincleput District, Madras State, since January, 1956. A census was taken in the beginning of the period and a socio-economic survey was also conducted at about the same time. A few months of educational work was given, in the form of a program of talks with villagers (individually and in groups) on economic and health matters, with particular reference to family planning. A survey of the attitudes of mothers and fathers, and of husbands and wives, was also made along with the census.

The primary objective of the Clinic is, of course, to advocate and promote scientific contraception and provide the necessary facilities for it. It aims to provide correct information on various approved birth control methods and to give such appliances or devices as are acceptable to rural mothers, free of cost. This objective is based on the belief that the average mother desires to limit the total number of children she will bear, and that she wishes to space them with an interval of a minimum of two years between the termination of one pregnancy and the commencement of another.

In work of this kind, one has to make several assumptions; in fact, one of the aims of the project is to test the validity of these assumptions. Do fathers and mothers want to limit the size of their families? Secondly—and this is the more basic question—do mothers, particularly in the villages, want family planning at all? (It is easy for us self-appointed social reformers to grant the existence of several pressing economic, social, and cultural problems and go about tackling them!) In other words, is the problem of population pressure upon the available resources real to the rural folk? Do they realize to any extent the relation between a large family and a low level of living, and the incompatibility of the former with a desire and effort to raise the living standards? Do they see any connection between poverty and large families on the one hand, and the poor health of the mother and her frequent child-bearing on the other? Do parents in rural India ever think about how many children they can raise so that their lot tomorrow may be a little better than yester-

day? As these questions reveal, the first step is an *awareness* of the problem and its causes.

The second objective is to find out whether people are so concerned about the problem that they want to do something about it. Here is a difficulty. Some may accept a given situation, no matter how depressing or unpleasant, without any protest or question. Such acquiescence is based on many rationalizations. These range from the situation being considered divinely ordained or the result of fate, karma, kismet, or ill-fortune, to its acceptance as something merely traditional and time-honored. The need here is for education on the possibilities of economic and social betterment.

Some others would like to change the existing situation for the better, but they are incapable of the physical and mental effort involved in the process. These people need encouragement and stimulus to put forth such efforts as they are capable of.

Then there are those—usually a small minority—who are aware of the problem, who want to solve it and have the requisite capacity for effort, but who lack the financial means. These folks need to be provided with the required services gratis for some time at least.

All these different groups and stages of progressive effort are not, of course, obvious or clear-cut. The groups as well as the stages overlap or merge imperceptibly into one another, but they are there and should be taken into serious consideration before planning cultural and social change in any traditional community.

The third objective is to assess the cultural, material, and psychological barriers against the dissemination and acceptance of family planning in rural India. The fourth is to discover what methods and what kind of contraceptives are acceptable to the rural population, particularly the mothers. And the last is to find out how successfully the birth rate can be reduced over a specified period of time, estimate the effort needed to lower it, and evaluate whether this is financially and otherwise justified.

The demographic survey and the family planning work cover an area of Mangadu caste village proper and nine ancillary hamlets (constituting what may be called Greater Mangadu) of which eight are Harijan (the so-called Untouchables) and one caste Hindu. According to a census conducted by the Institute on January 1, 1956,

the population of the selected area was 5,305. The number of biological and joint families in the area numbered in all 1,133. The total number of females of all ages was 2,612 and that of married women alone 1,052. And the total number of married women between the ages of fifteen and forty-five, that is roughly between puberty and menopause, was 673. From the point of view of the family planning experiment, the potential fertility performance of these 673 couples was the deciding factor. In other words, this number, 673, is important, for, out of a population of 5,305 in one designated area, only these 673 wives could, under normal conditions, have babies. The attitudes of the mothers and their ability to translate them into action constituted, in a way, the crux of the family planning experiment.

While Mangadu is not a particularly backward village, it is in many ways fairly typical of the rural areas of South India in the sense that people here live under quasi-primitive conditions. But these are slowly changing through government efforts, external pressure, and increasing cultural proximity to the urban areas. These changes have been observed even during the short period of our work in the area.

Mangadu is a Hindu village. Nearly half the population included in our survey are caste Hindus—mostly vegetarian Mudaliars and Naickers (two castes)—and the other half are Harijans living in the ancillary hamlets. The "Hindu-ness" of the village is accentuated by the fact that a neighboring locality is almost exclusively Muslim. Tamil is the mother tongue of nearly ninety-three per cent of the population, while the rest can understand and speak that language. About seventy-six per cent are dependent on agriculture—the cultivation of rice and betel leaves—either as land-owning peasants or as landless laborers. Thus, in its occupational composition the village is a representative sample of India. About eighty-eight per cent of the gainfully employed earn up to thirty rupees (or $6.00) a month. Less than one per cent earn more than one hundred rupees. The housing in general is a little better than what obtains in a traditional village: there are both brick-walled and tiled houses and mud-walled and thatched huts. For the most part, the better homes are in Mangadu proper while the huts are in the Harijan hamlets. The former usually have a window or two for ventilation.

While a few homes have protected wells, almost all the people depend for their water supply on public wells and pumped water from bore well pumps, a recent innovation. A few homes have latrines and sheltered bathing areas. Most people, however, resort to the fields, the nooks and corners on the village outskirts, or to the two public latrines which are kept in not too clean a condition.

Although electricity has recently been brought to the village (it happened to be on the route of electricity), few homes have been electrified. Most of the caste Hindu homes have hurricane-lanterns and some of the Harijan hamlets have naked lamps (kerosene oil and wick without a glass or chimney) common in rural areas. Many huts in these hamlets seldom have any lights—folks usually retire with the onset of darkness.

Twenty-four per cent of the population above the age of ten are literate. This is high in comparison with the all-India figure of fifteen, especially when it is remembered that Harijans constitute half of the total population. As for education, twenty-two men and two women have read up to the School Final Class (in American terminology, the senior year of high school). But literacy is no index of knowledge. For example, the majority of the villagers are ignorant of the basic rules of health and personal and public hygiene.

Along with the census, an attitude survey was taken. In this were included couples between the ages of fifteen and fifty who were living together with at least one child. Of the 692 couples approached, seventy-two per cent answered in the negative to the question, "Do you want any more children?" Those who replied in the affirmative were further asked "Why?" The invariable answer was "We want a boy" or "We want one more boy," or simply "We want sons." That is, a large majority would like to limit the number of children.

The next question dealt specifically with family planning. The subject was explained with particular reference to the use of contraceptives. Many villagers were under the impression that the practice of family planning also meant abortion. Of the 692 husbands, 55.06 per cent were in favor of family planning, 44.65 per cent were against, and 0.29 per cent were in favor of moral restraint. Of the wives, 58.11 per cent were in favor, 41.6 per cent were against and 0.29 per cent were in favor of moral restraint.

There are many methods of family planning, but the Clinic is concerned primarily with what may be called scientific contraception. This is conventionally based on mechanical and chemical barriers, but surgical methods have not been ruled out. An ideal contraceptive is one that is safe, reliable, acceptable, and cheap. All four criteria are equally important. A contraceptive must be safe; that is, it should not be harmful to the person using it or to the partner. It must be reliable in the sense that it should control conception. It must be acceptable from the aesthetic, cultural, moral, and religious points of view. And last, it must be cheap and within the means of the user. The last two criteria include the low levels of living of the rural population, their illiteracy as well as ignorance of the structure and function of the human reproductive system. A contraceptive for the use of rural mothers must take all these factors into serious consideration. The effectiveness of any program of family planning in rural India may depend almost entirely on the kind of contraceptives recommended. This factor is sometimes measured by what is called "the rate of acceptability."

The Kaufman Clinic, for reasons familiar to anyone who knows Indian rural conditions and on the basis of experience gathered elsewhere, decided against the diaphragm and jelly method. This method, followed in all advanced countries and practiced by educated and relatively high income groups, is of no practical value in the Indian countryside. As it is not indigenous to India and the materials have to be imported, it would be expensive. And even if the rural mothers could afford it—a doubtful proposition—the village and even most urban shops do not carry vaginal jelly.

This method also implies a pelvic examination by a competent physician (or a trained nurse) who alone can recommend the diaphragm of the proper size. Such medical examinations and assistance are of course not available in the villages. And last, an intelligent use of this method also takes for granted a knowledge of the structure and function of female genitalia—a knowledge that is totally absent. In view of these difficulties, a simpler and more readily usable contraceptive had to be recommended.*

---

*One young village mother on being shown a diaphragm (as the contraceptive used by Western and city women) exclaimed, "Is it not very large to swallow?"

After some trial with several methods (including cotton tampons and oil, salt solution, etc.) it was found that the sponge and foam powder was the method to which the mothers had the least objection. During the earlier months of the experiment, before foam powder was given, the women used the sponge with domestic cooking oil (gingelly oil). As this was found messy, the women were not much in favor of it. The foam powder has been found more acceptable. The sponge is made of very soft scrap rubber, about two inches square, with an eight inch thin silk thread at one end. It is easily inserted (before retiring or before intimacy) and pulled out about eight hours after intimacy with the aid of the string. The sponge can be washed with warm water and soap and is usually good for many exposures. These sponges are given free and the mothers may have as many as they want. Their actual cost, even though imported from Canada, is a trifle. The sponge is used with foam powder sprinkled on it. The foam powder does not go bad over long periods of time in normal Indian temperatures if kept in air tight containers.

Between fifteen and twenty thousand people were contacted through meetings and group discussions during the earlier months of our campaign. These were men and women of all ages, a great majority of whom were fathers and mothers who came from not only Mangadu but neighboring villages and hamlets such as Pattu, Ponnamallee, Chinna Mangadu, Kunrattur, Kovur, Kolamanivakkam, Chikkarayapuram, and Sivanthangal. The campaign was intended to make the villagers familiar with the population problem in general terms at the home, state, and national levels, and the central and state government policies on this question in favor of family planning. The fact that the provincial and central governments in India are in favor of family limitation and that Prime Minister Nehru and the Union (federal) Health Minister Karmarkar have repeatedly expressed themselves in favor of family planning has been something of a revelation to the villages. This attitude of surprise on the part of rural groups to our statements that the governments are concerned with the size of families and the increase in the country's population revealed that these matters, though freely discussed in the Tamil newspapers in the cities, did

not filter down to the villagers. This may be due to the fact that few villagers are effectively literate and few literates get or read newspapers. Here is a case for some kind of visual rural news service to keep the villagers abreast of happenings in the country and particularly the attitudes and activities of their state and national governments.

In Mangadu, our contacts have been more intense in the sense that the writer and his associates (men and women) visited every home in the village. We met the father or the mother and often both and talked about the need for family planning and the free services available at the village Kaufman Clinic. These visits have always been lively, for, once the ice was broken and the man or woman was encouraged to talk and ask questions, the visit became a small forum where doubts were aired and cleared and dogmatic assertions on the need or needlessness, the morality or otherwise, of this innovation were freely discussed. It has been our experience that the reticence and shyness of the average villager are not deep and he can be drawn out when one's *bona fides* are established and if one can talk not only in his language but in the local idiom.

These discussions, however, could not be held in private. When one calls on a villager at his home, preferably in the evening when he has some leisure, the neighbors always drop in and we all squat on the *pial*. The group would include children of all ages, the grandfather or grandmother, and just about anyone who happens to be passing by. There is no such thing as privacy in the villages. The only person who would not join this private visit turned public forum was the young unmarried daughter who knew better than to make an appearance and stayed in the kitchen! The discussions revealed both a profound ignorance of the subject, beyond old wives tales, and an anxiety to know the truth and how it would help them. About 1100 heads of families were contacted in this manner. These included some widowers, old men, and grandfathers and a few who were not living with their wives for some reason or other. As for married women, we contacted about 1050 in these house-to-house visits. The ages of these women ranged between twelve and sixty-five. While some had completed their families and were beyond menopause, all were included in our home visits as we found it inadvisable to leave any married woman uninformed on this ques-

tion. The voice and advice of an older woman (though she herself could no longer bear children) to a young wife, be it a daughter or daughter-in-law or neighbor, might be of decisive value. In village groups sometimes an older woman may set the tone for or against the use of contraceptives.

The Kaufman Clinic is primarily a family planning clinic but no village mother would directly come forth demanding advice on this question. Therefore, the Clinic provides general medical help. While our major objective is the educating and encouraging of the village women in family planning, we also do a little dispensary work along with the giving of contraceptives. In fact, most women come to the Clinic to consult our women physicians more on their and their infants' ailments than on direct family planning problems. We also feel that it is necessary that the planning of babies must go hand in hand with the saving of babies. We feel that the villagers appreciate that our objective is not merely a negative one of limiting the size of families and spacing the arrival of babies, but is positive in that we want to conserve the health and life of every child born. This extends naturally to the health of the mothers. While our resources in supplying drugs and the time of our medical personnel for diagnostic purposes are very limited, the Clinic serves also to a limited extent as a general clinic. This medical help, however, is limited to mothers and children, though family planning advice is extended to men also when they ask for advice or materials.

There is another factor that attracts mothers to the Clinic. Once a week we distribute milk powder (donated by several agencies in the United States of America) to mothers who have infants and children up to five years of age. This sometimes artificially swells the number of mothers, for on a few occasions we have found "mothers" with borrowed babies to enable them to obtain free milk!

The total number of mothers who have received contraceptives directly from the Clinic in the last two years in 1,200; but these include women from neighboring villages. The number connotes one significant fact. At some time or other these women felt the urge to think about their large families or showed a disinclination to have further additions to them (no doubt a result of our propaganda and not a spontaneous feeling). From the point of view of

our experimental project, however, they are beyond our scope and could not be followed up for lack of personnel. Of these, 632 or about fifty per cent belonged to Mangadu. In other words, of the 673 wives between the ages of fifteen and forty-five, 632 or about ninety-four per cent of the married women in the relevant age group have been contacted, persuaded to visit the Clinic, convinced of the need for family planning (at least momentarily!), and have received the necessary appliances. The reasons given by them for wanting to limit the size of their families can be summarized under three categories: "We cannot afford another baby since we don't have the means to support the children we already have"; or "My health is too poor for me to have another baby"; or "Everything is in such a pass that we can't cope with another baby." The frequency of responses were in the above order.

For a rural community with a population composed of caste Hindus and Harijans, the acceptance of contraceptives by such a large number of wives would appear to be an extraordinary achievement, but this brings us back to the question of concentration of work through talks and home visits.

A subsequent study revealed that 192 of these women conceived and therefore were definite failures. But does this indicate the failure of the contraceptives themselves? Fortunately, all these wives who conceived have confided either to our lady physicians or health visitors that they did not always use them! Apparently the step between the acceptance of a contraceptive with the best of intentions and the actual use of it is a formidable one for many women. The psychological barrier appears to be a real one.

The reasons given by the women who have failed to use the contraceptives are summarized below. These throw some light on our rural milieu and are listed here in the order of their frequency.

1. "Tried but found the contraceptive awkward and bothersome and therefore gave it up." 31.8%

2. "Breast-feeding the baby—will not conceive as long as I am lactating. Hence did not use the contraceptive." 27.6%

3. "Do not like the sponge and foam powder method. Would prefer injection or oral medicine." 11.5%

4. "Husband objects to it." 8.8%

5. "Have small baby; monthly period not established. Don't think I can conceive." 5.2%

6. Fear of injury to her husband. 4.6%

7. "Simply forgot to use it." 4.2%

8. "Mother-in-law objects to it." 2.1%

9. "Decided to have more children." 2.1%

10. "Coitus took place without my knowledge when asleep." 2.1%

Two reasons in the above interesting list stand out. One is the belief that nursing mothers cannot conceive. The writer has heard this statement from so many people, including some educated husbands and wives, that it appears to be part of the accepted folklore. There is a great need for spreading the knowledge that a prolonged lactation period is not a barrier to conception.

The second major objection appears to be to the method itself, particularly the genital manipulation involved in it. Many women all over the world find contraceptives messy and meddlesome, awkward and unaesthetic. Our rural women in India are no exception. Many a Mangadu mother has expressed her desire for an injection (injections, by the way, are very popular in rural India) or a dose of a mixture. These village folk are demanding exactly what the world is waiting for—an oral contraceptive, a pill that can be taken easily.

Out of the 632 women, 192 have been failures. The remaining 440 are having normal conjugal relations but have not conceived. The period of exposure ranges from three to twenty months. According to the routine check-up by the health visitor, these mothers are using contraceptives.

Now, does this mean that these women, who have accepted contraceptives and who are presumably using them, constitute the successful in preventing conception? Can their number be taken as an index of the quantitative effectiveness of this particular method? There are, however, difficulties. As an American specialist, Dr. Clarence J. Gamble, points out,

> The estimation of effectiveness of contraceptive methods is more difficult than that of oral or hypodermic medication because their use cannot be observed. The physician must rely on the patients' statements to determine whether the materials prescribed have been used and used correctly. A

single omission may end the desired protection and result in a pregnancy. Even when the omissions are reported by the patient, however, the physician cannot be sure that the pregnancy began on one of those occasions.

In view of these and other difficulties, the calculation of the conventional pregnancy rate may not be of any considerable value since we have no pre-experiment figures for comparison.

An effective way to measure whether a family planning clinic has been a success or not is to calculate the birth rate at the end of, say, a four- or five-year period and compare it with the birth rate of the community before the clinic was opened. If a detailed census is carried out at the end of the stipulated period, the census count checked against the vital registration and the records of the clinic may give us the necessary answer.

However, in the light of work already carried out, a few tentative conclusions can be set down.

1. The first change (and to those who know rural India in the South, a remarkable one) is that an outsider, albeit an Indian, can talk about these personal and private matters of sex and reproduction, conception and its control without any particular reserve. In a way, there is more mental freedom in Mangadu than in Boston! One can venture the statement that, by and large, the traditional conservatism and reticence on the question have disappeared and a healthy curiosity and a desire for knowledge have taken their place.

2. The second conclusion is that advice and help in these intimate matters is willingly taken even from foreigners. In our work, the Institute has been assisted very generously by American women working in a voluntary capacity. At the beginning of the survey, we had qualms about utilizing the free and valuable services of some American women. But after awhile we found that the village women had no objection to talking with these American women about their personal problems and taking their advice. I must add that the language naturally was a barrier, but with the assistance of intepreters the barrier was overcome.

3. A majority of fathers and mothers, irrespective of their age and the number of children they already have, accept in theory the desirability of limiting the family for a variety of reasons. Of these, the first usually advanced is economic and the second health.

4. But the follow-up histories have revealed an interesting set of reasons for not using the contraceptives carefully or consistently, or not having recourse to them at all. This may mean that the *motivation* is not strong enough. The effort involved in practicing family planning (especially as the method involved is genital manipulation—a repugnant procedure to many women) is decidedly greater in the thinking of many women than the difficulties inherent in another pregnancy and another baby.

5. The need for an ideal contraceptive can hardly be overemphasized. What is wanted is something simpler and which, when used once only, will be effective for numerous exposures over a period of weeks or months. The women themselves ask for an injection, a mixture, or a pill that is easily taken and provides immunity over a longer period of time. When the much-talked-of "oral contraceptive" is perfected, the battle will be nearly won.

Small Sea

By CHARLES FARBER

Once an eagle,
crucified against the wind
of time, the old man, his mind
returned from the sleet, the curse, said
Wait: your seas will go to bed,

and his shawled, dark woman
fussed with the strings of care
and set before me a circle of soup,
eye-sized;
They come to that, he said and said.

CHARLES FARBER is a chemist whose poems have been published in *Compass Review*, *Mutiny*, *The Fiddlehead*, *Quicksilver*, *Yugen*, *New Athenaeum*, and the New York *Times*.

■ BOOKS

Setting the Record Straight

By GLENN NEGLEY

"This is a peculiar time in which to be writing about John Dewey. It is a time when almost every fundamental part of his philosophy seems to have been rejected." In the first two sentences of this work[1] Professor Geiger thus recognizes the difficult task of achieving perspective at very close range and under rather unfavorable atmospheric conditions. Although this Dewey centennial year is the appropriate time for the publication of such a book, what is presented here is no mere *Festschrift*. To be sure, Geiger is most sympathetically disposed toward the philosophical perspective of Dewey, and the reader will very quickly perceive that this "scientific naturalistic humanism" has been the profound and formative influence in Geiger's own philosophy. Yet, it is by no means an uncritical appraisal; while it undoubtedly presents Dewey at his best (and is thus a kind of tribute), the method is that of exposition rather than apologetics. Geiger is not primarily concerned with the details and the argumentative construction of Dewey's philosophy, but rather with an estimate of the meaning, the relevance, and the historical importance of the philosophical position he believes Dewey to have consistently maintained. The work is, in a sense, an appraisal of an era in American philosophy, attending to the contributions to that pattern of development made by Mead, James, the social sciences, psychology, and education. For the moment, at least, the social scientist, the psychologist, and even the student of philosophy, who may not read Dewey today, will hardly find a better statement of the contribution of Dewey to the American philosophy, thought, and culture of the century.

---

[1] *John Dewey in Perspective*. By George R. Geiger. Oxford University Press, 1958. $5.50.

GLENN NEGLEY, Professor of Philosophy at Duke University, is the author of *The Organization of Knowledge* and co-author of *Democracy vs. Dictatorship* and *The Quest for Utopia*.

Geiger knows that any philosopher with Dewey's range and extent of interest, with a life span of almost a century, will inevitably be subject to misconceptions and stereotypes. What provokes Geiger is that the stereotypes in Dewey's case so often represent the most "narrow and occasionally vulgar interpretation of his philosophy"; "Deweyism" has become a bad word. In his first two chapters, therefore, Geiger essays to describe the totality of Dewey's philosophy, the fundamental and distinctive quality of his premises and beliefs, what he was trying to realize with the "handmaidens" of "thinking, knowing, scientific method, educational reform, and the like." Remaining chapters are devoted to a selective exposition of how methods of inquiry were "geared to the end" of Dewey's central theme.

The most basic and important point in Dewey's philosophy, as evaluated by Geiger, was his description of experience as "transactional" rather than as an interaction involving the classic dualistic cleavage of reality and appearance. Dewey himself suggested that his use of the term "situation" to describe experience anticipated the now familiar concept of "field." The background of this description is, of course, a definition of man and nature in context; individuals emerge from a social situation in which relations among individuals are constitutive. Man is a social animal, not an animal that becomes social. "This social thesis is basic for all of Dewey's work. . . . This is why 'experience' is the very signature of Dewey's philosophy."

Experience is separated by Dewey into three distinct stages which can be described only in terms of dialectical development. "Sensitive awareness" is the background of knowledge, and by this is meant an immediate apprehension. Dewey will not call this immediate experience knowledge; what it conveys as a matter of direct confrontation is quality, and "the final feel of a total situation is not an item of discourse or of knowledge." Knowledge arises when a problematic situation evolves, that is, when the simplicity and continuity of the immediate are disturbed: "when one want collides with another—inference, in however simple a form, is under way." It is to be expected that such a view will see the final end of knowledge as the "restoration of continuity to experience." Stated in this straightforward manner, a historical parallel (which it is not to Geiger's purpose to point out) becomes apparent: both the similarity and the difference of the idealist description of experience which was developing at the same time, notably in Bradley. Immediate experience was for Bradley also the background of knowledge, and inference the process of the development of that knowledge. Perhaps Dewey emphasized process more than did Bradley, but the important difference

is in Bradley's description of inference as the "self-development of an object taken as real." The difference here is significant; "Dewey urges that theory of knowledge be based on the way problems are really solved, especially through scientific method, rather than upon dialectical ingenuity." A review is not a proper place to elaborate this comparison, but when a transactional and contextual description of experience approaches organic analysis (as it does, *e.g.*, on pages 22-23), a certain mutuality of problems between the idealist and the pragmatic views begins to emerge.

The handmaiden of scientific method serves art, which "sets the measure of the good life" in a restoration of the synthesis of experience. Once the illusion that experience is fragmentary has been dispelled, "a unified experience will emerge as the prime human value." Geiger admits that such "remarks may seem remote from the work of John Dewey," but he contends that they are not. At any rate, this introduction to Dewey's philosophy is refreshingly different.

The problem of value, which is now necessarily considered, is a difficult and controversial one. It is fair to remark that Geiger does not try to evade the difficulties which seem unavoidable in Dewey's treatment of value, that aspect of his work which many who are otherwise sympathetic to his views find most troublesome. As Geiger says in conclusion, "We are concerned here with the absence of an explicit moral criterion in Dewey's definition." Dewey's continued emphasis on inquiry as the operational and experimental use of scientific method in problem-solving is well known, but the intruding question is "whether values can themselves be derived from or justified by scientific knowledge." The available answers to this question are not satisfactory. Geiger points out quite properly that knowledge ought to be prerequisite to evaluation and that "there is no substitute for authenticated knowledge *in dealing with problems*." At this point, one is likely to encounter an annoying confusion of meaning. Geiger suggests that "scientists have also come to recognize the predominant part selection—therefore valuation of a sort—must play in their work." Now this suggestion, however restrained, of an equivalence between methodological selection and moral or aesthetic evaluation seems very suspect—and Geiger is quite well aware of it. If the "source of values appears to lie where Dewey located it: in an integrated experience where problems do not fester but are resolved," does this mean that problem-solving is itself the highest value? There is here a confusion of rational inquiry and psychological preference which is not resolved by Dewey's insistence upon "a kind of knowledge which, by being thoroughly humane, is entitled to the name *moral*," however laudable may be the sentiment. Perhaps Geiger is close to the truth when he suggests

that "Dewey's analysis may never satisfy a certain kind of temperament"; it is his own opinion that "the introversions of British dons and American professors, however suave they may be, are not to be considered philosophy's 'answer' to the growth of a science of man."

Certainly, one of the temperaments which finds Dewey unpalatable is the "new conservative," and the chapter on "Intelligence and Liberalism," while sometimes rather caustic in an urbane kind of way, is thoroughly effective. The present disrepute of the "liberal," the reaction to "intellectualism" and "secularism," represents the epitome of reaction to Dewey's scientific humanism. The effort to make a Marxist philosopher out of Dewey because he tried to be sympathetic with the new Russian society was cheap and transparent to all who knew anything of Dewey's writings; this is one of the shoddiest of the stereotypes Geiger would like to destroy. Geiger's strongest comments are directed to the anti-naturalists: "to accuse a scientific naturalism that is barely getting under way for not having made man a god is impertinence of a peculiarly arrogant kind." Supernaturalism, he remarks, has had "a longer period to demonstrate its supposed competence and to practice its exorcisms and exhortations. . . . Supernaturalism must be held as guilty as anything else . . . for modern moral defeatism."

It is in terms of whether men are ever "finally ready to apply intelligent inquiry to the solving of their problems," so Geiger judges, that Dewey's philosophy will stand or fall. Perhaps, as he says, it "is not fair to John Dewey to place his ideas against the crazy background of a fugitive present," but if it can be done with fairness, Geiger has done so.

It is difficult to do justice to this book without extending the review to inappropriate length. However, time must be taken to call to the attention of those interested in the development of psychology and psychiatry the chapter on "Nature, Communication, and Mind." Geiger is properly resentful on Dewey's behalf that much of the latter's early and pioneering work in the description of the transactional and *Gestalt* character of experience seems to have been forgotten. Especially is this early and influential exploration of Dewey and Mead almost unknown and unrecognized abroad. Dewey's "running battle with Descartes," Geiger reminds us, is completely ignored in a recent influential attack on the Cartesian ghost-in-the-machine.

As for what has been done to Dewey in the philosophy of education and pedagogy, no humane person could wish it to happen to his worst enemy. It is doubtful that a book on the subject could deal adequately with this misappropriation and misuse. The chapter here is more than a gesture toward historical clarification; our growing tendency to regard

education as the preparation of scientists and technologists to outstrip all other scientists and technologists suggests that a re-examination of Dewey's objections to education-as-preparation might be fruitful.

Whether or not one agrees with all or none of Dewey's philosophy is completely irrelevant to the appraisal of this work. It is an effort, within its scope, to set the record straight as to what Dewey said and what he meant in the context of his entire philosophy. Dewey's work seems to have suffered most from the very fragmentation he deplored. The relevance of his philosophy to contemporary problems of human experience may be a matter of disagreement; Professor Geiger presents his opinion ably and effectively. Quite apart from matters of opinion, however, it is a matter of probity to evaluate a man's philosophy on the basis of what he said, not by constructions at second or third hand of what he did not say nor could have intended. It was Professor Geiger's stated purpose to provide this clearer perspective for John Dewey; he has done it well.

The Great Debate, Continued

The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. By William Appleman Williams. World Publishing Company, 1959. $4.75.

The Causes of World War Three. By C. Wright Mills. Simon and Schuster, 1958. $3.50. Paperback, $1.50.

George F. Kennan's containment policy rested on the faith that Russian power would somehow decay or mellow, if only American pressure were unremittingly applied to the Soviet Union. Republican and Democratic statesmen labored for a decade to see who could be the more unremitting, and in late 1957 the Russians triggered Sputnik I. Although it was difficult to read the decline of Soviet power into this event, American cold war policy has since remained largely faithful to the Kennan orthodoxy. Many of the anxious have simply cried out for more and more containment, with bigger and better weapons.

If official Washington has stood pat on these matters, so have the intellectuals whose job it is to add imaginative range to American policy-making. The spectrum of the intellectuals' debate since Sputnik has not been impressively wide, at least in view of Russia's constantly expanding challenges to the West. The foremost commentators on American policy have, it is true, been quite uneasy during the last two years, but they have

not framed new programs so much as they have made piecemeal suggestions for the shoring up of this, that, or the other aspect of our diplomacy. A heartening exception is Kennan himself who, when he spoke urbanely of the disengagement of Russian and American troops in Europe, and of the overmilitarization of American thinking in the cold war, moved clearly away from his original doctrine of containment. But while some experts believed that Kennan had opened new areas for profitable discussion, Dean Acheson was moved to wrath and bitterness, and John Foster Dulles went right on containing.

Professors Williams and Mills have now entered the lists of the Great Debate, and this fact may turn out, in retrospect, to be an intellectual event. Their books are complementary, and they as scholars are alike in many ways. Each is an *enfant terrible* in his own field. Each comes armed with the results of long research in and contemplation about his specialty (neither book is altogether a response to Sputnik and later developments). Each brings from his previous work stimulating hypotheses about American diplomatic failures. Each sees the ironical results of the containment theory, and each has a program. Above all, each is determined to widen the ambit of the foreign policy debate, to go far beyond Kennan's revision of his early ideas.

Williams makes his contribution as an historian by going back to the 1890's to discover the origins of our self-defeating cold war policies. When the frontier closed and depression threatened, American businessmen looked beyond the oceans for new opportunities. The Open Door Policy was precisely adapted to the overseas expansion of our capitalism, since it delivered up foreign markets for surplus American production as well as needed raw materials from foreign areas, and all this without the bother and embarrassment of territorial annexation and control. Williams accordingly calls the Open Door Policy "imperial anticolonialism." It had an air of political restraint about it, but still it was exploitative. Even though statesmen like Woodrow Wilson saw it as a vehicle for spreading democracy, he also talked about the righteous conquest of foreign markets, and there has been in fact no real split between Republicans and Democrats about American capitalism's urgent need for overseas theatres. Williams contends that the Open Door has been our fundamental diplomatic program during all of the Twentieth Century. It has been our way of trying to make the world over in the image of American capitalism and democracy: we have never really practised the principle of self-determination for other peoples. After 1945, our leaders, says Williams, were spurred on by enticing (but misleading) visions of American omnipotence to fasten a subtle imperialism on an unwilling world. When

they met Russian resistance, Kennan drafted his containment essays, actually an updated version of the Open Door.

Although Mills also talks about American "imperialism," and particularly about oil interests in the Middle East, his special contribution as a sociologist is quite different. Instead of exploring the past for clarification of our endless dilemmas, he flashes before us a quick montage, as it were, of the contemporary American power structure, and then alleges that this structure has much to do with our cold war blunders. First we see fleeting shots of the decision-making power elite—military, government, and corporation brass, constantly in motion between the Pentagon, the Executive Department, and General Motors. These V.I.P.'s, who virtually run our foreign policy, are driven by the "military metaphysic" and are frantically preparing World War III. (Here we have, as fresh as the morning's newspapers, the latest generation of Williams' imperial anticolonialists.) At the second level of power, we have shots of those actors who converge on the Congress—farmers, labor leaders, small businessmen, and others who, mostly preoccupied with internal issues, exert little impact on our international relations. Mills finally trains his fast-moving camera on the faceless American masses, who live in a political vacuum, who are far from any centers of power, and who have nothing whatever to say about diplomacy. The validity of this entire montage depends, it will be recognized, on the far more thorough and leisurely portrait of the national power structure in *White Collar* and *The Power Elite*, books published considerably before Sputnik.

Mills rushes on to inferences based on the proposition that, in history, those who have power are accountable for their acts. At this moment, the American and the Russian power elites (there is little detail on or castigation of the latter) bear joint responsibility for the next developments in world history because only they have access to important decision-making.

When these authors turn to the fruits of American cold war policy, it is Williams who has the keener eye for irony. He wrote in his *American-Russian Relations*, published as far back as 1952, that when the United States spurned a negotiated settlement in favor of a power contest after World War II, she surrendered the initative to the Soviet rulers. More than a year before Sputnik, Williams argued for co-existence on the ground that Kennan's containment program, initiated when Soviet power was relatively weak, had the odd effect of calling a stronger Russia into existence. Now he claims that containment, really only a contemporary form of Open Door imperialism, ironically stimulated the Soviet leaders to tougher measures at home and abroad and to a redoubling of their efforts to match the West. Containment also rallied the Russian people

behind their leaders. The contention is that America's total cold war diplomacy has boomeranged, and that the United States now confronts a world wholly unlike the one it expected its policies to create. Russia herself has speedily recovered from the recent war, she has managed the delicate transfer of power from the Stalin regime to later ones (here one of Kennan's hopes has surely been dashed), she has started to eradicate poverty, she has contrived a program of economic aid to other countries and, possibly most frustrating of all, she has proven with her missiles that she can match Western technology and military power. Meanwhile, according to Williams, American policy is no more effective in the backward areas of the world. Imperial anticolonialism attracted the poor nations at first, but when they saw how it subordinated their own cultural, political, and economic life, and especially when they recognized that it led to unbalanced development of their economies while most of the newly created wealth went back to the United States, they turned to Communism for the guidance of their recent revolutions. If clung to much longer, Williams warns, Open Door expansion will literally isolate America.

For Mills, the great irony is that war with total weapons, although it is being prepared by the power elites here and in Russia, can achieve no political aims, can serve no national interests, because it implies mutual destruction. Like Williams, Mills is convinced that our cold war policymakers have achieved few of the results they set out to accomplish. The Soviet Union, far from tottering, has had a series of economic, scientific, and military successes. The Russian economy has been growing at double the rate of the American system and will overtake the latter in a decade or two. Mills says with Williams that we are also losing the race to control industrialization of the backward areas.

What is to be done? Briefly, Williams believes in co-existence, in reordering the American governmental and economic systems (he is not very specific on this point), and in turning imperial anticolonialism on its head to the end that American policy, instead of inhibiting self-determination in backward countries, would aid them to carry through their revolutions in ways which they themselves have chosen. But while all these programs are going forward, there is to be no weakening of America's military strength, says Williams, even though her survival will not be decided simply by more missiles.

For Mills, who offers an astonishing array of demands for the liquidation of the cold war, the foregoing program is not enough. He wants the eventual diversion of our entire military budget to the economic development of backward regions. He wants America to stop all production of

extermination weapons and to announce the size of its stockpile, together with a schedule for reducing or converting it to peacetime uses. All American military bases outside the United States should be abandoned. We ought to remove all security restrictions on scientific endeavor and invite qualified scientists from anywhere to participate in it. All scientific work relevant to the military should be removed from the private economy. What makes the Mills agenda even more breathtaking is the fact that he says it should be announced unilaterally by the United States.

Mills writes jocularly that he does not suppose his ideas will be acted on this week by the U.S. power elite. Accordingly, he has an interim program for American intellectuals, who must impute to the elite the responsibility for the current crisis, and who must do so publicly in order to make the masses aware of the consequences of elitist decisions. Intellectuals should struggle to break the grip of the elite and to convert the private economy into one which is publicly responsible, and from which the economics of war are excised.

The books under review are chiefly valuable as nagging reminders that we are living in the twilight of the containment era. That period, from about 1947 to 1957, was immensely educational for many Americans who shed the naiveté of isolationism, or of relying on the United Nations (which hardly mirrored power realities) as a primary instrument of our foreign policy. As we went to school to Kennan and others of his persuasion, we learned the wisdom of backing our programs with power, of trying to use power rationally and restrainedly, and of being patient about facing up to the long duel with Russia.

It was a splendid achievement for us to get the mid-century world into focus, but no sooner had we done so than it changed on us again. The containment policy assumed too much American power, or it was based, in D. W. Brogan's phrase, on the illusion of American omnipotence, a dream of which Williams makes a great deal. Our boundless power was supposed to lead to a Pax Americana; what supervened instead was the Russian upsurge and the hideous balance of terror.

Where do we go from here? In the Williams program we have the maintenance of America's military posture even while she is working out patterns of co-existence with Russia and of genuine self-determination for restless backward peoples. This program is far more viable than that suggested by Mills who, in his zeal to end the cold war, would have us unlearn Kennan's lessons about the nature of power. It is a perilous *non sequitur* to conclude from America's failure to stop Russian growth that she can safely leave power vacuums throughout the world. Mutual and cautious disengagement, yes, but not the headlong abandonment of our

outposts. There is a suggestive likeness between Mills and the late Charles A. Beard, who was masterful at drawing diagrams of power *within* the American society but who seemed, at least in the late thirties, to be blind to the meaning of national power structures beyond the continental shelf. In another direction, Mills' feeling for power is well developed: the balance of terror, which has impressed him deeply, is a significant fact on the international power scene nowadays, and everyone must somehow reckon with it. How long can we and the Russians afford to live with it? How long can co-existence be postponed?

Bard College —Fred Crane

Poets of the Sixties

The Night of the Hammer. By Ned O'Gorman. Harcourt, Brace, 1959. $3.75.

The Country of a Thousand Years of Peace. By James Merrill. Knopf, 1959. $3.95.

The Sense of Movement. By Thom Gunn. University of Chicago Press, 1959. $2.75.

A Dream of Governors. By Louis Simpson. Wesleyan University Press, 1959. $1.65 (paper).

The Dark Houses. By Donald Hall. Viking, 1958. $3.00.

The Death of Venus. By Harold Witt. Golden Quill, 1958. $2.50.

A Cage of Spines. By May Swenson. Rinehart, 1958. $3.75.

Heart's Needle. By W. D. Snodgrass. Knopf, 1959. $3.75.

Ten years ago John Ciardi edited an excellent anthology, *Mid-Century American Poets*, containing the best of those poets who had emerged in the preceding ten or fifteen years: Wilbur, Rukeser, Nims, Shapiro, W. T. Scott, Bishop, Mayo, Holmes, Viereck, Ciardi, Roethke, Eberhart, Schwartz, Jarrell, and Lowell. In a sense these poets continue to govern our poetry as they influence younger poets, teach classes, edit magazines, review poetry, and judge contests. Mostly in their forties now, they are a remarkably able, active, and mature force in American letters. While they do not constitute a "school," they certainly have more in common than have the poets who emerged earlier in the century—such as Williams, Eliot, Cummings, Pound, Frost, Crane, MacLeish, Millay, Ransom, Moore,

Jeffers. In his introduction to *Mid-Century American Poets*, Ciardi uses the word "sanity" to describe their common quality. This means, I think, that they have given up trying to "break the iamb" and that one can usually understand them.

Modern poetry came to be modish in the twenties and thirties—and because it looked odd, it had to be defended from the Philistines. This was a good fight, but now, although skirmishes still occur, the fight is dated—as are the poetic mannerisms of the twenties and thirties. New ways had to be tried; they were, and produced some very exciting poetry—although little, I warrant, that will outlive the century. The poetry of the twenties and thirties might be thought of as analogous to painting and music: the poem was a composition, not to be "read" so much as to be taken in as a total aesthetic experience. We were called upon to appreciate rather than to understand. Frost, of course, was the exception, sticking more cautiously by the history of poetry while his contemporaries and younger poets shot off in all directions.

But I believe it was Frost's influence, above that of any of the others, which shaped the poetry of the forties and fifties—or, if not Frost directly, it has been the history of poetry which produced the "sanity" of our mid-century poets. They produce a poetry of statement, language making coherent comment—less like painting and music, more like stories and essays, more like what poetry has always been. This is a great relief.

It will take a while to recover from the experimentalism of the early Moderns. I know that I, for example, was educated on their poetry: I came to love and admire, say, Eliot, as Dryden, recovering from the metaphysicals, loved his darling Cowley. ("Recovering" is a prejudicial word: Donne may be more exciting than Dryden; Cummings may be more exciting than Richard Wilbur; but you can't go on being Donne or Cummings when the world has changed around you.) If we were to begin now selecting the poets of the sixties as Ciardi selected those of the fifties, I think we would find ourselves still in the Age (belated!) of Frost. Most of the new books appear to be by poets in their thirties (as were the mid-century poets ten years ago.) I have picked a skimpy sample of these books to illustrate what is going on. In my judgment, the best of these are poets of statement, shaping their verse to the outlines of easy colloquial speech, concerning themselves more with content than form—yet versatile in the use of traditional measures. They are dry, wry poets who seem to want us to know what they are talking about.

Not all the books, of course, are like that. I will begin with two which are not—and try to show why they don't work for me. Had Ned O'Gorman's *Night of the Hammer* not won the Lamont Poetry Selection for

1958, I would not have read past the first poem. It is good evidence that the mid-century poets and their contemporaries are not imposing their own values on the younger generation. A very distinguished panel found something in this book I persist in missing. The judges were more broad-minded than I would be to have discovered it.

A few of the poems seemed clearly conceived and completed—as in the wonderful clowning of "On Saint Theresa's Difficulty in Keeping Her Feet on the Ground" or the lyric roundness of "The Rose and the Body of the Rose." I felt most power in "A Description of the Sea for Lina Lenzi Who Has Never Seen it." Here is a sample:

> There's the noise of the noon
> bus in it, like a swoon
> of girls hollering with rage
> that Tom, decrepit cat, had
> chewed their darling captive
> in its cage. Or a fix of soldiers
> pale from urging priests from sleep
> and saints from pinnacles
> rail on a hill and rock the air
> with cannon. That's the sea,
> my simile of the mind's famine.
>
> There's the song of caves in it,
> like a flex of pistols when
> children bail balloons on Sunday
> echoing. Or the rocks rattle
> as jugglers, the long act through,
> take off their socks and hear
> the applause of orphans. Or
> soldiers saluting Sally as she walks
> by the parade ground wearing goggles.
> Hear the sails snap: that is
> the echo, percussive, of the sea's song.

There is a certain energy here, an imaginative reaching for qualities that exceed experience, a humor, an associative freedom. The first line of the poem says, "There is no reason in it" (i.e., the sea). The first stanza quoted above is the third of the poem—and you can see how it bears out the promise of the poem's first line. The stanza about the song of caves is my own insertion—offered for comparison. I wrote it in about two minutes with only one principle of composition in mind—not to make sense. If it is startling illogicality which makes good poetry, I submit that that effect is easily come by. It seems to me basic to Mr. O'Gorman's

poetic method—in almost every poem. We can be amused or startled once by such a notion as that of soldiers who disturb saints railing on a hill and rocking the air with cannon, by such phrases as "a swoon of girls"—but the technique becomes tiresome, precious, when sustained too long. Add to this that the poems are mostly occasional pieces, art at arm's length—that they seem casual, careless even—that they seem to have nothing much to say, except perhaps that we'd be better off being animals. You see why the book and I didn't make connection.

I suffer much the same blindness about James Merrill, who appears in Untermeyer, whose first book appeared in 1951, and whose second, *The Country of a Thousand Years of Peace and Other Poems*, leaves me feeling crude, ignorant, and bored. I quote the first sentence (if that's the word) of "Thistledown":

> First clan of autumn, thistleball on a stem
> Between forefinger and thumb,
> Known for the seeds
> That make a wish come true when the light last of them
> Into air blown subsides,
>
> Feather sphere of seeds, frail brain
> On pricky spine,
> I feared their dissipation, deeds of this crown aspin,
> Words from a high-flown talker, pale brown
> Thistledown.

The grammar is diffuse, the touch so delicate as to be (for me) indiscernible. "Aspin" isn't in my dictionary—but I don't sense any message I care much to decode. Something about a few of the poems—"Lovers," "The Mirror," "Laboratory Poem"—came through to me, but the chief effect was of beautiful limp words words words seen underwater, transmitted by a quiver of a brow, on a wave length I am not equipped to receive.

My failure to appreciate these books properly arises, of course, from a predeliction for another sort of poetry—for the statement, coherency, order of what I take to be the dominant tendency of poetry in our time. I grant that I would read Hart Crane or Wallace Stevens or Dylan Thomas or Conrad Aiken (whom Merrill in some ways resembles) with more patience. But O'Gorman's associative kaleidoscope and Merrill's blurred focus seem to me obstacles to seeing the world clearly. Twenty years ago they might have been regarded as needed innovation.

I respect much more Thom Gunn's *The Sense of Movement*, although it runs into its own excesses. Gunn, an Englishman, although teaching

now in California, loves philosophical paradoxes and abstractions, often rendering them in lines that are merely prosy and banal:

> I am condemned to be
> An individual.

or:

> The unmotivated sadness of the air
> Filling the human with his own despair.

or:

> For in that discipline of resignation
> Each gesture is deliberate: they confess
> A manacled desire, and this resort
> Both limits and implies their liberty.

or:

> What could I do but seek the synthesis
> As each man does, of what his nature is?

The word "will" speckles his poems—his central theme, as I understand it, being a celebration of deliberateness, however arbitrary, which gives a sense of movement. His first poem, which I think the best, concerns the motorcycle boys who roar madly into, at least, selfhood. It closes:

> A minute holds them, who have come to go:
> The self-defined, astride the created will
> They burst away; the towns they travel through
> Are home for neither bird nor holiness,
> For birds and saints complete their purposes.
> At worst, one is in motion; and at best,
> Reaching no absolute, in which to rest,
> One is always nearer by not keeping still.

Elsewhere he says:

> But I must act, and make
> The meaning of each movement that I take.

First, quibbles: the towns are not homes for the motorcyclists, "who have come to go." Does this mean, then, that the motorcyclists are *like* birds and saints (for whom the towns are also not homes) or are they to be contrasted to birds and saints, as the motorcyclists do not, apparently, complete their purposes? And, in the second quotation, doesn't one make movement, not take it? Has he let the flat rhyme drive him to distort the idiom?

Quibbles aside, however, these lines suggest the searching manner of the book, the attempt to make sense of our restlessness "in a valueless world," where

> Men manufacture both machine and soul,
> And use what they imperfectly control
> To dare a future from the taken routes.

There is an attempt to work responsibly with ideas, which seems better, to me, than hiding one's head under an aspin. It is not, perhaps, Gunn's fault that his philosophizing shares the weakness of most philosophy in our century: ingenious analysis, aridity, and, in spite of the movement, little progress.

Another poet struggling with relevant statement, almost with social consciousness, is Louis Simpson, whose third book, *A Dream of Governors*, crackles with irony and satire, counseling, I believe, indifference to the heaving of history—as the shepherd and shepherdess, in his first poem, love obliviously on their magic mountain, or as the mind offers escape in "Against the Age":

> Landscape and garden, village of the mind—
> This is man's only state. Here he survives,
> And only in a corner will he find
> His happiness, if any. But our lives
> Are lies of State, the slogans for today.
> That wind is carrying the world away.

His pentameters are sparse in imagery, very lean and plain. In "The Goodnight" there is a moment of tenderness, but usually the tone is hard, most characteristically bitter amusement. His most ambitious poem here is a long narrative, "The Runner," a kind of condensed *Red Badge of Courage*, a tale of a Second World War soldier finding his manhood in combat in Holland. It is so unornamented (much prosier than Stephen Crane's prose), the poetic line tends to disappear in the rush of the story, the realistic dialogue and detail. The story is exciting and the experiment interesting: we need a narrative style for poetry, and perhaps it must be too lean before it can dare be rich. Simpson hasn't the metaphorical charge or the depth, in this book, to carry off what he intends. But he seems to work carefully and to make sense.

Donald Hall hit big with his first collection; his second book, now, *The Dark Houses*, contains a good deal of work less tidy than the earlier poems I have read, as though there were a conscious effort not to be neat and slick. I like neatness, however—and respond much better to the satirical, rather domestic poems than those with more ambitious subjects.

"Oysters and Hermits" is an example of the latter—in which oysters seem to be an unlikely symbol for love contrasted in an unlikely way with the solitary life of Ted "the clever eremite." The poem jogs hard, with, for me, obscure juxtapositions and uninteresting language. I quote its close:

> A sane man called "the two
> Unendurable words. Wastage of life will create
> The implication of death," which means that you
> Must tell your love while you reveal your hate,
> And never leave your hands nothing to do.

I confess that I don't understand this—but I quote it to bring attention to the last line, which strikes me as an excellent example of the colloquial, poignant irony which Hall does best. I was most pleased with "The Umbrella," a provocative and amusing extension of the idea that people are no damned good, the speaker having provided himself with a cosmic umbrella to keep out everything and everybody. Such a little touch as "I read in here," stands against the rhetoric, making the poem light enough to mean something serious.

Harold Witt's third book, *The Death of Venus*, is, similarly, best when neatest and most satirical. I sometimes have the feeling, reading Witt, that his insights are too brief to make poems: never dull, he draws me on with astonishing phrases, lines, bright musical figures of sound and rhythm. But I find difficulty when I look for a whole poem to praise. One of the most satisfying in this book was "Public Library." Here we have a series of brief pictures—a sex enthusiast tearing out a plate of a nude "to grace his gruesome room," a lady wanting a book to make her easily rich, a "learned looking man / who finds all books entitled MIND are gone," an "aging chambermaid" futilely searching the want ads, a scholarly type working a crossword. Each is done expertly; the final stanza, then, shows Witt's strengths and faults:

> Shine, innumerable watted, correctly metered
> lights, your messianic radiance like
> the spotlights of expectancy. There might
> emerge among the magazines sometime
> a poet no one will read—that coughing boy
> limping like a hurt stag toward history
> where, behind a pillar, lovers grope
> and foolish schoolgirls shriek our final hope.

This seems crusty with false wit at the same time that it has the movement and, in places, the language of splendid poetry. "Limping like a hurt stag toward history" strikes me as a perfect line, with a limp in it,

subtle modulation of sound, and just the right touch of irony in the word "history" for the context of the poem. But look again at those lights: if they are "innumerable watted" they are not "correctly metered"; if they glow with "messianic radiance" they are in no way like spotlights. And what does the last line mean? It strikes me as a slightly pretentious, meaningless close—an attempt at a grand cadence the ear demands but the mind is not quite up to.

Witt, unlike any poet I have dealt with so far, is tremendously quotable: one can go through picking out exquisite gems: "Chesslike figures, black nuns go / to feed the blackbirds in the snow"; or "Dull as history, relatives arrived / and sat like albums of the seldom kissed"; or "pink instinctive angleworms" or "inadvertent birds" (in a photograph) or "deeper blue on blue, the hills, the endless wind." Most of these phrases are picked from a provocative sonnet sequence, "Memoirs," which recalls childhood, figured with a brother who "belches like a bottle while I butterfly / in the Mozartian gardens of the mind," and who is:

> an egregious god of bodily grace
> a symmetry of sinew, but whose face,
> blank as a snowbank or an executioner's,
> stares neither cruel nor kind, indifferent
> to when cannas bled, where swallows went.

In the family album are "aunts in whose immaculate embrace / also cold cousins were quietly conceived," a snapshot in which "Mom is mentioning, mouth open, what? / We are not ready for immortality?" and across the picture, "Aslant, Dad's shadow, like a crucifix, / darkens a corner of our glossy day." As these quotations attest, Witt is both fertile and sharp. With such talent, he cannot help writing in time much better poems than any he gives us here.

Of the books I read this year, I was most excited by the two I have left to deal with. May Swenson's *A Cage of Spines* is more verdant with imagination and imagery, with indelible observation, with engaging language, than any book I have read in years. There is very little human element in her poetry—and consequently very little emotion beyond the thrill of seeing exactly: but there are exceptions suggesting that other tones are within her range. The poems I would recommend straightway for the anthologies, for example, "The Centaur" and "Death Great Smoothener," are each unlike anything else in the book. "The Centaur" is an amusing, touching memory of stick-horse riding. "Death Great Smoothener" might be dismissed as a trick poem—but it strikes me as not merely clever but deeply felt and thought, building dramatically to an astonishing climax. I would like to quote the whole of it:

Death
great smoothener
maker of order
arrester unraveler sifter and changer
death great hoarder
student stranger drifter traveler
flyer and nester all caught at your border
death
great halter
blackener and frightener
reducer dissolver
seizer and welder of younger with elder
waker with sleeper
death great keeper
of all that must alter
death
great heightener
leaper evolver
great smoothener
great whitener

Like Witt, she is a phrase-maker, a renderer, having an almost oriental fascination with and knack for catching life in its beautiful instants. Her "Water Picture" is an especially oriental poem—a detailed study of the world reflected upside down in a pond until "A swan, with twin necks / forming the figure three"

. . . kisses herself,
and all the scene is troubled:
water-windows splinter,
tree-limbs tangle, the bridge
folds like a fan.

What one misses is content—not that she has none, but that there is so much promise in her art and language that one waits for wisdom. Certainly, with two books to her credit already, May Swenson will emerge as one of the strong poets of the sixties.

Wisdom and art combine like man and wife in the best poems of W. D. Snodgrass, whose first volume, *Heart's Needle*, is clearly a candidate for a National Book Award or Pulitzer Prize—or perhaps just immortality. It is the only book I have read this year in which the hard ribs of sincerity show through. Snodgrass wants us to know what he has learned—with terrible earnestness—and he shapes his poems, almost confessions, with painful beauty. Some are the bright, hard sort done so well

by Shapiro, Jarrell, Ciardi, and other "mid-century" poets—"Ten Days Leave," "Returned to Frisco, 1946," "The Operation," "The Campus On the Hill." In the last of these, however, we hear the truly individual voice—the sudden breaking of all posture into a heart-rending plaint for honesty—which is peculiarly Snodgrass's contribution:

> What shall I say to the young on such a morning?
> Mind is the one salvation?—also grammar?
> No; my little ones lean not toward revolt. They
> are the Whites, the vaguely furious driven, who resist
> Their souls with such passivity
> As would make Quakers swear. All day, dear Lord, all day
> They wear their godhead lightly.

In this poem, as in all his best work, an awareness of the large world ("Aged in wrong, the empires are declining, / And China gathers, soundlessly, like evidence.") bears upon the difficult personal moment; as he puts it in "These Trees Stand . . ."

> While civilizations come down with the curse
> Snodgrass is walking through the universe.

I keep hearing him ask, Who are we kidding? Beneath "the gold and silver in my teeth" I am (he might say) pathetically inadequate to endure the world or celebrate its beauties—but, damn it, if I wipe my glasses on my shirt and look as clearly as I can, something endures, values (like gentleness, loveliness) persist, there is more in me than I thought. So long as I don't delude myself. "April Inventory," an amusing rejuvenation from scholarly fatigue, summarizes most of this.

I want to comment and quote poem after poem, but will have to settle for "A Cardinal," a pastoral narrative about the poet's encounter with a noisy bird. He tromps off to the woods from his "refurbished quonset / where they let me live," searching for a natural horizon, a place to write: "I carry a sacred silence / with me like my smell," but the civilized squeals and roars, the cadence of cadets marching, penetrate the woods:

> the ground bass of our credo—
>
> faith in free enterprise
> and our unselfish forces
> who chant to advertise,
> the ancient pulse of violence.
> Meantime, I fuss with phrases
> or clamp my jaws in silence.

Then he is distracted by an "Old sleek satanic cardinal . . . natural Jesuit" singing a "Hosannah to Appetite": the poet tells the bird,

> sing for the flyboys, birdy,
> in praise of their profession;
> sing for the choirs of pretty
> slogans and catch-phrases
> that rule us by obsession;
> praise what it pays to praise:
>
> praise soap and garbage cans,
> join with the majority
> in praising man-eat-man,
> or praise the young who sell
> their minds to retire at forty.
> With honor.
> Go to hell!

But then the poet recognizes that he has been absurd—"as if I'd ask a bird / to mortify his body." He hears the bird singing from the next ravine and recognizes a truer song, an honest request for "my meals and loving":

> "The world's not done to me;
> it is what I do;
> whom I speak shall be;
> I music out my name
> and what I tell is who
> in all the world I am."

There is courage in being "Selfish, unorthodox," in recognizing that it's "nobody else's world." Assert, assert, and music out your name.

"Heart's Needle" is the title of a sequence addressed to a daughter by an earlier marriage: built on the poignant moments of infrequent reunion, the memories, the awkward visits to zoos and museums, the torture of necessary discipline, the little-hand, big-hand love, so one-sided in understanding, so impossible to protect, so difficult to assert against the world. "I don't know the answers," "I cannot fight / or let you go."

> If I loved you, they said, I'd leave
> and find my own affairs.
> Well, once again this April, we've
> come around to the bears;
>
> punished and cared for, behind bars,
> the coons on bread and water
> stretch thin black fingers after ours.
> And you are still my daughter.

Snodgrass has a remarkable way of rolling natural details into a gentle symbolism, to restate, on the level of bears and bars and coon fingers, the underlying emotion of the actual relationship:

> I lift you on your swing and must
> shove you away,
> see you return again,
> drive you off again, then
>
> stand quiet till you come.

He never affronts us with ingenuity; invariably shares his wisdom simply, as, indeed, for a daughter who won't, at best, quite understand or be impressed.

A half dozen poems (e.g. "Orpheus") don't work for me; sometimes he tries a kind of poem which demands, I think, someone else's voice—and gets tangled. (For example, in "Papageno" an elaborate simile of caging birds gets twisted unaccountably in the last lines, the cager becoming the caged. I find it merely confusing.) But his own voice is clear, personal, and compelling when he discovers it, holds it. I hope it is an influential voice in the sixties.

—JUDSON JEROME

Now available in a paperback edition

John Dewey's ART AS EXPERIENCE

The most distinguished work ever written by an American on the formal structures and characteristics of all the arts: architecture, sculpture, painting, music and literature.

A PUTNAM CAPRICORN BOOK

$1.35, paperbound, at all bookstores

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
New York 16

SEEKING A PUBLISHER?

It is no secret that publication is regarded as the foundation stone of a scholar's career. To gain recognition and advancement, the scholar has no choice but to seek publication.

Under our special academic imprint, **Exposition University Books,** we offer you a complete publication service.

Your inquiries and manuscripts are invited. An editorial report will be furnished promptly without obligation.

FREE: Two fact-filled, illustrated brochures reveal the behind-the-scenes story of subsidy publishing, describe our 40% royalty plan on first editions, and present a breakdown of contract terms and typical costs. **Please write to Arthur Rhodes, Editorial Department.**

EXPOSITION PRESS
386 Fourth Ave., New York 16, N.Y.

UNIVERSITY OF Chicago PRESS

John Dewey's

THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM

and

THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY

The spirit of John Dewey's "effort of thought" in education is needed now more than ever to make sense of the noisy opinions on methods and goals. His revolutionary emphasis was child-centered education: the child reaches out toward learning with the motivating and assimilating power of his own imagination; the teacher, in the Socratic sense, plays midwife to the child's own ideas. How was this concept corrupted into an attitude of meaningless indulgence? Dewey himself foresaw the danger of the child's present powers and interests being regarded as something finally significant in themselves. In a world of changing values, his emphasis on personal responsibility has much to offer.

A Phoenix Book (P3), $1.25

Other Dewey titles

THE RELATION OF THEORY TO PRACTICE IN THE EDUCATION OF TEACHERS

by John Dewey, Sarah C. Brooks, F. M. McMurry, and others.

64 pages, paper, $0.53

THE THEORY OF VALUATION

by John Dewey, Volume II, Number 4, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.

67 pages, paper, $1.25

Through your bookseller

UNIVERSITY OF Chicago PRESS

5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois

IN CANADA: *The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Ontario*

An illuminating examination of John Dewey's major lines of thought and their impact on American society

JOHN DEWEY IN PERSPECTIVE

By GEORGE R. GEIGER

"Clear-visioned, luminous, thoroughly informed exposition of John Dewey's philosophy."—MAX C. OTTO

"Pinpoints the misunderstandings that have grown up about the philosophy of one of the titans in educational and social thinking . . . warmly sympathetic and eminently readable interpretation of Dewey's thought . . . shows how grossly Dewey's philosophic ideas are frequently misrepresented, how baseless are the accusations that Dewey's educational ideals are the root of our educational failures, and how intimately the prospect for a humane technological civilization is dependent on the cultivation of the scientific temper of mind for which Dewey was a crusader . . . Dr. Geiger succeeds in making clear that despite their familiarity the fundamental ideas of Dewey's philosophy are still vital and challenging, and are still relevant to the problems confronting our age."—**Saturday Review**

"A sympathetic study of Dewey's ideas, with the aim of rehabilitating his reputation at a time when, Professor Geiger says, 'almost every fundamental part of his philosophy seems also to have been misperceived.' "—**The New Yorker**

$5.50 at all bookstores

Oxford University Press

QUA

XU